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The 2007-2009 financial meltdown reflected the failure of the regulators to 
address financial fragility and it has clearly showed that regulating banks on an 
individual basis was an ineffective approach to prevent financial crises. Before the 
crisis, financial regulation was primarily focused on managing the risk of 
individual banks by requiring them to keep sufficient reserves to safeguard 
themselves from the inherent risk of their own investments. Since they ignored 
the risks that are generated by links between the banks, i.e. interbank borrowing 
and lending, a failure in a small number of banks could spread to other banks, and 
cause the paralysis of the whole banking system. Therefore, there is the need to 
give special emphasis to systemic risk, rather than consider the risk at an 
individual level. From an academic research point of view, the 2007-2009 financial 
crisis renewed the interest in finding new ways of studying financial systems. 
More specifically, since then new modelling frameworks have been proposed that 
incorporate the interconnected nature of the banking system. Network models 
have been used to investigate the stability of the banking system under different ǡ ǤǤ  ǯ   connectivity. This thesis proposes a new 
dynamic network model based on ordinary differential equations, which 
represents the banking system and seeks to interface the network model 
approach with control engineering. Control theory is an interdisciplinary branch of 
engineering, which is used to study the behaviour of dynamical systems, and how their 
behaviour can be modified by feedback mechanisms to achieve a desirable 
performance. In this work control theory is applied for the first time to analyse a 
model of the banking system and to propose feedback mechanisms, which 
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1.1 Background and motivation 
The financial crisis that occurred in 2007-2009 has driven financial regulators (e.g. 
central banks) and researchers to revisit ways to understand and regulate the banking 
system [1Ȃ4]. Traditionally, financial regulation was primarily focused on managing 
the risk of individual banks by requiring them to keep sufficient reserves to safeguard 
themselves from the inherent risk of their own investments. Since the systemic risks 
due to links between the banks (e.g. interbank borrowing and lending) are ignored, a 
failure in a small number of banks can spread to other banks, and cause the paralysis 
of the whole banking system. Thus, it has been understood that to improve financial 
stability through regulation, more attention should be given to systemic risk [5], 
rather than only to individual institutions [6-8]. The necessity for managing systemic 
risk has persuaded financial operators to think about new regulatory approaches that 
recognize the interconnected nature of the banking system. 
The motivation of this thesis is to try to find new ways to model and analysis the 
dynamics of the banking system. The network model proposed in this thesis is based 
on ordinary differential equations and it incorporates the interconnected nature of the 
system; the model also facilitates the application of engineering control theory, which 
can suggest ways to reduce the occurrence of systemic failure. This thesis presents a 
novel and interdisciplinary research at the interface between economics and control 
engineering, which aims to provide tools to better understand ǯ
dynamics and the corresponding systemic risk. 
A network is widely understood as a collection of nodes connected by links. Systems 
taking the form of networks abound in the world, such as the Internet, social networks, 
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and biological networks. Researchers have developed a variety of techniques and 
models to help us understand and predict the behaviour of these systems [9]. Network 
models have been applied in different areas such as the Internet, epidemiology, 
ecosystems and financial markets [10]. The banking system exhibits a high degree of 
interdependence, with connections between different banks stemming from both the 
asset and the liability sides of their balance sheets. As such, the banking system can be 
modelled as a network where nodes are individual banks and edges are the loans 
between any two banks. The 2007-2009 financial crisis has drawn a sharply increase 
in the academic research which has used network models to study financial systems 
and to propose ways to preserve financial stability [11Ȃ14]. To the best of our 
knowledge, no research work in the literature has proposed network models of the 
banking system based on ordinary differential equations, and importantly, none of 
them has applied engineering control theory on their models.    
Control theory is an interdisciplinary field of applied mathematics and engineering 
[15], a major application of which is in the engineering discipline known as control 
engineering, which deals with the design of control systems for industry. ǲǳbehaviour of the system in order to achieve a desired 
goal. Feedback is a key concept in control theory, and a feedback process is the one in 
which the state of the system determines the way the control has to be exerted at any 
time. Nowadays, as the understanding of the dynamics of business, social, and political 
systems increases, control engineering is not limited to only engineering discipline but 
is equally applicable to these systems. As the general theory of feedback systems, 
control theory is useful wherever feedback occurs [16]. Therefore, in this thesis, we 
propose to apply control theory to a model of the banking system, with the aim to 
study its stability and try to control it around equilibrium.  
This thesis develops a new dynamical network model, in which the banking system is 
represented as a network where the nodes are individual banks and the links between 
any two banks consist of interbank loans and borrowing. The dynamic structure of the 
model is represented as a set of ordinary differential equations consisting of balance 
sheet dynamics. This dynamic structure not only allows us to analyse systemic risk but 
also to incorporate an analysis of control mechanisms.  
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This thesis also provides details of the implementation of the dynamic network model 
in MATLAB Simulink, which is a powerful tool for simulating and analysing efficiently 
the solutions of complicated systems modelled with differential equations; moreover, 
Simulink is widely used in control theory for simulation and design.  In the simulations 
performed in this thesis, shocks are introduced into the system via deposit 
fluctuations of the banks in the system. In order to study the stability of the banking 
system, the number of survival banks at the end of the simulation period is calculated 
and compared in different scenarios characterised by different values for the rate of 
connectivityǡǡǯ
size. In this work, a measure of contagion is also proposed to study how the failure of 
a bank can affect the failure of other banks under different scenarios; this thesis shows 
interesting nonlinear effects on contagion due to the rate of connectivity and reserve 
ratio. 
This thesis presents also for the first time the application of control mechanisms on 
the model of the banking system. Classical control theory is used to study the stability 
of a system and subsequently an output feedback control is designed to improve the 
stability of the system. In order to achieve this, an equilibrium point analysis is 
performed on the mathematical model representing the system, to gain an insight of 
how different parameter values affect the modelǯs stability. Proper control 
mechanisms are designed according to the different system dynamics to achieve 
desired objectives. This work proposes feedback mechanisms in which single banks 
sell their assets to avoid failure; the novelty of the proposed approach is to sell assets 
according to rigorous control laws, which allow the bank to regain and maintain a 
stable condition. 
1.2 Contributions 
This thesis contributes to the knowledge and research in both network models and 
control theory applied to the banking system. The novelty of the approach consists in 
developing a model of the banking system based on differential equations and in 
applying control analysis to study its stability.  
The thesis contributes the following three main results: 
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1. Development of a dynamical network model of the banking system: a new 
dynamic model based on a system of ordinary differential equations is developed to 
describe the banking system as a network where the nodes are the individual banks. 
This model has been used to study how different parameters (e.g. reserve ratio, ǡǯ) affect the stability of the banking system. In particular, this 
work has found interesting nonlinear effects of the reserve ratio and connectivity on 
the spread of failure within the banking system.  
2. Development of Simulink block diagrams of the dynamic network model: the 
proposed dynamical network model is implemented in the simulation environment 
MATLAB Simulink which simulates and analyses dynamical systems. Simulink was 
chosen because of its block structure, which allows adding complexity to the system 
in a visual and modular way; moreover, it facilitates the application of control analysis, 
given that Simulink is the software mostly used by the control theory community. 
3. Application of control theory analysis: Control theory is applied for the first time 
to assess and to preserve the stability of the proposed dynamic model representing 
the banking system. Output feedback control mechanisms are designed in which single 
banks sell their assets to prevent bankruptcy; the novelty of the approach presented 
in this thesis lies in the way banks sell their assets; the sale of assets is prescribed by 
specific control mechanisms, which allow the bank to resume and maintain a stable 
condition. 
 
The work in this thesis has produced the following articles and presentations: 
Papers 
x 21st International Conference on Computing in Economics and Finance 
June 20-22, 2015, Taipei, Taiwan 
Paper entitle: A dynamic network model of banking system stability 
x 5th International Conference of the Financial Engineering and Banking Society  
June 11- 13, 2015, Nantes, France 
Paper entitle: Study of banking system stability using differential equations 
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This paper received the Best Paper Award, offered by LabEx ReFi - a European 
research facility dedicated to the evaluation of financial policies regulation. More 
than 240 papers were submitted to the conference. 
x ǣǯ 
This paper is in preparation for the Journal of Financial Stability 
Talks/Presentations  
x Presentation at the Research Group Seminar 2013. 
x Poster presented at the Postgraduate Research Festival at the University of Kent 
2013. 
x Presentation at the 3rd School of Engineering and Digital Arts Research 
Conference on January 2014.  
x Presentation at the Research Group Seminar 2014 at University of Kent 
x Presentation at the 4th School of Engineering and Digital Arts Research 
Conference on January 2016.  
Courses Attended 
x 2014 Summer Workshop Banking Stability: Lessons from the Global Financial 
Crisis 2 July 2014 in London. 
 
1.3 Organization of the thesis 
The thesis is structured as follows: 
Chapter 2 provides a summary of the existing literature on the study of stability of the 
banking system. An introduction to financial systems is provided and work on how 
financial crises occur and spread within the banking system are reviewed. Next, the 
chapter introduces some network models developed by academic researchers to 
describe the banking system and assess the systemic risk within it. The chapter also 
introduces the control theory as well as the existing work in the literature that applies 
control theory to financial problems.  
Chapter 3 introduces the dynamic network model of the banking system which has 
been developed in this Ph.D. project. The banking system is represented as a network 
where nodes are individual banks and the links between any two banks consist of 
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interbank loans and borrowing; the dynamic nature of the system is prescribed by a 
set of ordinary differential equations representing the balance sheet dynamics of the 
banks. The dynamic model is presented in the chapter step by step, from a one-bank 
model to a two-bank model and finally to a multi-bank model.  
Chapter 4 presents the numerical simulation results of the dynamical network model 
which is introduced in Chapter 3. These results are generated using MATLAB Simulink; 
details of the implementation are provided in the first subsection in this chapter, 
followed by three subsections that show the numerical simulation results of the one-
bank model, the two-bank model and the multi-bank model respectively.  
Chapter 5 presents the details of the application and analysis of control mechanisms 
on the one-bank model. Classical control theory is used to study the stability of the 
dynamic model and subsequently output feedback control is designed to improve the 
stability of the model.  












This chapter provides a summary of the existing literature related to this Ph.D. project. 
Due to the interdisciplinarity of the topic, the literature is reviewed from three 
perspectives. Firstly, a general overview of financial crises and contagion is provided. 
Secondly, network models are introduced. Finally, control theory is introduced and 
discussed. This chapter is organised as follows: Section 2.1 presents an introduction 
of financial systems and the contagion that characterised the 2007-2009 financial 
crisis. This section reviews the function of financial systems and the way the financial 
crisis evolved in a systemic risk crisis, which shows how the interconnections within 
financial systems facilitate risk sharing but also are the vehicle for transmission of the 
systemic risk; thus studying the role of the interconnectedness within financial 
systems is therefore becoming more and more important. Section 2.2 reviews the 
literature about network models which focus on studying financial contagion within 
the banking systems and how the network structure of the banking system affects and 
responds to crisis. Section 2.2 shows that the network model can be instrumental in 
capturing and analysing systemic risk. Section 2.3 introduces the concept of feedback 
in control engineering and reviews some of its applications to economic issues, which 
show that the feedback control can be a possible tool to analyse and control the 
stability of the banking system. Finally, Section 2.4 concludes the chapter. 
2.1 Financial systems and contagion 
The following subsection 2.1.1 introduces some general concepts about financial 
systems and then describes, specifically, how the banking system works; this helps in 
building the foundations for developing the structure of the dynamic model proposed 
in this project. Subsection 2.1.2 reports some historical examples of financial crises 
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and the concept of systemic risk to illustrate contagion mechanisms that acted in the 
banking system. Those historical examples provide ideas on how to interrogate the 
proposed model.  
2.1.1 Financial systems 
A financial system can be described as a structural interconnected network of financial 
markets, financial intermediaries and financial instruments [17]. The key role of the 
financial system is to channel the funds from units who have surplus of funds (called 
lender-savers e.g. household) to units who have a shortage of funds (called borrower-
savers e.g. firms and government) [18]. Well-functioning financial systems can 
improve the efficiency of the circulation of funds in the economy and help the economy 
growing sustainably and stably [19, 20].  
Figure 2.1 schematically shows how the funds are channelled. The lender-savers are 
shown at the left of figure 2.1 and the borrower-savers are shown at the right. Funds 
can be transferred through two routes. One is the direct route (the route at the bottom 
of figure 2.1), in which the borrowers borrow funds directly from lenders in financial 
markets by selling lenders financial instruments. Financial instruments (which can 
also be called securities) are monetary contracts between parties that can be traded 
in the financial market [21]Ǥǯ
or assets. Financial instruments can be treated as assets for the person who buys them, 
but as liabilities for the individual or firm that sells (issues) them [22].For example, if 
a firm need to borrow funds to expand its business, it might borrow the funds from 
 
Figure 2.1 Direct and indirect route of funds flow from lender-savers to borrower-savers 
in a financial system [23]. 
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households by selling them a bond which is a debt security that promises to make non-
contingent payments to the households periodically for a specified period of time; or 
by selling a stock which is a security that entitles the households to a share of the ǯȋ
world). 
Another route to transfer funds is the indirect route (at the top of figure 2.1) in which 
funds are transferred through financial intermediaries. Financial intermediaries are 
institutions who specialise in the activities of buying and selling financial instruments 
(i.e. bonds and stocks) in order to help individuals and firms to transfer funds. These 
institutions include banks (which is the major component) as well as other institutions 
such as building societies, credit unions, insurance companies and so on; these 
institutions may be named differently in different countries. In the United Kingdom, 
these institutions form the banking system which mainly comprises commercial banks, 
investment banks and building societies. They provide different types of services 
shown as follows.  
A commercial bank attracts deposits by paying the depositors interest and then lends 
those deposits out to individuals and firms with a charge that is greater than the 
interest the bank pays to the depositors. In this way, the bank can not only earn profits 
to support its activities but also, more importantly, facilitate the transfer of resources 
to places where it is needed. An investment bank helps governments or firms raise 
financial capital by issuing securities [23]. First, it advises the firms on which type of 
securities to issue (stocks or bonds); then it helps sell (also called underwrite) the 
securities by purchasing them from the firms at a predetermined price and reselling 
them in the market. The investment bank then bears the risk that they are not able to 
resell the entire issue in which case it will hold the unsold securities by itself. In return 
for managing this risk, the investment company receives an underwriting fee from the 
issuing firms. Investment banks also act as deal makers and earn enormous fees by 
helping firms acquire other firms through mergers or acquisitions. In the UK, banks 
are allowed to engage in both commercial banking and investment banking, and such 
banks are called universal banks1. A building society is a financial institution that was 
                                                             
1  	    ȋ Ǯ ǯȌ      ǣ
Barclays, Royal Bank of Scotland (RBS), HSBC, and Lloyds. They are essentially universal banks 
as they also help firms to issue securities. 
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originally constrained in their activities to provide residential mortgage loan (which 
will be introduced later) to individuals by acquiring funds primarily through deposits 
[23]. Over time, these restrictions have been loosened so that they expand their 
activities into traditional banking; as a result, the distinction between building 
societies and commercial banks has blurred and building societies are now 
competitors of the universal banks. 
Not only the households and firms lend or borrow funds through financial market, 
financial institutions such as banks also lend or borrow funds in the financial market 
shown in figure 2.1. The market in which banks exchange short-term loans to one 
another is called interbank market [24]. Sometimes a commercial bank cannot meet 
the reserve ratio set by the central bank, while other commercial banks have excess 
cash above the reserve requirement. These banks will lend money in the interbank 
market, receiving interest from the borrowing bank. Most interbank loans have 
maturities of one week or less; the majority being overnight. The rate of interest 
charged on the loans between banks is called interbank rate. The published interbank 
rate in the UK is the LIBOR (London Inter Bank Offered Rate) [25], which is the average 
of interest rates estimated by each of the leading banks in London.  
Given the functions of the financial market and financial intermediates, the banks exist 
because of asymmetric information in financial markets [26]. Banks specialise in 
monitoring and screening the information, which gives them a comparative advantage 
in helping individuals to reduce the transaction costs; this allows small savers and 
borrowers to benefit from the existence of financial markets. Moreover, banks can 
help agents when they need liquidity. As explained by Diamond and Dybvig [27], in 
fact, banks are institutions that facilitate risk sharing, by pooling deposits from a large 
customer base and using these in a diversified portfolio of investment projects. 
Importantly, deposits are liquid, in the sense that they can be easily withdrawn. 
Because consumption needs are uncertain, customers prefer liquid deposits instead of 
directly financing businesses. Business investment projects are illiquid, because they 
cannot be withdrawn at any point without a loss. Banks thus transform illiquid 
investment opportunities into liquid deposits that provide insurance against 
unexpected future events.  
Moreover, risk-transfer between banks also has strong economic motivation since 
banks seek to transfer risk as part of their day-to-day business. For example, two 
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banks might have, respectively, surplus and deficit liquidity; these banks might agree 
an unsecured loan or a repurchase agreement. These interbank activities cause a 
series of bilateral transactions, through which banks are highly interconnected. 
Interbank market facilitates a growing volume of bilateral transactions, as individual 
banks constantly optimise their own risk exposures, but at the same time, it provides 
more channels for default to spread. The next section reviews the contagion of defaults 
in the banking system. 
2.1.2 Financial crisis and contagion 
In normal times, banking systems can help the economic growth by funding 
investment opportunities and to reduce volatility in the financial markets by 
facilitating risk sharing. However, during financial crises, the banking system itself can 
become a vehicle for amplifying and spread financial shocks [28]. The 2007-2009 
financial crisis showed the fragility of the banking system and its origins were many 
and varied; one of the most important was the underestimation of the true aggregate   ǯ   Ǥ    subsections, the subprime 
mortgage crisis which contributes to the crisis of 2007-2009 is introduced in more 
detail.  
The subprime mortgage crisis 
The immediate cause of the crisis in 2007-2009 was the large portion of the increased 
mortgage loan defaults which are     Ǯ-ǯ  [29]. 
Traditionally, banks provided loans to people for house purchase via mortgages, as 
shown in figure 2.2.  
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Figure 2.2 Funding chain showing the funding flow from the household savers to 
households who obtain a mortgage to buy a house. The arrows indicate the direction of 
payments due. 
Since house prices were increasing before the crisis, such mortgage loans were 
thought to be secured against saleable real-estate and can make good profits for the 




a higher price to other banks and financial institutions through derivatives. Thus many 
derivatives were generated to trade the mortgage loans; one example is the mortgage-
backed security, which is secured by a mortgage or collection of mortgages.  
Figure 2.3 shows one possible funding chain (adapted from Glasserman and Young 
[30]) representing how the mortgage-backed security is generated and traded in the 
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Figure 2.3 Funding chain showing the funding flow from the ultimate creditors 
(household savers) to the ultimate debtors (households who obtain a mortgage to buy a 
house). The arrows indicate the direction of payments due, funding flows clockwise 
through the chain. Adapt from Glasserman and Young [30]  and Shin 2010 [31]. 
Starting from the left side of figure 2.3, households that want to buy houses take on 
mortgage debts from banks or financial institutions (called mortgage-backed 
securities issuer). This kind of banks or institutions issue and sell the mortgage-
backed securities to securities dealers (usually these are investment banks) in order 
to get funding for the household. The dealers (investment banks) then pledge the 
securities as collateral to borrow from commercial banks to get funding for the 
mortgage-backed securities issuer. Commercial banks fund themselves by taking 
deposits from household savers. Before the financial crisis, banks generated huge 
profits by selling the mortgage-backed securities at a higher price to the next buyer in 
the chain. Therefore, the banks decided to expand their lending by making easy access 
loans (sub-prime mortgages) for borrowers who have a poor credit record. In this way, 
banks attracted more mortgage loans to issue more mortgage-backed securities. 
However, this lending expansion generated high risk. At each step in the chain, there 
is a potential loss of information about the quality of the underlying debt. Banks 
increase their lending to households with poor credits while the supply of real assets 
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from the household savers remains relatively fixed. From the perspective of an 
individual bank, the risk from the households to default was sold together with the 
mortgage-backed securities to the next bank or financial institution in the chain. As a 
resulǡǯ
banking system remained the same. This is because the total value of assets multiplied, 
whilst the collateral backing these securities remained relatively fixed. This collateral 
scarcity increased the risk of a sudden house price drop and consequent mortgage 
defaults. Ultimately, a large portion of the mortgage loan and mortgage-backed 
securities holders (banks) defaulted because of the poor credit of the borrowers 
(householders).  
As shown in figure 2.3, defaults in mortgage loans can affect commercial banks 
through the chain. Defaults in mortgage loan repayments can cause significant losses 
in the commercial banksǯ s that can drive the banks to fail. The idiosyncratic 
default of a bank on its interbank liabilities can spread and cause losses among other 
banks. The losses in other banks may result in further defaults. Besides the direct loss 
caused by the repayment defaults of the household, the value of the mortgage-backed 
securities decreases and the interbank interest rate increases. These changes in the 
prices affect the banksǯ  to allocate resources. The banks may change the 
composition of their assets and liabilities in response to economic stress, in order to 
safeguard themselves from the losses due to stress. For example, to secure its own 
assets from loss, banks may cut lending in the interbank market, but this may result in ǯing 
cutting in the interbank market. This is known as liquidity hoarding. Due to liquidity 
hoarding, the bank may face liquidity shortage. To pay its obligations a bank may sell 
its illiquid assets at heavily discounted prices, which is known as fire sales. This causes 
the decrease in asset prices and mark-to-market losses (a loss generated through an 
accounting entry rather than the actual sale of a security) for other banks which hold 
the same assets; the affected banks may face a liquidity shortage due to the mark-to-
market losses and need to sell their illiquid assets to pay their obligations, which cause 
further decrease in asset prices. Finally, a bank may default due to the big loss in its 
assets.  It can bǯ behavioural responses might be rational and 
favourable for the individual bank, but together they increase the instability of the 
banking system and therefore they may trigger and amplify systemic crises. The 
banking system as a whole becomes distressed and unable to perform its 
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intermediation and insurance functions. In this scenario, the risk generated in an 
individual bank can be amplified through the connectivity between banks thus to 
become systemic risk. Next section presents relevant literature, which focuses on the 
use of network models to study how the banking systemǯis affected by the 
structure of its interconnection and ǯ dynamical behaviours (such as liquidity 
hoarding, fire sale or both2). 
This thesis mainly focuses on the commercial activities of the banks and, specifically, 
on their interbank borrowing and lending.  The dynamic model developed in this Ph.D. 
project describes a banking system rather than the entire financial system; the model 
contains only banks in it and the links between the banks are formed of interbank 
borrowing and lending. The behaviour of depositors is implemented in a simplistic 
manner in our model by using a stochastic signal which represents the amount of 
money deposited into or withdrawn from a bank at a given time. The financial markets, 
as well, are modelled in a simplistic manner by a stochastic signal called investment 
opportunity that provides the amount of money that a bank can invest in a given time 
(see Chapter 3 for details).  
 
2.2 Network models of the banking system  
The complexity and the instability characterising financial systems played a significant 
role in the 2007-2009 financial crisis; the recent focus on macro-prudential 
regulation3 is a direct response to the inherent instability of the complex financial 
systems. New analytical methods for studying the effect of the interconnectedness in 
financial systems have been developed by academics [39]. This thesis is focused 
specifically on network model analysis; existing work using network models to study 
financial systemic risk is quite diverse and also fast-growing [40]. Two seminal papers 
by Allen and Gale [41] and Freixas et al. [42] evaluate the potential for contagion 
following a common or idiosyncratic liquidity or solvency shock, showing that to be 
able to assess systemic stability, it is important to understand ǯ
structure. This section presents the literature that mainly focuses on studying the 
                                                             
2 ǤǤǯǡ
appropriate redefinition of the equations can be introduced to account for this behaviour. 
3 There is a rich literature about the macro-prudential regulation. See [32-38] for details. 
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systemic risk on the interbank market4. Papers on this topic usually carry out the 
network model analysis using one of the following two distinct approaches; the first 
approach is called static network analysis and the second approach is called dynamic 
network analysis [43]. Static network analysis uses topological indicators to describe 
the network structure (i.e. degree, strength, density); this kind of analysis does not 
include a mechanism by which shocks are transmitted. For this reason, it is referred 
to as static network analysis and papers that used this analysis are introduced in 
subsection 2.2.1. The second approach, introduced in subsection 2.2.2, focuses, instead, 
on modelling how different network structures react to shocks, in order to identify the 
key factors that affect the resilience of the network. This approach usually involves a 
dynamic simulation to model how the default spread in the network, thus it referred 
as dynamic network analysis. 
2.2.1 Static network analysis 
The topology of a network affects its functionality and stability, therefore general-
network-theory methods [44] can be applied to analysis the network representing a 
financial system. The stability of the interbank market is important for the proper 
functioning of modern financial systems and the market structure may play an 
important role in determining the risk of contagion; by studying the network metrics, 
the information about the stability of the network structure can be gained which helps 
analysts to identify central nodes which are more likely to propagate shocks. 
One line of the static network research falls in capturing and analysing the 
interconnectedness in the interbank market based on empirical data. Some common 
network metrics such as degree, strength, density, centrality and clustering can be 
used to analyse the interbank market, which helps to identify the characteristics of the 
interbank markets. The findings show that the network of interbank market has the 
complex characteristics of small-world network and scale-free network5  [45]; this 
means there are often a small number of highly connected large nodes(banks) in the 
                                                             
4 Network models are also widely used to study the different kinds of risks (such as credit risk, 
systemic risk and liquidity risk) on different financial market (such as banking market, 
interbank market and CDS market), see the paper [14] for a review. 
5 A small-world network is a network in which most nodes are not neighbours of one another, 
but the neighbours of any given node are likely to be neighbours of each other and most nodes 
can be reached from every other node by a small number of hops or steps. A scale-free network 
is a network whose degree distribution follows a power law [44]. 
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network (interbank market) that connect to a large number of small nodes with few 
links. Therefore, the networks of the interbank marke   Ǯ-ǯ
structure for most countries [46-51]6 as well as for global financial networks[52]. The Ǯ-ǯǡ
and a periphery, the core forming a fully connected clique, whereas peripheral banks 
are only connected to the core. The cores of the networks, composed of the most 
connected banks, are often much more important than nodes in the periphery. Due to 
the difference in the nature of transactions in the banking system, different markets 
can have different topological properties [53]. The topological analysis in [54] shows 
that the structure of the Danish money market is different from the structure of the 
payments network and the banks in the core of the money market are of more equal 
size. Langfield et al. [55] find that the strength of the core-periphery structure varies 
significantly by asset class in the UK interbank market: the observed interbank 
network fits the core-periphery model more strongly for derivatives and marketable 
securities than for unsecured lending and repurchase agreements. 
The other line of the static network analysis focuses on looking into the changes in the 
network topology of the financial system over the last decades [56-59]and also the 
changes due to financial crises, to study the effects of crises on dynamic link formation. 
Some studies focused on one-country cases and they found that the core-periphery 
structure tends to be stable over time but the number of core banks and the aggregate 
level of interbank activity may vary over time. Puhr et al. [58] show that financial 
crises decreased the network density between 2008 and 2010, with central nodes 
becoming more important. While in the studies by Fricke and Lux [59], core banks 
tend to rely on the liquidity of periphery banks during crises, whereas in normal times 
they tend to be net providers of liquidity to the system. Studies on global financial 
system find that structure of global banking networks varies over time. They become 
more connected [52, 60, 61] and respond to economic and financial shocks. Kubelec 
and Sá [52] show that there has been a remarkable increase in interconnectivity over 
the past two decades; financial links have become larger and more frequent and 
countries have become more open. Minoiu and Reyes [62] show that the 2007Ȃ2009 
global financial crisis stands out as an unusually large perturbation to the cross-border 
banking network. Connectivity tends to fall during and after systemic banking crises 
                                                             
6 [51] analyses the network structure of CDS market. 
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and sovereign debt crises. Hale [63] also finds that the global financial crisis of 2007Ȃ
2009 had a large negative impact on the formation of new relationships in the global 
banking network, especially for large banks, which were previously immune to effects 
of banking crises and recessions. A recent study by Minoiu [64] shows that financial 
interconnectedness has early warning potential, especially for the 2007-2010 wave of 
systemic banking crisis. 
A third line of the research draws in the research work which developed algorisms to 
identify different interbank activities, such as the transactions of interbank loans on 
overnight market [65] or with maturities of up to 1 year [66, 67], the presence of 
intraday lead-lag relationships between financial assets [68], and the presence of 
lending relationships [69] and preferential trading [70] in interbank market. These 
works uncover some characteristics of the interbank network structure which can 
help to give a better understanding of the dynamics of the interbank market.   
The existing static network analysis considers the overall structure of the network. 
The results contribute to the study on systemic risk in the interbank market, which 
also provides a stronger basis for the assessment of contagion risk using dynamical 
simulations [40]. 
2.2.2 Dynamic network analysis 
Computational techniques have been adopted on network analysis to assess the 
possible extent of contagion via interbank liabilities, which refers to the dynamic 
network analysis. This often involves computer simulation that is used to explore the 
resilience of a network in certain stress scenarios. The literature regarding network 
models with dynamic network analysis can be reviewed following three strands. 
1. The first strand of the dynamic network analysis is to evaluate the resilience of the 
network to different shocks based on real interbank data. First, the network 
structure is constructed using the real data ǯ. Then an 
external shock is applied to this constructed network, which propagates through 
the system affecting the balance sheets of individual institutions, thus the 
contagion effects caused by one or more bank bankruptcy can be studied. These 
studies [71-76] generally found that significant contagion effects are potential but 
a substantial weakening of the whole banking sector is unlikely to happen. Due to 
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the difficulty in obtaining the balance sheet data between banks, a maximum 
entropy method has been used in many works [77- 80] to make an estimation of 
bank assets and liabilities positions. However, maximum entropy approach is 
found to overrate the scope for contagion in the work by Mistrulli [81]. Anand et 
al. [82] propose an efficient alternative that combines maximum entropy with a 
minimum-density solution to define a useful range that bounds the cost of 
contagion in the true interbank network when counterparty exposures are 
unknown. 
2. The second strand of the research focuses on modelling and studying the different 
kinds of contagion propagation mechanisms, which usually consists of two steps: 
firstly, develop a mathematical model of the banking system; these dynamic 
models use mathematical equations to describe contagion mechanisms between 
banks. Secondly, parameters values and initial conditions are used to run 
simulations of the model, which are derived from real data collected from the ǯǤata used should 
exhibit scenarios that represent the banking system under stress (such as default 
on liabilities or falls in asset price). Then the behaviour of the networks is 
investigated to understand the different kinds of propagation mechanisms under 
different types of applied shocks. The shock used in the simulations can be a 
systemic shock that affects all the banks in the system or just an idiosyncratic one 
that affects one single bank. Further, the resilience of the network can be 
investigated too. Two types of shock propagation are usually studied: mechanical 
propagation and behavioural dynamics, which are described as follows. 
Mechanical propagation 
As introduced in subsection 2.1.2, with this type of propagation mechanism the 
bank does not take behavioural reactions (e.g. liquidity hoarding and fire sale), 
when there is a shock, instead it changes its balance sheet according to the loss. ǯ
banks. The default spreads through interbank loans. Studies focusing on this 
propagation mechanism usually run simulations with different network 
structures with different bank sizes, connectivity and concentration, and 
ultimately they study how the network structure affects the system stability. Georg 
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[83] shows that money-centre networks (where a small number of large banks is 
very highly interconnected and a large number of banks is very little 
interconnected) are typically more stable than random networks. Sachs [84], by 
contrast, finds that a money centre model with asset concentration among core 
banks is less stable than a random graph with banks of homogeneous size.  
Robust-yet-fragile characteristic of the banking system has been investigated [12]. 
Battiston et al. [85] study how network density (the number of connecting links) 
relates to systemic risk in a model of the economy as a credit network (in which 
nodes represent agents and links represent credit relationships); they found that 
connections between banks improve risk sharing, but connectivity also leads to 
trend reinforcement. When an economic agent suffers a negative shock, trade 
partners react by making conditions even worse. Studies in the literature found 
that contagion stemming through mechanical propagation has a limited effect [72, 
75]ǡ       ǯ behavioural dynamics (e.g. liquidity 
hoarding and fire sale) is more important than the direct solvency contagion. The 
likelihood of contagion through mechanical propagation is very small due to the 
robust properties of financial networks.  
Behavioural dynamics 
As introduced in subsection 2.1.2, banks will show behavioural dynamics if the 
economy is under stress, which includes liquidity hoarding and fire sales7. The 
following subsection explains these phenomena in more detail. 
Liquidity hoarding: this happens when a shock appears in the banking system and 
the subsequent credit losses in banks may weaken investor confidence, resulting 
in a general reduction in the bank funding supply. Then the banks prefer to hold 
its liquidity rather than invest or lend to other banks, therefore this results in 
liquidity hoarding within the network.  Studies on liquidity hoarding based on 
network models mainly focus on two phenomena, the first one is the general 
reduction in the bank funding supply [86,  87]. The other phenomenon is how 
banks cut lending in the interbank market within the network; banks may 
withdraw lending from a specific infected bank or run on all banks 




indiscriminately [88] or banks may cut lending according to their own health and 
confidence in the system [89] and withdrawing deposits held at other banks [90]. 
The general conclusion from these studies is that liquidity is very important for 
systemic stability; it can impose a negative externality on the entire financial 
system and amplify other sources of risk. The model in our work assumes that a 
bank lends money depending on its own health and the health of the borrowing 
bank.  
Fire sales: Fire sales happen when banks face liquidity shortage, forcing them to ǯǤ-to-
market losses result on other banks which hold the same assets.  Papers are 
written by Plantin et al. [91]and Allen and Carletti [92] discussed the potentially 
destabilizing effects of mark-to-market accounting; these reactions may have 
repercussions on other financial institutions and to some extent exacerbate 
contagion. Fire sales cannot only happen in the course of liquidation or resolution 
after a bank default [69, 87, 89], but also happen as a defensive action in a bid to 
prevent or defer failure. In the model of Gauthier et al. [93], it assumes that the 
bank needs to reduce their size and leverage because a pre-specified minimum 
capital ratio is breached and finds that the effect from the fire sales accelerates 
bank defaults as bank capitalization decreases. 
While the mechanical or behavioural shock propagation often operate 
simultaneously in a real banking system [94], network models studies generally 
find, through simulations, that the behavioural dynamics has a more significant 
effect on the stability of the system than the mechanical propagation mechanism. 
Therefore, Gauthier et al. [86] conclude that comprehensive bank regulation 
should be based on a set of requirements related to capital, liquid asset holdings 
and short-term liabilities.  
3. The third strand of the research is a group of recent and growing work aiming to 
consider uncertainty within the modelling [13], [95-102]. As the behaviour of the 
bank is very complex, the network structure changes with time and these changes 
interact with the behaviour of the banks, which generates the uncertainty in the 
network. Therefore, researchers recently applied game-theoretical tools on the 





The model of the banking system proposed in this Ph.D. project belongs to the dynamic 
network analysis which involves simulations. There are three papers which are closely 
related to this Ph.D. project, need to be introduced in details in order to better 
understand the proposed model. Iori et al. [103]8  studied the performance of the 
interbank market in its role as a safety net by simulating interbank lending. The work    ǡ     ǡ   ǯ
constituents and the nature of their interconnectedness affect the potential for 
contagion. When banks are homogeneous, interbank lending plays an insurance role 
to stabilize the system, while when the banks are heterogeneous, contagion effects 
may arise and systematically increase with connectivity. It should be stressed here 
that the initial differential equation model developed in our work was inspired by the 
difference equation model developed by Iori et al. 
Work by May, Arinaminpathy [105] and Haldane, May [106] shows an interesting 
perspective to study the banking system which draws analogies with the dynamics of 
ecological food webs and with networks within which infectious diseases spread. In 
these papers, banks are nodes in the network and bank activities have been classified 
into four categories: deposit, external assets, borrowing and lending. The borrowing 
and lending are the links between the banks. This structure was extended and used in 
our work. 
From the existing literature, it can be seen that network models can be a natural way 
to model the complex dynamics by simulating different network structures in different 
degrees of size, connectivity, concentration and so on. Though this can address the 
issue of having uncertainty and the change of connectivity in the system, existing 
network models do not include mechanisms that can control and affect behaviours 
emerging from the dynamics of the units which make the entire systems. In the next 
section, control system engineering will be introduced as a tool to monitor and control 
a dynamical/interconnected system characterised by uncertainty. 
                                                             
8 A previous contribution of this work can be found in [104]. 
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2.3 Control theory and its applications in finance 
Control theory is an interdisciplinary field of applied mathematics and engineering 
that deals with the basic principles underlying the analysis and design of control Ǥ ǲ  ǳ     behaviour of the system in 
order to achieve a desired goal. Control theory deals with the use of a controller to 
achieve this purpose. 
Subsection 2.3.1 first gives a brief introduction to the history and development of the 
control theory, then followed by a detailed introduction of feedback, which is a key 
concept in control theory. Essentially, a feedback process is the one in which the state 
of the system determines the way the control has to be exerted at any time. Control 
theory has its roots in the use of feedback as a means to regulate physical processes 
and mediate the effect of modelling uncertainty and noise [107, 108]. Subsection 2.3.2 
reviews some applications of feedback control in the economic area. 
2.3.1 Development of the control theory and feedback control system 
Development of the control theory 
The development of the control theory can be divided conveniently into four main 
periods shown in figure 2.4 [109, 110]. Control systems of various types date back to 
antiquity, a more formal analysis of the field began with a dynamics analysis of the 
centrifugal governor, conducted by the physicist James Clerk Maxwell in 1868 [111]. 
He described and analysed the phenomenon of self-oscillation, in which lags in the 
system may lead to overcompensation and unstable behaviour. The invention of the 
flyball centrifugal governor enabled effective speed control of the steam turbine and 
thereby shares credit for the industrial revolution. Ever since, control has played a key ǲǳǡ navigation 
and telecommunications, to manufacturing, and power systems.  
A Physical system can be modelled in the "time domain", where the response of a given 
system is a function of time, the various inputs and the previous system values. As time 
progresses, the state of the system and its response change. However, time-domain 
models for systems are frequently modelled using high-order differential equations 
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which can become impossibly difficult for humans to solve and some of which can even 
become impossible for modern computer systems to solve efficiently. 
Modern control theory (1960)
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Figure 2.4 Flow chart shows the development of the control theory. 
To counteract this problem, classical control theory uses the Laplace transform [112] 
to change an Ordinary Differential Equation (ODE) in the time domain into a regular 
algebraic polynomial in the transform domain. Once a given system has been 
converted into the transform domain where it can be manipulated with greater ease. 
Modern control theory, instead of changing domains to avoid the complexities of time-
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domain ODE mathematics, converts the differential equations into a system of lower-
order time domain equations called state equations, which can then be manipulated 
using techniques from linear algebra. The closing of the 20th century saw a rapid 
development of the mathematics of systems, control and optimization with a focus 
placed on understanding the benefits and limitations of feedback. Intelligent control 
starts around the 1970s due to remarkable developments in computing, 
communications, and sensing technologies. The scope of control theory is rapidly 
evolving to encompass hybrid, hierarchical, data-driven, decision-making networks 
where their connectivity at various scales affects functionality. 
Feedback control system 
A major application of control theory in the engineering discipline is known as control 
engineering, which deals with the design of control systems for industry. It applies 
control theory to design systems with desired performance. Such designed systems 
are called control systems. There are basically two types of control systems: the open 
loop system and the closed loop system. As shown in figure 2.5, system in which the 
output quantity has no effect upon the input to the control process is called an open-
loop control system.  
 
Figure 2.5 A block diagram of an open-loop control system. 
The closed-loop system, also known as a feedback control system, uses the concept of 
an open loop system as its forward path but has one or more feedback loops or paths 
connecting the output and the input. Feedback is the foundation for control system 
analysis and design. A simple feedback control system is shown in figure 2.6. In a 
feedback control system, the usual objective is to control a system, often called the 
plant, so that its output follows a desired signal, called the reference, which may be a 
fixed or changing value. To do this a controller is designed (generating a control input 
on the planet). The difference between the actual and desired output, called the error 
signal, is applied as a feedback to inform the input of the system, to bring the actual 
output closer to the reference. In any real-time control system, there is always some 
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amount of external noise which is called disturbance. With feedback, the controller is 
able to use the output to shape the input of the system. In this way, it reduces the effect 
of the disturbances on the system, which is called disturbance rejection in feedback 
control. 
 
Figure 2.6  A block diagram of a negative feedback control system. It illustrates the 
concept of using a feedback loop to control the behaviour of a system by comparing its 
output with a desired value (called the reference input), and applying the difference as 
an error signal to dynamically change the output so it is closer to the desired behaviour. 
A typical example of a feedback control system is a person steering an automobile (see 
figure 2.7). The driver can control the car to drive on the desired path through the 
steering wheel. The automobile is the plant and the driver is the controller. The driver 
will adjust the error which is the difference between actual course of travel and the 
desired course of travel using the steering wheel.  
 
Figure 2.7 A block diagram of an automobile steering control system. The error is the 
difference between the actual course of travel and the desired course of t ravel. The driver 
adjusts the error by using the steering wheel to control the car so that it travels on the 
desired path. 
It can be seen from the feedback control system that control engineering has the ability 
to deal with uncertainty as the system can reduce the error without the knowledge of 
why the error occurs. For instance, the driver may not know why the car has deviated 
from the desired path but s/he can still bring it back to the desired path. Therefore, 
the initial motivation to design and apply a control approach to model the banking 
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system is to expect the control approach to bring the banking system back to stable 
when the causes of instability in the banking system are unknown. 
2.3.2 Feedback control application in finance  
Nowadays, as the understanding of the dynamics of business, social, and political 
systems increases, control engineering is not limited to engineering discipline but is 
equally applicable to systems above. As the general theory of feedback systems, 
control theory is useful wherever feedback occurs. Many applications have been 
successful in the area such as ecosystems, physiology, climate modelling, and neural 
networks as well as in finance. The existing literature shows that control theory has 
been used to analyse financial problems. 
Wingrove and Davis [113, 114] show some results based on the application of classical 
linear control to the analysis of economic system dynamics. The linear control analysis 
is applied as an aid in understanding the fluctuations of business cycles in the past, 
and to examine monetary policies that might improve stabilization. The results 
confirm that to improve stabilization of the business cycle, a general rule is that any 
movements in the growth of money supply should be countercyclical with respect to 
the growth of real GNP. Novotna [115] studied the finance system with the distributed 
time delay and indicated that the complex dynamic behaviour in such a finance system 
can be controlled under appropriate strength feedback and delay times, as well as that 
the feedbacks either suppress or enhance the dynamic behaviour. Barmish et al. [116] 
provide an overview of basics of simulation and performance evaluation associated 
with stock trading via feedback control methods; from this it shows the feedback 
control has been widely studied in the stock trading strategies.  
It can be seen from the literature that the feedback control applications are mainly 
focused on macro-economic models to study how business cycles affect economic 
stability. In this thesis, feedback control is applied for the first time on a banking 
system model to study its stability as well as design proper controllers to keep the 




This chapter presents a brief introduction of financial systems and provides an 
extensive literature review of the 2007-2009 financial crisis as well as the network 
models used to study of financial systems. The chapter also introduces control theory 
used in engineering and its application to financial problems. While network models 
have provided useful insight in the understanding of financial crises, they have never 
been combined with control theory to study the stability of the banking system. The 
following chapter, Chapter 3, shows the details of the new dynamic network model of 
the banking system that has been developed in this Ph.D. project; the links with 
existing network models are also highlighted.  Chapter 4 compares the results of the 
proposed model with the findings in the literature. Chapter 5 presents the novel 






Chapter 3  
 
The Dynamic Network Model 
 
 
In this chapter, the dynamic network model developed in this Ph.D. project is 
introduced. The banking system is represented as a network where the nodes are 
individual banks, while the links between any two banks are interbank loans and 
borrowing. The dynamic structure of the model is represented as a set of ordinary 
differential equations consisting of balance sheet dynamics. The choice of differential 
equations not only allows the analysis of systemic risk but also allows applying control 
theory. In this chapter, the dynamic model is introduced step by step, from a one-bank 
model to a two-bank model and finally to a multi-bank model.  
Section 3.1 provides details of how the basic structure of a bank has been designed 
and how the banks are connected; some assumptions are also explained.  In Section 
3.2 the one-bank model and the corresponding differential equations are introduced; 
subsequently, the two-bank model and the multi-bank model are presented. 
Specifically, Section 3.2 explains how the differential equations are used to model the 
banking system have been generated. Section 3.3 concludes the chapter. 
3.1 Description of the banking system model 
This section describes the basic structure of each individual bank as well as how banks 
are connected with each other. As explained in the literature review, the real banking 
system is very complex in nature. Banks perform many activities which cannot all be 
modelled in detail, so some assumptions and simplifications are made in the proposed 
work. The goal is to develop a model which, on one hand, retains the most important 
characteristics of the banking system and, on the other, allows us to develop an 
analysis of its stability which has implications for the real system. In the proposed 
work, the following main banking activities are considered:  
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1) Collection of deposits to accumulate cash, and payment of interests to depositors 
2) Investment of cash to generate profit through receipt of returns 
3) Lending money to other banks, and receipt of interests 
4) Borrowing money from other banks, and payment of interests  
The primary purpose of a bank in performing these activities is to generate profit, to 
maintain (and increase) a positive net worth and cash, so to avoid defaulting and 
failure. A bank needs to keep its cash above a threshold (reserve ratio requirement): 
more specifically, the cash of a bank, at any given time, has to be equal or bigger than 
the total deposits multiplied by a positive factor (<1). This factor is called reserve ratio 
and is usually set by the Central Bank. By preserving this cash, the banks safeguard 
themselves from shocks such aǡǯdefaults and investment failures. 
There may be situations in which a given bank may not be able to meet the reserve 
ratio requirement due, for example, to investment failure or cash withdraws by 
depositors. In these cases, the bank has to find cash in the interbank 
borrowing/lending market. In the interbank market, the bank lacking of cash looks for 
opportunities to borrow money from banks with cash above the reserve ratio 
requirement.  
In the proposed model, each bank is characterised by five activities which produce 5 
different variables, as shown in figure 3.1:  accumulation of deposits - variableܦ , 
interbank borrowings Ȃ variable ܤ , interbank lending Ȃ variable ܮ , investment - 
variable ܫ and accumulation of cash Ȃ variable ܥ, see figure 3.1. The net-worth,ܰ, is 
given by the formula:  ܰ ൌ ܫ ൅ ܥ ൅ ܮ െ ܦ െ ܤ.  
In this model, the deposit, ܦ , represents the funds deposited by creditors, which 
cannot be controlled by the bank. Therefore, ܦ is modelled as an exogenous signal. 
When new funds are deposited in a bank, this automatically increases the cash: more 
specifically, any change in the deposit,  ?ܦ, of a bank corresponds to a change in its 
cash,  ?ܥ ൌ  ?ܦ. Equivalently, when a bank changes its investments,  ?ܫ, its cash will 
change accordingly,   ?ܥ ൌ െ ?ܫ  . The negative sign represents the fact that an increase 
in the investment corresponds to a reduction of the cash, and vice versa. Similar 




Figure 3.1 ǯ ǣ ܰ  =net-worth, ܦ  =deposits, ܤ  =interbank borrowings,  ܮ =interbank loans, ܥ =cash and ܫ =investment. 
The borrowing and lending activities make the linkages between banks which 
ultimately form the network; in this network, the banks are the nodes and borrowing 
and lending between any two banks (ܮ௜௝  and ܤ௜௝9) are the connections (see figure 3.2). 
These links, which determine the network structure of the ǡǮǯ
differential equations of the dynamical model. Next section introduces the ordinary 
differential equations developed in our work to implement the network model we 
have just described.     
 
Figure 3.2 Linkages between banks: the network links between banks are made by the 
interbank lending/borrowings.  
                                                             
9 ܮ௜௝ is the total lending that banki lends to bankj. ܤ௜௝  is the total borrowing that banki 
borrows from bankj 
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3.2 Ordinary differential equations of the banking system 
model 
In this section, the development of the ordinary differential equations is introduced in 
three stages. In the first stage, a one-bank model is presented, which is characterised 
by differential equations describing the cash, deposit and investment only. This model 
can be used to elucidate the basic activities within one bank. In the second stage, a 
two-bank model is presented by adding in the differential equations the borrowing 
and lending activities between the two banks. This two-bank model allows studying in 
a simple way the effect of interbank connections on the system. In the last subsection, 
the number of banks in the system is increased to any value larger than 2. In this multi-
bank model, the number of connections between banks can be increased arbitrarily, 
which increases the complexity of the system. In particular, new algorithms need to 
be developed to deal with the more sophisticated way banks exchange cash with each 
other; modifications of the differential equations are introduced to describe the 
borrowing and lending behaviours as well as the corresponding interest payments in 
the multi-bank model.  
The differential equations characterising the banking system model contain the time 
derivatives of the quantities ܥǡ ܫǡ ܮ  and ܤ , which govern the changes of these 
quantities, i.e.  ?ܥ, ?ܫ, ?ܮ and  ?ܤ,  as function of time. These differential equations 
prescribe the dynamics of the model, and allow us to apply control theory tools in a 
straightforward way, as described in Chapter 5.  
3.2.1   Differential equations for one-bank model 
The one-bank model contains only three quantities: cash, deposit and investment. The 
bank is independent from other banks, and the cash can only be affected by the deposit 
and the investment. The one-bank model allows one to easily appreciate how the 
banking system has been modelled. Moreover, it is easier to investigate the effect of ȋȌǯare no 
interbank borrowing and lending effects. Importantly, the one-bank model allows a 
simple and analytical implementation of the stability analysis, which can be used also 




In this one-bank model, ܦଵ is used to represents the total deposits of the bank1. ܦଵ is 
assumed to be assigned by an exogenous signal. This means the deposit cannot be 
controlled by the bank and the fluctuations in the deposit introduce shocks in the bank 
by affecting its cash and exposing the bank to the risk of failure. In this thesis, the 
deposit signal is generated numerically. Different kinds of deposit signals have been 
generated for different purposes. For example, constant deposit is used for testing and 
verifying the model. To simulate cases with interesting dynamics,  the deposit signal 
is set as the following random function of time, t , (see also Iori et al. [117]): ܦଵ ൌ  ȁܦഥ ൅ ܦഥߪ஽ߝ௧ȁ     (3.1) 
Equation (3.1) models the case in which fluctuations (shocks) in the deposit are 
caused by random but mutually uncorrelated payments/withdrawals of deposits. ܦഥ 
represents the average size of the deposits;ߪ஽ሺ൐  ?ሻrepresents the amplitude of the 
shocks, while ߝ௧  is a random variable (ߝ௧  ?ܰሺ ?ǡ ?ሻ). When ߝ௧  is positive an increase 
(payment) in the deposit is made while when ߝ௧ is negative a decrease (withdraw) of 
the deposit is experienced by the bank.  
Investments 
The investment behaviour of the bank is described in equation (3.2) below;  
ௗூభௗ௧ ൌ ሾሺܥଵ െ ݎܦଵሻାǡ ݋݌݌ଵሿ െ ݓଵܫଵ െ ݒଵܫଵ(3.2) ݋݌݌ଵ ൌ  ห݋݌݌തതതതത ൅ ݋݌݌തതതതതߪ௢௣௣ߟ௧ห                                               (3.3) 
each bank invests at time ݐ depending on two factors: one is the availability of cash, 
the other one is the stochastic investment opportunity. In equation (3.2), ௗூభௗ௧  is the 
change of the investment of the bank over the time ݀ݐ;  ܥଵ is the total cash of the bank, ܦଵ is the total deposit of the bank and  ݎ is the reserve ratio. The reserve ratio is the 
proportion of the total deposit that the bank must have on hand as cash. Therefore, the 
availability of cash is represented by, ሺܥଵ െ ݎܦଵሻା, where ሺݔሻା stands for ሼݔǡ  ?ሽ. 
This means the bank can only invest using the cash which is above the value required 
by the reserve ratio,ݎܦଵ. If the ܥଵ ൏ ݎܦଵ, ሺܥଵ െ ݎܦଵሻା is equal 0, which means that 
there is no available cash for investment. 
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The term ݋݌݌ଵin equation (3.2) is the stochastic investment opportunity at time ݐ; as 
for the deposit, ݋݌݌ଵ is also an exogenous signal and it is described in equation (3.3). ݋݌݌ଵ fluctuates randomly around an average value, ݋݌݌തതതതത, where  ݋݌݌തതതതത ൌ ߜܦഥ (with  ? ൏ߜ ൏  ? and  ߟ௧  ?ܰሺ ?ǡ ?ሻሻ, which means that the average size of the investment 
opportunity is affected by the size of the bank (see also Iori et al. [117]). Therefore, 
taking these two factors into consideration, ሺܥଵ െ ݎܦଵሻା݋݌݌ଵ , the amount of 
resources invested per unit of time is the minimum value of these two terms. This 
means that a bank invests only when it has sufficient cash and investment opportunity. 
Strictly speaking the term, ሾሺܥଵ െ ݎܦଵሻାǡ ݋݌݌ଵሿ , in equation 3.2 should be 
multiplied by a factor with dimensions, time-1; for simplicity, we assume that this 
factor is equal to one.  
Besides adding new investment, investments made in the previous time mature after 
some time. Moreover, there will be some failed investment that cannot be recovered. 
In equation (3.2), െݓଵ represents the proportion of total investment, per unit time, 
that has matured. While ݒଵ  represents the proportion of total investment that has 
been lost per unit time. For simplicity ݓଵis constant in the proposed model. In future 
work, to account for more realistic scenarios  future work, ݓଵ can be different for each 
bank and time dependent; ݓଵ can also be introduced as an exogenous signal based on 
real data. This would add further nonlinearity to the dynamic model. 
Cash  
The changes of the deposit, 
ௗ஽భௗ௧ , and of the investment, ௗூభௗ௧  , can affect the change in 
cash, 
ௗ஼భௗ௧ . The differential equation governing the change over time of the cash, ௗ஼భௗ௧ , of 
bank1 is given by:  
ௗ஼భௗ௧ ൌ  ௗ஽భௗ௧ െ  ௗூభௗ௧ െ  ݃ଵܦଵ ൅  ݌ଵܫଵ െ ݒଵܫଵ                                     (3.4) 
In equation (3.4),  
ௗ஽భௗ௧   represents the change of the deposit and it has a positive sign 
because the change of the deposit will affect the cash in the same direction. As more 
deposits are saved into the bank, the cash increases and as deposits are withdrawn 
from the bank, the cash decreases. Similarly, 
ௗூభௗ௧  represents the change of the 
investment. It has a negative sign because any increase in the investment means that 
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the bank uses its cash to make new investments, so the cash decreases. It must be 
stressed that matured investments, instead, increase the cash.  
Besides the change of deposit and investment, the cash of the bank can also be affected 
by paying interest to depositors and getting returns from the investment. In equation 
(3.4), ݃ଵ is the deposit interest.  Therefore, െ ݃ଵܦଵ represents the reduction in cash 
over time due to the payment of interest to depositors. Similarly,݌ଵis the return rate 
of the investment and  ݌ଵܫଵ is the increase in cash due to the receipt of returns from 
investments. ݒଵܫଵ represents the proportion of total investments that has been lost, 
per unit of time, due to defaults. This term also appears in equation (3.2), since the lost ǡǯcrease the cash, therefore, 
in equation (3.4),ݒଵܫଵ has to be subtracted from the cash so that it does not increase 
the cash.  
The cash needs to be above zero to keep the bank functioning. If the cash of a bank falls 
below zero, that bank is labelled as a failed and all its activities are stopped.  
Net-worth  
Another important variable is the net-worth of the bank, ଵܰ, which is the difference 
between asset and liabilities. The asset is the sum of the cash, ܥଵ, and investment,ܫଵ, 
while the liabilities are the deposit,ܦଵ. Therefore, ଵܰ is represented by the equation 
(3.5).  
ଵܰ ൌ  ܥଵ ൅ ܫଵ െ ܦଵ                                                                                    (3.5) 
A positive net-worth means that the bank is managing its cash and investment well so 
to make a profit. 
3.2.2   Differential equations for two-bank model 
In this subsection the development of the two-bank model is presented. Compared to 
the one-bank model, two new activities are introduced; interbank borrowing and 
lending. Due to fluctuations in deposits, the cash of any given bank may fall below the 
required amount dictated by the reserve ratio. In this case that bank needs to borrow 
from the other bank. The interbank borrowing and lending activities make the 






In the two-bank model, the total deposit is modelled in the same way as in the one-
bank model. As shown in equation (3.6), the total deposit of bank1,ܦଵ, and bank2,ܦଶ, 
at time ݐ are all exogenous signals, which fluctuate randomly around the average size ܦഥ. ܦଵ ൌ  ȁܦഥ ൅ ܦഥߪ஽ߝ௧ȁ ܦଶ ൌ  ȁܦഥ ൅ ܦഥߪ஽ߝ௧ȁ                                                       (3.6) 
Interbank borrowing and lending 
The interbank borrowing and lending activities in the two-bank model are 
represented in equation (3.7). 
ௗ஻భమௗ௧ ൌ ௗ௅మభௗ௧ ൌ ݉݅݊ሾ ሺݎܦଵ െ ܥଵሻାǡ  ሺܥଶ െ ݎܦଶሻାሿ െ ߙଵଶܤଵଶ(3.7) 
 
  
ௗ஻భమௗ௧  represents the amount of cash borrowed by bank1  from bank2, over time ݀ݐ, 
which is equal to, 
ௗ௅మభௗ௧ , the amount of cash lent by bank2 to bank1, over time ݀ݐ. It is 
assumed that in this two-bank model, only bank1ǯ
requirement and bank2ǯ       ǡ  
borrowing only happens for bank1 and lending only happens for bank2.  
The right-hand side of equation (3.7) shows how the total borrowing (lending) is 
updated. Bank1 borrows just enough to meet the reserve ratio requirements, which is 
the amount represented by the term,ሺݎܦଵ െ ܥଵሻା, where ሺݔሻା stands for ሼݔǡ  ?ሽ.  
Bank2 only lends cash that is above its required reserve, which is represented by ሺܥଶ െ ݎܦଶሻା. Therefore, the actual borrowing (lending) is the minimum of these two 
factors. Also in this case the term, ݉݅݊ሾ ሺݎܦଵ െ ܥଵሻାǡ  ሺܥଶ െ ݎܦଶሻାሿ, in equation 3.7 
should be multiplied by a factor with dimensions, time-1; for simplicity, we assume 
that this factor is equal to one. 
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Bank1 needs to repay its borrowing to bank2 after some time; this repayment 
behaviour is represented by the term, ߙଵଶܤଵଶ, where ߙଵଶ is the proportion of the total 
borrowing, ܤଵଶ, repaid, per unit time, by bank1 to bank2 during the current period of 
time.   
Investments 
The investment in the two-bank model is slightly different from the one-bank 
model.Bank1 is unable to make any investment when its cash falls below the reserve 
ratio requirement; therefore the change of the investment of bank1, 
ௗூభௗ௧ , is represented 
as in equation (3.8), where the newly added investment is equal to 0. It is assumed 
that the investment happens after the interbank borrowing and lending. The change 
in the investment for bank2,  is given by the cash above the required reserve, ܥଶ െ ݎܦଶ, 
minus the lending to bank1, 
ௗ௅మభௗ௧ , (see equation (3.9)).  The investment opportunity is 
the same as in the one-bank model, which is an exogenous signal represented by 
equation (3.10).  
ௗூభௗ௧ ൌ  ? െ ݓଵܫଵ െ ݒଵܫଵ                                                       (3.8) 
ௗூమௗ௧ ൌ  ൤ቀܥଶ െ ݎܦଶ െ ௅భమௗ௧ ቁା ǡ ݋݌݌ଶ൨ െ ݓଶܫଶ െ ݒଶܫଶ                          (3.9) ݋݌݌ଶ ൌ  ห݋݌݌തതതതത ൅ ݋݌݌തതതതതߪ௢௣௣ߟ௧ห                                         (3.10) 
Cash 
The differential equation governing the change in time of the cash, 
ௗ஼భௗ௧  andௗ஼మௗ௧  , of 
bank1 and bank2 is given by:  
ௗ஼భௗ௧ ൌ  ௗ஽భௗ௧ െ  ௗூభௗ௧ െ  ݃ଵܦଵ ൅  ݌ଵܫଵ െ ݒଵܫଵ ൅ ௗ஻భమௗ௧ െ ܤଵଶ݄ଵଶ                        (3.11) 
ௗ஼మௗ௧ ൌ  ௗ஽మௗ௧ െ  ௗூమௗ௧ െ  ݃ଶܦଶ ൅  ݌ଶܫଶ െ ݒଶܫଶ െ ௗ௅మభௗ௧ ൅ ܮଶଵ݇ଶଵ                        (3.12) 
In equations (3.11) and (3.12), the deposit and investment affect the cash in the same 
way as for the one-bank model. Two more terms are added to each equation, which 
represent the effect of the borrowing (lending) on the cash. For bank1, any increase 
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in the change of borrowing,ௗ஻భమௗ௧ , means that the bank borrows money to increase its 
cash, while any decrease in 
ௗ஻భమௗ௧  means that the bank repays money using its cash. So 
in equation (3.11), 
ௗ஻భమௗ௧   has a positive sign. Similarly, in equation (3.12),  ௗ௅మభௗ௧  has a 
negative sign because that the lending will decrease bank2ǯ the repayment 
of the lending increases bank2ǯǤ Moreover, bank1 needs to pay the interest to 
bank2 according to the total borrowing, ܤଵଶ . In equation (3.11), ݄ଵଶ  is the interest 
rate bank1 pays to bank2, while ݇ଶଵis the interest rate bank2 receives from bank1; 
therefore, ݄ଵଶ ൌ ݇ଶଵ. The interest rate is considered as a constant in the two-bank 
model for simplicity. The interest for borrowing (lending) is paid using the cash, so  
bank1ǯ   ȋed by the term, െܤଵଶ݄ଵଶሻ  and bank2ǯ 
increases (represented by the term,ܮଶଵ݇ଶଵ) due to the payment of interest. 
Net-worth  
Borrowing is part the ǯ liabilities of the bank, while the lending is part of the 
assets. So the net-worth of bank1 and bank2, ଵܰ and ଶܰ, are given by equations (3.13) 
and (3.14), respectively. 
ଵܰ ൌ  ܥଵ ൅ ܫଵ െ ܦଵ െ ܤଵ                                                                           (3.13) 
ଶܰ ൌ  ܥଶ ൅ ܫଶ ൅ ܮଶ െ ܦଶ                                                                           (3.14) 
 
3.2.3   Differential equations for the multi-bank model 
This subsection presents the development of the multi-bank model has ݊ሺ݊ ൒  ?ሻ 
banks. The multi-bank model is more complex than the two-bank model in the 
following reasons: 
banks can be connected in many different patterns, for example, a bank can be 
connected to some banks but not some others or some banks can be connected to more 
banks than others. So a new parameter ߪ௜௝ is introduced to represent the connections 
between any two banks ݅ and  ݆ ( ǡ ݆ ൌ  ?ǡ ?ǡ ǥ  ݊and ݅ ് ݆). ߪ௜௝  can be 0, which means 
that there is no link between the two banks, or 1, which means that the two banks are 
connected. All the values for ߪ௜௝  are generated at the beginning of the simulation 
according to the choice of the link rate, ݈௥, which can take values from 0 to 1. ݈௥ can be 
seen as the probability that  ߪ௜௝ ൌ  ?. Therefore, ݈௥  is a variable that represents the 
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degree of connectivity of the system; the closer the link rate is to 1, the more connected 
the system will be.  
The network model representing the banking system is characterised by a given 
pattern of the connections, and the order by which a bank borrows from its links can 
differ. Therefore, an algorithm has been developed to determine the order of the 
interbank borrowing and lending of each bank. The details of this algorithm are 
introduced later in the borrowing and lending subsection. 
As there are more banks in the system, the default of one bank may affect other banks 
as well as the pattern of the connections, so a default liquidation procedure is 
introduced in the system to deal with the remaining assets and liabilities of any failed 
bank. The details of this liquidation procedure are reported later in this section. Also, 
a parameter called ݏ௜ Ǯǯi; when banki is 
still functioning, ݏ௜ ൌ  ?, while ݏ௜ ൌ  ? when the banki has failed. 
In this section, the differential equations of the multi-bank model are introduced with 
the characteristics above.  
Deposits 
The deposits of banki,ܦ௜, has the same characteristics as in the previous models. In the 
multi-bank model, two cases are simulated: homogeneous case and heterogeneous 
case. The heterogeneous case is characterised by different average size of the deposits. 
In the homogeneous case, each bank has the same average size, ܦഥ , as shown in 
equation (3.15): ܦ௜ ൌ  ȁܦഥ ൅ ܦഥߪ஽ߝ௧ȁ                                  (3.15) 
While in the heterogeneous case, the average size of the deposit of any banki is 
assigned by sampling from a Gaussian distribution with the mean, Ɋ௦, and variance, ߪ௦ଶ: ܦഥ௜ ?ȁܰሺɊ௦ǡ ߪ௦ଶሻȁ . 
Therefore, the deposit signal for a banki at time ݐ in the heterogeneous case is given 




Interbank borrowing and lending  
Equation (3.17) shows how the total borrowing banki is updated.  ௗ஻೔ೕௗ௧ ൌ ݉݅݊ ቂ ሺݎܦ௜ െ ܥ௜ሻାǡ  ൫ܥ௝ െ ݎܦ௝൯ାቃ ߪ௜௝ െ ݏ௜ݏ௝ߙ௜௝ܤ௜௝ (3.17) 
The first term in the right-hand-side equation (3.17) is the amount borrowed by banki 
from bankj, over time ݀ݐ .  As in the two-bank model, this amount should be the 
minimum value between the required cash of banki,  ሺݎܦ௜ െ ܥ௜ሻା, and the available 
cash of bankj, ൫ܥ௝ െ ݎܦ௝൯ା . The difference with the two-bank model is that, this 
minimum value needs to be multiplied by the parameter, ߪ௜௝, which represents the 
connection between banki and bankj. This is to ensure that the borrowing only 
happens between the two banks that are connected. If the two banks are not 
connected (ߪ௜௝ ൌ  ?ሻ, then there is no borrowing.  
The second term in equation 3.17 is the proportion, ߙ௜௝ , of the total borrowing repaid, 
per unit time, by banki to bankj during the current period of time. When a bank fails, it 
cannot repay its borrowing to the other banks and it cannot receive previous lending 
back from other banks. Therefore, to make sure the repayment only works for the 
survival banks, the repayment term, ߙ௜௝ܤ௜௝ , needs to be multiplied by the parameters, ݏ௜and ݏ௝, which represent the mode of the bank. If one of the two banks failed (ݏ௜ ൌ  ? 
or ݏ௝ ൌ  ?), then there is no repayment, (ݏ௜ݏ௝ߙ௜௝ܤ௜௝ ൌ  ?ሻ. 
The total lending banki gives to bankj is updated in a similar way as shown in equation 
(3.18): 
ௗ௅೔ೕௗ௧ ൌ ݉݅݊ ቂ ൫ݎܦ௝ െ ܥ௝൯ାǡ  ሺܥ௜ െ ݎܦ௜ሻାቃ ߪ௜௝ െ ݏ௜ݏ௝ߙ௝௜ܮ௜௝ (3.18) 
 
The total borrowing and lending of banki , ܤ௜  and ܮ௜, are represented in equation (3.19) 
and equation (3.20): ܤ௜ ൌ   ? ܤ௜௝௝ஷ௜                                                          (3.19) ܮ௜ ൌ   ? ܮ௜௝௝ஷ௜                                                          (3.20) 
 
Interest rates  
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In the multi-bank model the interest rates for borrowing and lending are not 
constant;݄௜௝and ௝݇௜, in fact, change with time according to equation (3.21).  
 ݄௜௝ ൌ  ௝݇௜ ൌ ݄଴ ൅ ௔௘ቆ೤షಳ೔ೕ಴ೕ ቇ೥ାଵ                                                           (3.21) 
In equation (3.21), ݄଴ is the basic interest rate applied for lending and borrowing. This 
can be thought of as the base interest rate determined by an exogenous monetary 
authority.  
The term, 
௔௘ቆ೤షಳ೔ೕ಴ೕ ቇ೥ାଵ , is the premium charged depending on the health of both 
borrowing and lending banks, which is measure with ஻೔ೕ஼ೕ  ; ܤ௜௝  is the total borrowing of 
banki from bankj and ܥ௝ is the total cash of bankj.The larger ratio, ஻೔ೕ஼ೕ  , the more risk 
the borrowing brings to the lending bank. Figure 3.3 illustrates the behaviour of  ݄௜௝  
for different values of  
஻೔ೕ஼ೕ . When ஻೔ೕ஼ೕ ൌ  ?ǡthe interest rate is close to ݄଴ . When  ஻೔ೕ஼ೕ ൌ ݕ 
, the rate becomes ݄௜௝ ൌ ݄଴ ൅ ௔ଶ. When ஻೔ೕ஼ೕ  ಱ ?, the rate becomes݄௜௝ ൌ ݄଴ ൅ ܽ, 
which is the maximum value possible. Therefore, as the 
஻೔ೕ஼ೕ  gets larger, the lending 
bank faces more risk, thus it needs to charge higher interest rates. ݖ represents the 
speed of transition between the states ݄௜௝ ൌ ݄଴ ൅ ௔ଶ and ݄௜௝ ൌ ݄଴ ൅ ܽ.  The larger the 
values ofݖ, the faster the interest rate switches. The values of the parameters, ܽǡ ݕǡ ݖ, 




Figure 3.3  Behaviour of  ݄௜௝  as function of  ஻೔ೕ஼ೕ .  
 
Thus, interest rates are endogenous to the fluctuations in balance sheets, although in 
a simple mechanical way; our approach, in fact, abstracts from a more complex 
modelling of asset prices based on optimising decisions and taking risk into account. 
This helps us to keep the model simple in our investigation of the stability of the 
system.  
Interbank borrowing and lending process 
Once the interest rates are set, the interbank borrowing and lending process works as 
follows: the bank with greatest net worth can first choose the bank to borrow money 
from. The borrowing bank will choose the bank with the lowest lending interest rate 
and, if the available borrowing is not enough, it will move to the bank with the second 
lowest lending rate. When the first bank has finished borrowing, the bank with the 
second greatest net worth starts to borrow according to the same rule. Again, this 
sequential form of borrowing and lending is a simplification of the simultaneous 
trading structure in interbank markets, but reflects the fact that certain banks will find 
it easier to finance their liquidity needs in the interbank market than others. A more 
complex structure could be introduced where banks post their financing needs 





As it in the two-bank model, equation (3.22) below describes the investment 
behaviour of banki; each bank makes its investment at time ݐ  depending on two 
factors: one is the availability of cash above the value required by the reserve ratio 
after interbank lending, ቀܥ௜ െ ݎܦ௜ െ  ? ௗ௅೔ೕௗ௧௝ஷ௜ ቁା; where ሺݔሻା stands for ሼݔǡ  ?ሽ.  The 
second factor is the stochastic investment opportunity at time t, ݋݌݌௜; this is described 
in equation (3.23) where  ݋݌݌തതതതത ൌ ߜܦഥ (with  ? ൏ ߜ ൏  ? and  ߟ௧  ?ܰሺ ?ǡ ?ሻሻ, which means 
that the investment opportunity is affected by the size of the bank. Therefore, taking 
these two factors into consideration, a bank invests only when it has sufficient cash 
and investment opportunity. In equation (3.22), െݓ௜ܫ௜  represents the proportion of 
total investment, per unit time, that has matured. And ݒ௜ܫ௜ represents the proportion 
of total investment that has been lost, per unit time.  ௗூ೔ௗ௧ ൌ  ൤ቀܥ௜ െ ݎܦ௜ െ  ? ௗ஻೔ೕௗ௧௝ஷ௜ ቁା ǡ ݋݌݌௜൨ െ ݓ௜ܫ௜ െ ݒ௜ܫ௜         (3.22) ݋݌݌௜ ൌ  ห݋݌݌തതതതത ൅ ݋݌݌തതതതതߪ௢௣௣ߟ௧ห                                                      (3.23) 
Cash 
The differential equation governing the change in time of the cash, 
ௗ஼೔ௗ௧ , of banki is 
reported in equation (3.24).  
ௗ஼೔ௗ௧ ൌ  ௗ஽೔ௗ௧ െ  ௗூ೔ௗ௧ െ  ݃௜ܦ௜ ൅  ݌௜ܫ௜ െ ݒ௜ܫ௜ ൅  ? ௗ஻೔ೕௗ௧௝ஷ௜ െ  ? ݄௜௝ܤ௜௝ ௝ஷ௜   െ  ? ௗ஻ೕ೔ௗ௧௝ஷ௜ ൅  ? ௝݄௜ܤ௝௜௝ஷ௜                                              (3.24) 
In equation (3.24),  
ௗ஽೔ௗ௧  represents the change cash due to changes in the deposit, while െ ݃௜ܦ௜ represents the reduction in cash over time due to the payment of interest to 
depositors. Similarly, െ ௗூ೔ௗ௧ represents the reduction in cash due to new investments 
and ݌௜ܫ௜ is the increase in cash due to the receipt of interest from investments, while െݒ௜ܫ௜  represents the proportion of total investments that has been lost, per unit of 
time, due to defaults.  ? ௗ஻೔ೕௗ௧௝ஷ௜ represents the increase in cash accrued from interbank 
borrowing and െ  ? ݄௜௝ܤ௜௝௜ஷ௝  is the reduction in cash due to the payment of interests 
to lending banks. െ  ? ௗ஻ೕ೔ௗ௧௝ஷ௜ represents the reduction in cash due to loans to other 
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banks and  ? ௝݄௜ܤ௝௜௝ஷ௜  is the increase of cash due to the receipt of interest from 
borrowing banks. ݃௜ , ݌௜ , ݄௜௝  and ݇௜௝  represent interest rates. Importantly, when ܥ௜ 
becomes non-positive, banki  fails and is removed from the system. 
Net-worth  
The net-worth of banki, ௜ܰ , is the sum of the total cash, investment and lending, minus 
the sum of the total deposit and borrowing, as shown in equation (3.25): 
௜ܰ ൌ  ܥ௜ ൅ ܮ௜ ൅ ܫ௜ െ ܦ௜ െ ܤ௜                                                           (3.25) 
Simulation of the model  	 ?Ǥ ?ǯ
place during each step of the computer simulation. At the beginning of each step, the ǯ
due to stochastic shocks. If the cash of a bank falls below the value required by the 
reserve ratio that bank has to borrow from other banks. After this step, each bank 
repays creditors in cash. Those banks that cannot meet the repayment obligations will 
need to borrow from other banks. Banks that still have extra cash will invest. Those 
banks that are left with negative cash, as they could not borrow enough cash, are 
deemed to be in default; these banks are removed from the system and their remaining 
assets are distributed to depositors and to lending banks. After any default liquidation, 
a new simulation step will start. At the end of the simulation, i.e. after a chosen number 






Figure 3.4 Flowchart showing activities taking place during one simulation step.  
Units of the variables and parameters used in the simulation  
This subsection reports the units for the values of the variables and parameters of the 
model used in the simulations presented in Chapter 4. Since the interest rates, i.e. ݃ ,݌ ,ݒ , ݄ , ݇ , alpha are expressed as daily rates, the time unit used in the simulations 
is day. The values of variables representing money, i.e. ܦ ,ܥ  ,ܫ  , ܤ, ܮ  and ݋݌݌ , are 
expressed in arbitrary units of money. Table 3.1 reports the units for all the variables 
and parameters used in the simulation. Unless stated otherwise, the units of the values 
of the variables and parameters are not reported in the remaining of the thesis. 
Table 3.1 Units for all the variables and parameters used in the simulation. 














݇ day-1 ߙ day-1 ܽ day-1 ݎ pure number (between 0 and 1) ݈௥ pure number (between 0 and 1) ݖ pure number ݕ pure number 
 
3.3 Conclusion 
A new dynamic network model of the banking system has been presented in this 
chapter. The dynamic structure of the banking system is modelled using ordinary 
differential equations, which prescribe how bank activities (e.g. cash, investment and 
borrowing) change with time. The proposed model not only allows carrying out 
simulations that describe how banks behave, but also allows incorporating feedback 
mechanisms typical of control theory. Ordinary differential equations are more 
suitable to facilitate the application of control theory tools compared to discrete 
models [112]. In the next chapter, Chapter 4, the differential equations are solved 
using MATLAB Simulink in the form of computer simulations, which show how banks 
receive deposits, invest, exchange money with each other and occasionally fail. In 






Chapter 4  
 




This chapter presents the results of numerical simulations for the dynamic models 
described in Chapter 3. The results are generated using MATLAB Simulink 
implementation of the models; details of the implementation are provided in this 
chapter.  
This chapter is structured as follows: Section 4.1 introduces the software packages 
MATLAB and Simulink. Section 4.2 introduces the implementation of the one-bank 
model in Simulink and its numerical simulations results with different initial 
conditions and parameter values; Section 4.3 shows the implementation and results 
of the two-bank model while Section 4.4 presents the multi-bank model which is made 
of 50 banks. Finally, Section 4.5 concludes the chapter. 
4.1 Introduction of MATLAB and Simulink 
MATLAB (Matrix Laboratory) is a proprietary programming language developed by 
MathWorks, which allows matrix manipulations, plotting of functions and data, 
implementation of algorithms, and interfacing with programs written in other 
languages, including C, C++, C#, Java [118]. Simulink is a commercial tool also 
developed by MathWorks for modelling, simulating and analysing dynamical systems 
[119], which can interface with the rest of the MATLAB environment. Simulink has 
integrated solvers that can numerically approximate the solutions of the differential 
equations which represent dynamical systems; differential equations are expressed 
graphically in Simulink as block diagrams. The reason to choose Simulink for the 
simulations in this Ph.D. project is that it allows to analyse efficiently the solutions of 
complicated systems modelled with differential equations that may be difficult or 
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impossible to deal with analytically; moreover, Simulink is widely used in control 
theory for simulation and design. 
4.1.1 General process of the simulation 
Figure 4.1 is a flowchart showing the general process used to run the simulations. 
Different MATLAB scripts are written to generate the initial conditions (for cash, 
investment, borrowing and lending), exogenous signals (such as deposit, ܦ , and 
investment opportunity,݋݌݌) and parameters values (such as ݓ, ݒ, ݌ and ݃ሻ, which 
can be used into the Simulink model. The Simulink implementation solves the 
differential equations presented in Chapter 3 with given initial conditions and 
parameter values (details are explained later in this section), and the results are 
outputted in the MTALAB workspace. Finally, other MATALAB scripts are used to 
process and plot automatically the results generated by Simulink; this facilitates the 
analysis of the results.   
 
Figure 4.1 Flowchart showing the general processes used to run a simulation.  
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4.1.2 Numerical solver of differential equations 
A dynamical system is simulated by computing its states (i.e. the values of the variables 
characterising the system) at successive time steps over a specified time span. This is 
done by numerically solving the differential equations representing the system; the 
calculations of the solutions are performed by a chosen solver in Simulink.  The flow 
chart in figure 4.2 shows the steps used to select a solver. 
 
 
Figure 4.2 Flow chart showing how to choose the solver. Red route indicates the selected 
solver. 
The step size of the time steps used to compute the states of the system can be constant 
or can vary during the simulation; accordingly, fixed-step solvers or variable-step 
solvers can be used respectively [120]. Fixed-step solvers compute the states of the 
system at constant time intervals from the beginning to the end of the simulation. 
Variable-step solvers can reduce the step size to increase accuracy when the states of 
the system change rapidly; when the states of the system change slowly, instead, they 
can decrease the step size to save computational time. From preliminary simulations, 
it has been concluded that using a fixed time step of 0.01 day allows the solution of the 
differential equations in the model with sufficient accuracy; smaller time steps, in fact, 
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produce nearly identical results. The choice of the time step is 0.1 day, which also 
allows running the simulation within practical periods of time (the longest simulation 
took 5 hours of CPU time on a commercial PC). Besides the step size, the solvers are 
also classified as continuous or discrete. As the proposed model of the banking system 
is a continuous system, a continuous solver has been chosen for the simulations. 
Finally, the fixed-Ǯ ?ǯǡ ?[121] to 
solve ordinary differential equations, has been chosen as it uses less computational 
time compared to other solvers, while its accuracy is not significantly different from 
other more-time-consuming solvers (as found out from preliminary tests).  
4.2   One-bank model 
In this section, the implementation of the one-bank model is explained in detail and 
the corresponding results are presented. The first subsection explains the Simulink 
block diagram of the one-bank model while the second subsection reports the results 
and related discussion. 
4.2.1   Implementation of the one-bank model in Simulink 
The Simulink block diagram of the one-bank model is shown in figure 4.3. Two 
exogenous signals, total deposit (ܦଵ) and the investment opportunity (݋݌݌ଵ), are two 
functions of time and are generated using MATLAB codes; they are imported into the 
Simulink block diagram through the red blocks in figure 4.3. These red blocks import 
the values of the variables from MATLAB workspace where all generated values are 
saved. The light blue blocks output the simulation results that are generated from 
Simulink. Parameters such as ݓଵ, ݒଵ, ݌ଵ and ݃ଵ  (proportion of matured investment, 
proportion of failed investment, return rate of investment and the inetrest rate of 
deposits respectevely) are used in the yellow blocks, which can multiply the input (any 
signal imported from the left side of the block) by a constant value (here the values of  ݓଵ, ݒଵ, ݌ଵ and ݃ଵ). The differential equations are solved by the integrator in Simulink 
which is the green block in figure 4.3. There are two differential equations in the one-
bank model, one is for cash, equation (3.4), and another one is for investment equation 
(3.2); therefore, there are two green blocks in the Simulink block diagram. Details of 
how the integrator works are explained in the following paragraph. 
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Ǯ  ?ǯfigure 4.3 integrates the time derivative of the 
investment, which is represented by equation (3.2). The signal imported in the 
integrator is the change of the investment  
ௗூభௗ௧ , while the signal exported is the total 
investment ܫଵ . There are three parts in equation (3.2),െݓଵܫଵ ,െݒଵܫଵ and ሾሺܥଵ െݎܦଵሻାǡ ݋݌݌ଵሿǡ    Ǯ  ?ǯ    ?Ǥ ?     
imports them into the integrator. The first two inputs, െݓଵܫଵ and െݒଵܫଵ, are generated     ǡ      Ǯ  ?ǯ  
multiplied by ݓଵ and ݒଵ . The third input, ሾሺܥଵ െ ݎܦଵሻାǡ ݋݌݌ଵሿ , is generated as 
follows: first using the total cash (which is exported after the integrator 2) minus the Ǯ ?ǯǯݎǯǢܥଵ െ ݎܦଵ, which     Ǯǯ   be    ?Ǥ  Ǯǯ  
maximum value of these two, i.e.ሺܥଵ െ ݎܦଵሻା; this signal is then importǮǯ
block,ሾሺܥଵ െ ݎܦଵሻାǡ ݋݌݌ଵሿ, which compares it with ݋݌݌ଵ. Similar implementation 
is done for equation (3.4) for the time derivative of the cash. Five inputs are imported Ǯ ?ǯblock, which correspond to the five terms in equation (3.4), and ǮI ?ǯǡ 
 
Figure 4.3 The Simulink block diagram of the one-bank model. 
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4.2.2   Simulation results of one bank model 
In this section, the results of the one-bank model are presented and analysed, in order 
to show how a single bank is affected by the different parameters of the model. This 
analysis facilitates the understanding of the more complex models where more than 
one bank is present. The simulation results of one-bank model are generated using the 
Simulink block diagram described in the previous section. In the simulations, the unit 
time is one day and the total simulation period is 10 days, which is a sufficient time 
period to show the simple dynamics of the one-bank model. The step size is set to 0.1, 
which means that the bank does all its daily activities in 10 time steps (we run some 
test simulations with smaller time steps and noticed that the results did not change 
significantly). The parameters, ݓଵ, ݒଵ, ݌ଵ and ݃ଵ, have the dimension of time-1, so their 
values are expressed as day-1. Results from six different simulations are presented in ǯ
the deposit under different conditions: 1) all the parameters, ݓଵ, ݒଵ, ݌ଵ and ݃ଵ equal 
to zero,  2) interest rate of the deposit bigger than zero (݃ଵ ൐  ?),  3) the return rate of 
the investment bigger than zero ( ݌ଵ ൐  ?), 4) the proportion of matured and lost 
investment bigger than zero ( ݓଵ ൐  ? and ݒଵ ൐  ?) and 5) investment opportunity 
(݋݌݌ଵ) is smaller than available cash, 6) larger shock in the deposit that makes the 
bank to fail. 
Simulation results 1: effect of the shock in deposit 
This first type of simulation is used to ǯbehaviour following a negative 
shock in the deposit. The details of initial conditions and parameter settings are shown 
in table 4.1. To study the effect of the deposit only, the parameter values of ݃ଵ , ݌ଵ , ݓଵ and ݒଵ  are set to 0 to disregard the effect of deposit interest payments, 
investment returns, matured investments and lost investments. The reserve ratio ݎ is 
set to 0.2; the effect of different values of the reserve ratio will be analysed with more 
complex models. In table 4.1, the values of cash (ܥଵ), deposit (ܦଵ), investment (ܫଵ) and 
investment opportunity (݋݌݌ଵ) represent money and they are reported in arbitrary 
units. The value of the cash in table 4.1 is set to 0.25 in order to be close to the reserve 
ratio requirement (ݎܦଵ=0.2×1=0.2). The values in table 4.1 for the investment and the 




Table 4.1 Initial conditions and parameter values used in simulation 1 . 
Initial conditions Parameter value ܥଵ ൌ  ?Ǥ ? ?  ܫଵ ൌ  ?Ǥ ? ?  ܦଵ ൌ  ?,  ݋݌݌ଵ ൌ  ? 
݃ଵ ൌ  ? , ݌ଵ ൌ  ?  ݓଵ ൌ  ? ,  ݒଵ ൌ  ? ݎ ൌ  ?Ǥ ?  
Figure 4.4 shows the behaviour ǯȋȌǡȋȌǡ
added investment (c) and cash (d). It can be seen from figure 4.4(a) that at the 
beginning the deposit is set to 1, then the deposit decreases linearly to 0.94 at day 4 as 
the result of the shock, and subsequently it goes back to 1 linearly at day 6. According 
to the behaviour of the deposit, the dynamics of the system can be analysed in the 
following three periods. 
 
Figure 4.4 ǯȋȌǡȋȌǡȋȌǡ




Period 1 (day 1- day3): when the deposit is at 1, the cash in figure 4.4(d) (blue line) is 
above the reserve ratio requirement (grey dash line). Therefore, in this period, the 
bank has extra cash to invest. This can be seen both from figure 4.4(b) where the total 
investment increases and from figure 4.4(c) where the added investment is above zero. ǡǯǡ
the added investment to decrease and total investment to increase more slowly. 
Period 2 (day 3- day5): when the deposit drops linearly from 1 to 0.94, the cash also 
drops and becomes lower than the reserve ratio requirement (the blue line goes under 
the grey dash line in figure 4.4(d)). During this period, the bank stops investing 
because of the lack of cash. Therefore, the added investment becomes zero (figure 
4.4(c)) and the total investment stays constant (figure 4.4(b)). 
Period 3 (day 5- day10): when the deposit starts to go back to 1, the cash starts to 
increase as well and after some time becomes higher than the reserve ratio 
requirement (at day 6 in figure 4.4 (d) - the blues line goes above the grey dash line). 
The bank starts to invest again at this period, therefore both the added investment in 
figure 4.4(c) and the total investment in figure 4.4(b) start to increase on day 6. 
From the analysis of the three periods, it can be concluded that, the cash changes at 
the same rate as the deposit and that the negative shock in the deposit can force the ǯ
if the shock is large enough.  
Simulation results 2: effect of paying deposit interest 
In this simulation, the same deposit signal as in simulation 1 is used. To study the effect 
of ݃ଵ, the interest rate of the deposit, all the initial conditions and other parameters 
values are kept as in table 4.1, but ݃ଵ is set to  ?Ǥ ?Ȁ ? ? ? - this value may not be realistic 
as 50% annual interest rate would be too high in a real scenario, but it is used for 
testing purpose only to get an observable difference in the results. Figure 4.5 shows 
the dynamics of the bank when ݃ଵ ൌ  ?Ǥ ?Ȁ ? ? ? (in red dashed lines) compared to the 
dynamics when ݃ଵ ൌ  ? (blue lines). Looking at figure 4.5(d), the payment of interest 
decreases the cash as the red line is always below the blue line. This causes the 
decrease in add investment as it can be seen in figure 4.5 (c) - the red line goes to zero 
after some time, which means that due to the interest payments there is no available 
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cash for investment. Figure 4.5(b) shows ȋȌǯ
increase after some time because there is no new added investment. 
 
Figure 4.5 ǯȋȌǡȋȌǡȋȌ
cash (d) for two different cases: ݃ଵ ൌ  ? (blue lines) and ݃ଵ ൌ  ?Ǥ ?Ȁ ? ? ?(red dash dot lines). 
The grey dash line in (d) is the reserve ratio requirement; ݌ଵ ൌ  ?, ݓଵ ൌ  ?, ݒଵ ൌ  ? and ݎ ൌ  ?Ǥ ?.  
Simulation results 3: effect of investment returns 
To study the effect of investment returns, ݌ଵܫଵ, a similar simulation as the previous 
ones is performed, in which the investment return rate is set to a non-zero value (݌ଵ ൌ ?Ǥ ?Ȁ ? ? ?) while the other values are kept as in table 4.1. In this situation the bank can 
earns returns (as cash) from its investment. Figure 4.6 shows the dynamics of the bank 
with the investment returns (red lines) compared to the dynamics without the returns 
(blue lines). Obviously, the investment returns increase the cash and therefore 
increases the added investment, so in figures 4.6(b), (c) and (d) the red lines are 




Figure 4.6   ǯȋȌǡ  ȋȌǡ
(c), cash (d) for two different cases: ݌ଵ ൌ  ? (blue lines) and ݌ଵ ൌ  ?Ǥ ?Ȁ ? ? ? (red dash dot 
lines). The grey dash line in (d) is the reserve ratio requirement ; ݃ଵ ൌ  ?, ݓଵ ൌ  ?,  ݒଵ ൌ  ? 
and ݎ ൌ  ?Ǥ ?. 
Simulation results 4: effect of matured and failed investments 
In this simulation, the effects of matured and failed investments are studied by 
manipulating the values of the parameter ݓଵ andݒଵ, which represent the proportion 
of the total investment that matured and failed, respectively. All the other values are 
the same as in table 4.1. Figure 4.7 represents the dynamics of the bank for three 
different cases: the first case is when ݓଵ ൌ  ? andݒଵ ൌ  ?, which means there is no 
matured and failed investment - results of this case are shown in blue lines;  the red 
line in figure 4.7 represents the results when ݓଵ ൌ  ?Ȁ ? ? ? and ݒଵ ൌ  ?, i.e.  100% 
annual matured investment rate and no failed investment; the green line, instead, 
represents the results when ݓଵ ൌ  ?Ȁ ? ? ? andݒଵ ൌ  ?Ǥ ?Ȁ ? ? ?, i.e. 100% annual matured 
investment rate and 20% failed investment rate.  
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Figures 4.7(d) and (c) show that the red lines are above the blue lines, which means 
that the matured investment increases the cash and then increases the added 
investment, as the bank gets back the investment as cash. Nevertheless, as the matured 
investment is subtracted from the total investment, the total investment decreases 
(see figure 4.7(b)). The green lines overlap the red lines in figure 4.7(c) and (d), which ǯ
cash, in the case analysed here. The only effect failed investment brings is the decrease 
in the total investment, in fact, in figure 4.7(b) the green line is below the red line. This 
is because the failed investment is subtracted from the total investment. Moreover, the ǯǡǯt change.  
 
Figure 4.7 ǯȋȌǡȋȌǡȋȌǡ
cash (d) for three different cases: ݓଵ ൌ  ? and ݒଵ ൌ  ?  (blue lines), ݓଵ ൌ  ?Ȁ ? ? ? and ݒଵ ൌ  ? 
(red dash dot lines), ݓଵ ൌ  ?Ȁ ? ? ? and ݒଵ ൌ  ?Ǥ ?Ȁ ? ? ?. The grey dash line in (d) is the reserve 




Simulation results 5: effect of investment opportunities 
Besides the deposit, the investment opportunity is another exogenous signal that can 
affect the bank as it represents an upper boundary for the added investment; in fact, 
the added investment is the minimum value of the investment opportunity, ݋݌݌ଵ, and 
the available cash, ሺܥଵ െ ݎܦଵሻା, see equation (3.2) in Chapter 3. Figure 4.8 shows the 
behaviour of the added investment (blue line) when the investment opportunity (red 
dash line) is set to 0.01 during the first two days and then increases to 0.2; the green 
line represents the amount of available cashሺܥଵ െ ݎܦଵሻା.  
 
Figure 4.8 Dynamics of added investment when݃ଵ ൌ  ?, ݌ଵ ൌ  ?, ݓଵ ൌ  ?, ݒଵ ൌ  ?, ݎ ൌ  ?Ǥ ? and ݋݌݌ଵ follows the curve represented by the red dot line. The green dash line represents 
the amount of available cash,ሺܥଵ െ ݎܦଵሻା. 
In this simulation, the deposit undergoes a shock as in the previous cases. It can be 
seen that the blue line first follows the red, then follows the green line, then becomes 
zero and finally follows the green line again. This is because during the first two days 
the investment opportunity is smaller than the available cash, so the added investment 
is limited by the investment opportunity. After two days, the opportunity increases 
and exceeds the available cash, so the added investment is limited by the available 
cash. Because of the shock in the deposit, the cash drops below the reserve 
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requirement and the bank is unable to invest, therefore there is a period of time in 
which the added investment is 0. 
Figure 4.9 reports further results of simulation 5, to see the effects of the investment 
opportunity on other activities; more specifically, figure 4.9 compares the case (blue 
lines) in which there is plenty of opportunities (݋݌݌ଵ ൌ  ?) with the case (red lines) in 
which the investment opportunity changes with time, as in figure 4.8. As shown in 
figure 4.9(c), during the first two days the red line (non-constant opportunity) is 
below the blues line ( ݋݌݌ଵ ൌ  ?) because the added investment is limited by the 
investment opportunity and fewer investments are made. This causes the total 
investment to increase more slowly and the cash to decrease more slowly for the non-
constant opportunity case, so in figure 4.9(c), the red line is below the blue line while 
in figure 4.9(d) the red line is above the blue line. 
 
Figure 4.9 ǯȋȌǡȋȌǡ(c), 
cash (d) for two different cases: (1) ݋݌݌ଵ ൌ  ?Ǥ ? ?ݓ݄݁݊ ? ൑ ݐ ൑  ?ܽ݊݀݋݌݌ଵ ൌ  ?ݓ݄݁ ݊ ? ൑ݐ ൑  ? ? (blue lines). (2)  ݋݌݌ଵ ൌ  ?ݓ݄݁ ݊ ? ൑ ݐ ൑ ? ? (red dash dot lines). The grey dash 
line in (d) is the reserve ratio requirement; ݃ଵ ൌ  ?,݌ଵ ൌ  ?, ݓଵ ൌ  ?, ݒଵ ൌ  ? and ݎ ൌ  ?Ǥ ?. 
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Simulation results 6: large shock in the deposit  
This subsection presents the case in which the bank fails; figure 4.10 reports the 
results of the simulation in which a shock in the deposit is large enough to make the 
cash negative and consequently the bank to fail. The deposit in figure 4.10(a) drops at 
day 3 to a level that causes the cash (shown in figure 4.1(d)) to decrease to a negative 
value and as result of this, the bank fails at day 4. This is a situation in which the shock 
in the deposit is too large for the bank to buffer it by itself. In the next sections, we 
introduce cases with more than one bank in the system to see whether borrowing 
between banks can reduce the occurrence of bank failure. Furthermore, in Chapter 5 
we analyse the case in which a control mechanism is developed and implemented in 
the one-bank model to make the bank more resilient to shocks. 
 
Figure 4.10 ǯȋȌǡȋȌǡ
(c), cash (blue line in (d)) and the reserve ratio requirement (grey dash line in (d)), when ݃ଵ ൌ  ? , ݌ଵ ൌ  ?, ݓଵ ൌ  ? ,  ݒଵ ൌ  ? and ݎ ൌ  ?Ǥ ?. The deposit undergoes a large shock causing 
the cash to fall below zero and the bank to fail at day 4.  
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4.3 Two-bank model 
In this section the implementation and simulation results of the two-bank model are 
presented in detail. The first subsection explains the Simulink block diagram of the 
two-bank model. The second subsection shows the simulation results to illustrate the 
effect of borrowing ǯbehaviour.  
4.3.1   Implementation of the model in Simulink 
Figure 4.11 shows the Simulink block diagram of the two-bank model. The deposit and 
investment opportunity signals for each bank are imported using the same blocks as 
in the one-bank model (red blocks).  
 
Figure 4.11 Two-bank model in Simulink. 
61 
 
Differently from the one-bank model, all the calculations are put into a single block ǮTwo-bank modelǯǢblock allows the user to write 
codes and generate their own functions and is used for simplifying the implementation. 
With the codes defined by the users, the two-bank model block can do all the desired ȋǮǯǮǯȌǢ
imported information to calculate the derivatives of the cash and investment of each ȋǯxdotǯ ?Ǥ ? ?Ȍǡ
subsequently, it passes them to the integrator. The integrator calculates the values of 
cash and investment and outputs them to the workspace through the light blue block Ǯǯ ?Ǥ ? ?Ǥ 
4.3.2   Simulation Results 
This subsection shows the simulation results of the two-bank model which are 
generated from the Simulink block diagram that is described in figure 4.11; these 
results allow us to analyse how two banks interact with each other through borrowing 
and lending. This analysis facilitates the understanding of the more complex models 
where more than two banks are present. As in the simulations of the one-bank model, 
the unit time is one day and the total simulation period is 10 days. The step size is set 
to 0.1. Since the bank either needs to borrow or to lend money, the borrowing and 
lending cannot happen in one bank at the same time; therefore, it is assumed that 
bank1 acts as the borrowing bank and bank2 acts as the lending bank. Results from two 
different simulations are presented: 1) in the first case we study the effect of 
borrowing on bank 1 which experiences a shock on its deposit; 2) in the second case 
we apply a shock on bank1 and another shock on bank2 to study the indirect effect of 
lending on bank2. 
Simulation results 1: the effect of the borrowing 
In this simulation, the initial conditions and parameter values of the two banks are 
shown in table 4.2. Bank1 experiences a large shock which makes the deposit, ܦଵ, to 
decrease from 1 to 0.76 at day 4. Bank1 needs to borrow money from bank2 which does 
not experience any shock in the deposit (ܦଶ ൌ  ? all the time). Furthermore, bank2 has 
cash above the reserve requirement (ܥଶ ൌ  ?Ǥ ? ൐ ݎܦଶ ൌ  ?Ǥ ?) that can be lent to bank1. 
To avoid that bank2 uses cash to invest, the investment opportunity in bank2 is set to 
zero (݋݌݌ଶ ൌ  ?). We consider two subcases: in the first one, ߙଵଶ, the proportion of the 
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total borrowing that is repaid, is set to 0, so that  ?ǯ
the loans that have been borrowed; in the second subcase ߙଵଶ ൐  ?. 
 
Table 4.2 Initial conditions and parameter values used in simulation 6.  
Initial conditions ܥଵ ൌ  ?Ǥ ? ?  ܫଵ ൌ  ?Ǥ ? ?  ܦଵ ൌ  ? when  ? ൑ ݐ ൑  ? ܦଵ ൌ  ?Ǥ ? ? when  ? ൑ ݐ ൑  ? ܦଵ ൌ  ? when  ? ൑ ݐ ൑ ? ? ݋݌݌ଵ ൌ  ? when   ? ൑ ݐ ൑ ? ? 
ܥଶ ൌ  ?Ǥ ?  ܫଶ ൌ  ?Ǥ ?  ܦଶ ൌ  ?  
when  ? ൑ ݐ ൑ ? ? ݋݌݌ଶ ൌ  ? 
 when  ? ൑ ݐ ൑ ? ? 
Parameter value ݃ଵ ൌ  ? , ݌ଵ ൌ  ?  ݓଵ ൌ  ? ,  ݒଵ ൌ  ? ݎ ൌ  ?Ǥ ?  ݄ଵଶ ൌ  ?  ߙଵଶ ൌ  ?  
݃ଶ ൌ  ? , ݌ଶ ൌ  ?  ݓଶ ൌ  ? ,  ݒଶ ൌ  ? ݎ ൌ  ?Ǥ ? ݄ଶଵ ൌ  ?  ߙଶଵ ൌ  ? 
 
 
Results in figure 4.12 are reported to study the behaviour of equation (3.7) when Ƚଵଶ ൌ  ?, in which case the added borrowing, ௗ஻భమௗ௧  , is only given by the minimum value 
between the cash demand of bank1 and the available cash of bank2. The blue line in 
figure 4.12 shows the money that bank1 borrows from bank2 at each time step. The 
red dash line represents the money bank1 needs to borrow,ሺݎܦଵ െ ܥଵሻା. The green 
dash dot line represents the money bank2 can lendሺܥଶ െ ݎܦଶሻା. It can be seen the blue 
line follows the red line up to day 4, which means that bank2 can lend all the money 
bank1 needs; then the blue line follows the green up to around day 5, which means that 
bank1 requires more money than bank2 can provide; after around day 5, the blue line 




Figure 4.12 Dynamics of added borrowing of bank1 when ݃ଵ ൌ ݃ଶ ൌ  ? , ݌ଵ ൌ ݌ଶ ൌ  ?,  ݓଵ ൌ ݓଶ ൌ  ? ,  ݒଵ ൌ ݒଶ ൌ  ?, ݎ ൌ  ?Ǥ ? and ݋݌݌ଵ ൌ  ?ǡ݋݌݌ଶ ൌ  ?. The red dash line represents 
the money bank1 needs to borrowሺݎܦଵ െ ܥଵሻା. The green dash dot line represents the 
money bank2 can lendሺܥଶ െ ݎܦଶሻା. The blue line represents the added borrowing. 
 
The results with Ƚଵଶ ൌ  ? are then compared with the results with Ƚଵଶ ൌ  ?. The 
comparison is made in figure 4.13, where the blue lines represent the results with Ƚଵଶ ൌ  ?, while the red lines represent the results with Ƚଵଶ ൌ  ?. From figures 4.13(b1) 
and (c1), it can be seen that the red line is always below the blue line, which means 
that repaying the borrowing causes a decrease of bank1ǯinvestment, because extra 
cash has to be used to make the repayment instead of the investment. In figure 4.13(d1) 
the red line and blue line overlap, which means that the bank1ǯ     ǯ Ǥ   4.13(d2), bank2Ǯ 
increases at around day 5 because bank2 receives borrowing repayments from bank1. 
Since bank2 ǯ    ǡ     






Figure 4.13 Dynamics of the two banks without borrowing repayment (blue lines) and 
with borrowing repayment (red lines). (a1) deposit, (b1) total investment, (c1) added 
investment, (d1) cash for bank1 - reserve ratio requirement in grey dash line in (d1). (a2) 
deposit, (b2) total investment, (c2) added investment, (d2) cash for bank1 - reserve ratio 
requirement in grey dash line in (d2). ݃ଵ ൌ  ?, ݌ଵ ൌ  ?, ݓଵ ൌ  ?, ݒଵ ൌ  ? , ݎ ൌ  ?Ǥ ? and  ݋݌݌ଵ ൌ  ?. ݃ଶ ൌ  ?, ݌ଶ ൌ  ?, ݓଶ ൌ  ? ,  ݒଶ ൌ  ?, ݎ ൌ  ?Ǥ ? and ݋݌݌ଶ ൌ  ?.   
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Simulation result 2: indirect effect of the borrowing on the lending bank 
This subsection shows a case in which borrowing has a negative effect on the lending 
bank. In order to let this behaviour to emerge, a shock in the deposit is applied on 
bank1, which is followed by a shock on bank2. Figure 4.14 reports the results of two 
different cases: blues lines represent the results when borrowing between the two 
banks is present (case 1) while red lines represent the results without borrowing (case 
2). The initial conditions and parameter values used in these two simulations are 
shown in table 4.3.  
Table 4.3 Initial conditions and parameter values used in simulation 2 . 
Initial conditions ܥଵ ൌ  ?Ǥ ? ?  ܫଵ ൌ  ?Ǥ ? ?  ܦଵ ൌ  ? when  ? ൑ ݐ ൑  ? ܦଵ ൌ  ?Ǥ ? ? when  ? ൑ ݐ ൑  ? ܦଵ ൌ  ?Ǥ ? ? when  ? ൑ ݐ ൑  ? ܦଵ ൌ  ? when  ? ൑ ݐ ൑ ? ? ܱ݌݌ଵ ൌ  ? 
ܥଶ ൌ  ?Ǥ ?  ܫଶ ൌ  ?Ǥ ?  ܦଶ ൌ  ? when  ? ൑ ݐ ൑  ? ܦଶ ൌ  ?Ǥ ? ? when  ? ൑ ݐ ൑  ? ܦଶ ൌ  ? when  ? ൑ ݐ ൑ ? ? 
 ܱ݌݌ଶ ൌ  ?Ǥ ? ? 
Parameter value ݃ଵ ൌ  ? , ݌ଵ ൌ  ?  ݓଵ ൌ  ? ,  ݒଵ ൌ  ? ݎ ൌ  ?Ǥ ?  ݄ଵଶ ൌ  ?Ǥ ? ?Ȁ ? ? ?  ߙଵଶ ൌ  ? 
݃ଶ ൌ  ? , ݌ଶ ൌ  ?  ݓଶ ൌ  ? ,  ݒଶ ൌ  ? ݎ ൌ  ?Ǥ ? ݄ଶଵ ൌ  ?Ǥ ? ?Ȁ ? ? ?  ߙଶଵ ൌ  ? 
 
The deposit signals of both banks are shown in figures 4.14(a1) and (a2). The shock in 
bank1 causes the deposit to decrease to 0.76 at day 4 and then to further decrease to 
0.75 at day 6. At the same time (day 6) a shock in bank2 happens causing bank2ǯ
deposit to decrease to 0.76. Bank1ǯ         
shock (see figure 4.14(d1)); with the borrowing from bank2, bank1Ǯecreases 
more slowly and it even increases during day 3 to day 5 (blue line), while without the 
borrowing from bank2, bank1 fails at day 4 (red line). Due to the lending to bank1, 
bank2ǯ ? ?sults 




Figure 4.14 Dynamics of the two-bank model without borrowing (blue lines) and with 
borrowing (red lines). (a1) deposit, (b1) total investment, (c1) added investment, (d1) 
cash for bank1 - reserve ratio requirement in grey dash line in (d1). (a2) deposit, (b2) 
total investment, (c2) added investment, (d2) cash for bank2 - reserve ratio requirement 
in grey dash line in (d2). ݃ଵ ൌ  ?, ݌ଵ ൌ  ?, ݓଵ ൌ  ?,  ݒଵ ൌ  ?, ݎ ൌ  ?Ǥ ? and ݋݌݌ଵ ൌ  ?ǡ ݃ଶ ൌ  ?, ݌ଶ ൌ  ?, ݓଶ ൌ  ?,  ݒଶ ൌ  ?, ݎ ൌ  ?Ǥ ? and ݋݌݌ଶ ൌ  ?Ǥ ?. 
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red line during day 3 to day 5). At day 5 a shock is experienced by bank2. As the cash 
of both banks is below the reserve ratio requirement, there is no borrowing/lending 
between the two banks during the second shock. Bank2 fails during this shock, while 
bank1 survives at the end of the simulation period. The indirect effect of the borrowing 
on the lending bank can be seen in this case: bank2 (lending bank) could survive during ǯ1 (see red line in figure 4.14(d2)). The ǯǡǯ
buffer a possible following shock. However, the borrowing has a positive effect for 
bank1, since it saves the bank from the shock. More complex cases will be studied in 
the multi-bank model in the next section, in which there are 50 banks in the system.   
4.4 Multi-bank model 
This section shows the implementation and the simulation results of the multi-bank 
model which is described in Chapter 3. The first subsection shows the Simulink block 
diagram of the multi-bank model while the second subsection presents the simulation 
results. In the simulations, shocks are introduced into the system via deposit. To study 
the stability of the banking system, the number of survival banks at the end of the 
simulation period are calculated and compared in different scenarios characterised by 
different values of the link rate, reserve ratio, the amplitude of the shock and the   ǯ Ǥ ǡ     characterised and 
studied as a function of link rate, reserve ratio and heterogeneity under different 
amplitudes of the shock. 
4.4.1 Implementation of multi-bank model in Simulink 
The Simulink block diagram of the multi-bank model, shown in figure 4.15, is similar 
to the one used for the two-bank model, but with two main improvements: 
1. The new Simulink block diagram can accommodate any number of banks in the 
system. The input signals (red blocks in figure 4.15) are represented by multi-
column matrixes (rather than just two-column matrixes) that contain the data for 
all banks. For example, the deposit signal in the two-bank Simulink block diagram ǣǯǢ
block diagram the deposit signal has one column representing the time and other 
N (number of banks in the system) columns representing the deposit values for 
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the N banks. All the other parameters (such as ݓ௜ , ݒ௜ , ݌௜  and ݃௜ ) and initial 
conditions used in Simulink (yellow blocks) are vectors that represent the 
information for all the banks.  
2. A new MATLAB script has been developed to perform the simulations, save and 
plot the results automatically with parameter values and initial conditions 
provided by the user. The script can also repeat the simulation a few times with 
the same parameter settings and calculate the average results automatically.  More 
details about the MATLAB script are included in Appendix 3. 
 
Figure 4.15 Simulink block diagram of the multi-bank model. 
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4.4.2 Simulation results of multi-bank model 
This subsection presents the results of simulations for two different cases: 
homogenous case (all banks have similar deposit size) and heterogeneous case (banks 
have deposit sizes that follow a Gaussian distribution) - see equations (3.15) and (3.16) 
in Chapter 3. In both cases, the following parameters are the same for all the 
simulations that are presented in this subsection: the number of banks in the system 
at the beginning of simulations is 50 - this number of banks is sufficient to provide a 
rich dynamics of the system. The unit time is one day and the total simulation time is 
300 days, which is a period of time long enough to observe the relevant dynamics.  
Homogeneous case simulation results 
This subsection shows the simulation results in the homogenous case, in which banks 
have similar size; the shocks is introduced into the system via deposit fluctuations. The 
values for the parameters in equation (3.15), which provide the deposit signal,  are set 
as follow: ܦഥ  =1000 (average size of each bank) and ߪ஽= 0.3 or ߪ஽= 0.7 (representing 
low and high amplitude of the shocksȌǡǯ
work [103]. The initial conditions of each bank are set as follows: the cash is set to ܥ௜ ൌ200 and the investment is ܫ௜ =800, so to have a net-worth close to zero; both 
borrowing, ܤ௜ , and lending, ܮ௜, are set to 0.  
The values used for the link rate, ݈௥, are 0, 0.03, 0.15, 0.3, 0.5, 0.75 and 1. The values 
used for the reserve ratio,ݎ, are 0.1, 0.2, 0.3, 0.4, 0.5, 0.6 and 0.7. Thus, there are 7x7= 
49 different combinations of link rate and reserve ratio, corresponding to 49 different 
scenarios. Each scenario is simulated 20 times Ȃ this number of simulations provide 
averages of the results with small standard deviations, for the given random shocks 
used in the simulations. All the results shown in this subsection are the averages of the 
20 simulations.  
Simulation results 1: effect of the reserve ratio on the number of survival banks  
Figure 4.16 shows how the number of survival banks is affected by different reserve 
ratios when the link rate,݈௥, is fixed, and ߪ஽= 0.3. Figure 4.16(a) reports the results 
corresponding to ݈௥= 0; this figure shows that when there is no interbank lending, the 
reserve ratio definitely plays a positive role to preserve the stability of the system. In 
fact, as the reserve ratio increases, more banks survive at the end of the simulation 
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period. It should be noticed that around 6 banks fail very quickly, within 1 or 2 days, 
and then the rate of failure decreases. This can be explained as follows: at the 
beginning of the simulation, all banks have cash equals to 200, investment equals to 
800 and they can get 240 from matured investments every day. Therefore, if they 
experience a shock which is larger than 440 (=200+240), they fail because there is no 
interbank lending (݈௥= 0). According to equation (3.15), the shock on a bank at time ݐ 
is given by ܦഥߪ஽ߝ௧ , where ܦഥ ൌ  ? ? ? ?, ߪ஽ ൌ  ?Ǥ ? and ߝ௧  ?ܰሺ ?ǡ ?ሻ; therefore, ܦഥߪ஽ߝ௧  ?ܰሺ ?ǡ ? ? ?ଶሻ. The probability, ݌, that ܦഥߪ஽ߝ௧ is smaller than -440 (i.e. the shock 
is larger than the sum of cash and matured investment) can be calculated as follows: 
first transform ܦഥߪ஽ߝ௧  into normal distributed variable, ݖ ൌ ஽ഥఙವఌ೟ି଴ଷ଴଴ ; then, it can get 
that ݌ሺܦഥߪ஽ߝ௧ ൏ െ ? ? ?ሻ ൌ ݌ ቀ஽ഥఙವఌ೟ି଴ଷ଴଴ ൏  െ ସସ଴ଷ଴଴ቁ ൌ ݌ሺݖ ൏ െ ?Ǥ ?ሻ ൌ  ?Ǥ ? ? . Therefore, 
about 4 banks, (50×0.08) are likely to fail at day 1, which is close to the value in figure 
4.16(a). In the following days, the survival banks have more cash from matured 
investments and from potential positive shocks, so the failure rates decreases.    
The effect of the reserve ratio, however, is different when the link rate increases as 
shown in figures 4.16(b) (c) and (d); the figures show that some banks fail around day 
1 and the number of failed banks is higher if the reserve ratio is higher - the remaining 
banks survive until the end of the simulation. This is because high reserve ratios 
discourage banks from lending, which is a problem when some banks experience 
negative shocks in their deposits. When the reserve ratio is low, for example ݎ=0.3, 
banks have more available cash for lending; with lending/borrowing, fewer banks fail. 
As reserve ratio increases the banks have less available cash for lending, because they 
need to keep the cash to meet their reserve requirement; therefore, more banks fail 
because they cannot borrow enough money to buffer the shock.  
There two reasons why the number of survival banks stays constant after the first a ǣǯǡ
(300 as ܦഥߪ஽ߝ௧  ?ܰሺ ?ǡ ? ? ?ଶሻ), the banks have enough cash to resist the shocks without 
the help of interbank lending. When the reserve ratio, ݎ, ranges between 0.1 and 0.3, ǯ





Figure 4.16  Number of survival banks in the homogeneous case with ߪ஽ ൌ  ?Ǥ ?ǡ ߪ௢௣௣ ൌ  ?Ǥ ? 
with different reserve ratios, ݎ =0.1 (dark blue line), ݎ =0.2(light red line), ݎ =0.3 (yellow 
line), ݎ =0.4 (purple line), ݎ =0.5 (green line), ݎ =0.6 (light blue line), ݎ =0.7 (dark red 
line), and under different link rates, ݈௥ = 0 (a), ݈௥ = 0.15 (b), ݈௥  = 0.5 (c), 
 ݈௥= 1 (d). 
From these results, it can be concluded that it is safe for the isolated bank to keep a 
high reserve ratio to preserve itself from the large shocks, but this is not always 
beneficial for the whole system, in fact, the dark red line (ݎ=0.7) in figure 4.16(a) is 
lower than the corresponding dark red lines in figures 4.16(b), (c) and (d) which have 
higher link rate; this indicates that the effect of the reserve ratio should be analysed 
together with the effect of the link rate. Moreover, the link rate seems to have a more 





Simulation results 2: effect of the link rate on the number of survival banks 
Figure 4.17 shows the effect of the link rate on the number of surviving banks, when 
the reserve ratio is fixed. Figures 4.17(a), (b), (c) and (d) show that more banks survive 
as the link rate increases; looking at the dark blue line, (݈௥ = 0), and the light red line, 
(݈௥ = 0.03), across the 4 figures, the higher the reserve ratio the more banks survive. 
With higher link rate (from 0.3 to 1) most banks survive and not significant differences 
exist for the different cases. This indicates that, when exceeding a threshold value, the 
increase in the link rate does not help much in improving any further the stability of 
the system. ǯ
the system stable, when the shock is not very larger. 
 
Figure 4.17 Number of survival banks in the homogeneous case with ߪ஽ ൌ  ?Ǥ ?ǡ ߪ௢௣௣ ൌ  ?Ǥ ?ǡ 
with different link rates, ݈௥  = 0 (dark blue line), ݈௥  = 0.03 (light red line), ݈௥  = 0.15 (yellow 
line), ݈௥  = 0.3 (purple line), ݈௥  = 0. 5 (green line), ݈௥  = 0.75 (light blue line), ݈௥  = 1 (dark 
red line), and under different reserve ratios, ݎ =0.1(a), ݎ =0.3(b), ݎ =0.6 (c), ݎ =0.7 (d). 
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Simulation results 3: effect of the shock amplitude on number of survival banks 
This subsection shows the simulation results when shocks have a higher amplitude. 
The amplitude of the shocks, ߪ஽, is increased to 0.7; the results are compared with the 
ones with ߪ஽= 0.3, reported in simulations 1 and 2, to see if the effects of the link rate 
and reserve ratio change when the system is under large shocks. 
Figure 4.18 shows how the number of survival banks is affected by different reserve 
ratios when the link rate,݈௥, is fixed. Figure 4.18(a) shows that banks fail more quickly 
(at day 40 all banks fail) than in simulation 1 due to larger shocks. When the link rate 
is fixed, similar effect of the reserve ratio is found as in simulation1. In figure 4.18(a), 
in which ݈௥  = 0, a higher reserve ratio makes bank survive longer while, when the link  
 
Figure 4.18 Number of survival banks in the homogeneous case with ߪ஽ ൌ  ?Ǥ ?ǡ ߪ௢௣௣ ൌ  ?Ǥ ? 
with different reserve ratios: ݎ  = 0.1 (dark blue line), ݎ  = 0.2(light red line), ݎ  = 0.3 
(yellow line), ݎ = 0.4 (purple line), ݎ = 0.5 (green line), ݎ = 0.6 (light blue line), ݎ = 0.7 
(dark red line) under different link rates, ݈௥= 0 (a), ݈௥  = 0.15 (b), ݈௥  = 0.5 (c), ݈௥  = 1 (d). 
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rate increases to 0.15, 0.5 and 1 as in figures 4.18(b), (c) and (d), higher reserve ratio 
works in an opposite way, causing more banks to fail because it discourages banks 
from lending. The negative effect of the high reserve ratio is more obvious in figures 
4.18(b), (c) and (d) when compared to figures 4.16(b), (c) and (d). 
Figure 4.19 shows the effect of the link rate on the number of surviving banks, when 
the reserve ratio is fixed. Comparing the results in figure 4.19 with the results from 
simulation 2, the same effect of the link rate is found; as the link rate increases more 
banks survive. In figures 4.19(a) and (b), when the link rate is equal or bigger than 0.3, 
the increase in the link rate does not make a noticeable difference. In figure 4.19(c) 
this happens when the link rate is equal or bigger than 0.5, while in figure 4.19(d) this 
happen when the link rate is equal or bigger than 0.75. This indicates that high reserve  
 
Figure 4.19 Number of survival banks in the homogeneous case with ߪ஽ ൌ  ?Ǥ ?ǡ ߪ௢௣௣ ൌ  ?Ǥ ?ǡ 
with different link rates, ݈௥  = 0 (dark blue line), ݈௥  = 0.03 (light red line), ݈௥  = 0.15 (yellow 
line), ݈௥  = 0.3 (purple line), ݈௥  = 0. 5 (green line), ݈௥  = 0.75 (light blue line), ݈௥  = 1 (dark 
red line), and under different reserve ratios, ݎ = 0.1 (a), ݎ = 0.3 (b), ݎ = 0.6 (c), ݎ = 0.7 (d). 
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ratios limit banks from lending; it is harder for banks to find available cash to borrow 
as reserve ratio increases, therefore, banks need to be more connected to have more 
chance to borrow and survive. 
Simulation results 4: joint effect of the link rate, reserve ratio and shock 
amplitude on the number of survival banks 
The trends showed in simulation 1, 2 and 3 can be observed in figures 4.20, which 
reports the waterfall plot of the number of surviving banks at day 300 (the end of any 
simulation) as function of both link rate and reserve ratio, when ߪ஽ ൌ  ?Ǥ ? or ߪ஽ ൌ  ?Ǥ ?. 
Figures 4.20(a) and (c) show the results for lower and higher amplitude of the shock, 
respectively; a larger amplitude of the shock causes more banks to fail, as expected, 
but the link rate has always a positive effect on the system. Reserve ratio acts 
positively when the link rate is low (see figure 4.20(b) for clearer evidence) and acts 
in the opposite way when link rate is high (see figure 4.20(d)).  
 
Figure 4.20 Waterfall plots showing the number of survival banks in the homogeneous 
case at day 300 as function of both link rate and reserve ratio; (a) and ( b)  ߪ஽ ൌ  ?Ǥ ? ; (c) 
and (d) ߪ஽ ൌ  ?Ǥ ? . 
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Simulation results 5: contagion 
Another interesting aspect of the model is the analysis of contagion of failure due to 
the interbank borrowing and lending. A measure of contagion is defined as follows: 
when a bank fails, the algorithm checks whether that bank has unpaid loans from those ǤǮǯ
the case in which the bank would have survived if it did not have those unpaid loans: 
therefore, the total of unpaid loans is considered to be significant if it is bigger than ǯǤǡ
proportion of failed banks with significant unpaid loans, as compared to the total 
number of failed banks, is calculated; the higher this proportion, the higher the 
contagion. Figure 4.21 reports the proportion of failed banks with significant unpaid 
loans as a function of both link rate and reserve ratio when ɐୈ ൌ  ?Ǥ ? (a) and ɐୈ ൌ  ?Ǥ ? 
(b). Figure 4.21(a) shows that the ratios are all quiet small (maximum is 0.1, see the 
colour bar) when ɐୈ ൌ  ?Ǥ ?, which means the contagion is small when the shock is 
small. This is also because most banks did not fail at the end of the simulation (see 
figure 4.20(a)). When the shocks are larger, contagion increases as in figure 4.21(b); 
up to 60% of the failed banks are affected by contagion. Therefore, the following 
analysis is focused on the high-shock case, to study how the link rate and reserve ratio 
affect contagion. 
 
Figure 4.21  Contagion for the homogeneous case as function of link rate ( ݈௥  = 0 to 1) and 




Figure 4.22 is a larger version of figure 4.21(b), and is divided into 4 areas: Area1 (ݎ 
from 0.1 to 0.35 and ݈௥ from 0 to 0.5), Area2 (ݎ from 0.35 to 0.7 and ݈௥ from 0 to 0.5), 
Area3 (ݎ from 0.35 to 0.7 and ݈௥ from 0.5 to 1) and Area4 (ݎ from 0.1 to 0.35 and ݈௥ 
from 0.5 to 1).  
 
Figure 4.22 Contagion for the homogeneous case as function of link rate ( ݈௥= 0 to 1) and 
reserve ratios(r = 0.1 to 0.7), when ߪ஽ ൌ  ?Ǥ ? . 
Looking at Area1 and Area2, when link rate is fixed and less than 0.2, an increase in 
the reserve ratio does not change the contagion significantly, as banks are less 
connected and failure has fewer channels to spread; when link rate is fixed and 
between 0.2 and 0.5, an increase in the reserve ratio decreases the contagion, as a high 
reserve ratio discourages the banks from lending to others, thus decreases the 
channels for failure to spread. 
Area4 and Area3 show how contagion is affected by the reserve ratio when the link 
rate is high and fixed; an increase in the reserve ratio has a nonlinear effect on 
contagion, in fact, contagion increases as the reserve ratio increases from 0.1 to 0.35 
(Area4), and it decreases as the reserve ratio increases from 0.35 to 0.7 (Area3). The 
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reason for the decrease in contagion in Area3 is the same as explain in the previous 
paragraph: high reserve ratio discourages the banks from lending to others. To explain 
the increase in contagion in Area4, figure 4.23 is reported, which plots the mean and 
variance of all the unpaid loans as a function of the link rate. The different colour of 
the lines represents the different reserve ratios. It can be seen that when link rate 
ranges from 0.5 to 1, the mean of the unpaid loans increase as ݎ increases from 0.1 
(light red line) to 0.3 (yellow line). This indicates that banks borrow more money (the 
mean increases), because they may need to satisfy an increasing reserve requirement. 
Therefore, the unpaid loans may increase in size, resulting in overall increase in 
contagion.  
 
Figure 4.23  Mean and variance of all the unpaid loans as a function of link rate, when ߪ஽ ൌ  ?Ǥ ?ǡ ߪ௢௣௣ ൌ  ?Ǥ ? and for different reserve ratios: ݎ = 0.1 (dark blue line), ݎ = 0.2 (light 
red line), ݎ = 0.3 (yellow line), ݎ = 0.4 (purple line), ݎ = 0.5 (green line), ݎ = 0.6 (light blue 
line), ݎ = 0.7 (dark red line). 
Looking at Area1 and Area4 in figure 4.22, it can be seen how contagion is affected by 
the link rate when the reserve ratio is low and fixed. For a fixed value of the reserve 
ratio, the link rate shows a nonlinear effect on contagion; when the link rate increase 
from 0 to 0.5 (Area1), the contagion increases - banks are more connected thus they 
have more channels to spread failure, while when the link rate increases from 0.5 to 1 
(area 2), contagion decreases. This can be explained looking at figure 4.23; for low 
values of ݎ (from 0.1 to 0.3, corresponding to light red line, dark blue line and yellow 
line respectively), as ݈௥ increases from 0.5 to 1, the mean and variance of the unpaid 
loans decrease. This indicates that as link rate increases, the amount of borrowings 
between banks become smaller in size and more uniformly distributed. Therefore, 
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failed banks have smaller loans thus it is unlikely they are significant enough to cause 
the contagion. 
Area2 and Area3 show how contagion is affected by the link rate when reserve ratio is 
high and fixed. The contagion increases as link rate increases from 0 to 0.25 because 
banks are more connected. As link rate increases from 0.25 to 1, the contagion does 
not change much. This is because when reserve ratio is high, an increase in the link 
rate does not increase the borrowing, as banks need to keep cash as reserves. 
Therefore, the channels for spreading failure do not increase significantly. 
Heterogeneous case simulation results 
This section shows the simulation results in the heterogeneous case, in which banks 
vary in size. Deposit data for each bank are generated using equation (3.16), in which ܦഥ௜ ?ȁܰሺɊ௦ǡ ߪ௦ଶሻȁ, is assigned to the banks by sampling from a Gaussian distribution 
with the mean, Ɋ௦, and variance, ߪ௦ଶ. The values of ߪ௦ , representing the degree of the 
heterogeneity, are set to 100, 200, 300, 400, 500, 600 and 700. The initial conditions 
of bankiǯ cash (ܥ௜), investment (ܫ௜), borrowing (ܤ௜), lending (ܮ௜) and net-worth ( ௜ܰ) 
are 0.2×ܦ௜, 0.8×ܦ௜, 0, 0 and 0 respectively. The reserve ratio,ݎ, is set 0.2. This reserve 
ratio does not limit the banks much from lending, so that the effect of the link rate can 
be observed. 
The values of the link rate, ݈௥, are 0, 0.03, 0.15, 0.3, 0.5, 0.75 and 1 and given the 7 
different values of the degree of the heterogeneity, ߪ௦  , there are 49 different 
combinations in total, corresponding to 49 different scenarios. Each simulation case is 
repeated 20 times, to make sure that the main trends in the results are not significantly 
affected by random noise. All the results shown in this subsection are the averages of 
the 20 times. The simulation results show how the number of survival banks is affected 
by heterogeneity, link rate and the amplitude of the shock. 
Simulations results 6: effect of the heterogeneity on number of survival banks 
Figure 4.24 reports the waterfall plots of the number of surviving banks at day 300 as 
function of both link rate and heterogeneity when ɐୈ ൌ  ?Ǥ ? and ɐୈ ൌ  ?Ǥ ?. Looking at 
figure 4.24(a), when the shock amplitude is low, ɐୈ ൌ  ?Ǥ ?, the effect of the link rate 
seems not to be significant, in fact, as link rate increases from 0.03 to 1, the lines in the 
figure 4.24(a) stay flat and almost all the banks survive at the end of the simulation. In 
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figure 4.24(c), instead, the effect of heterogeneity seems not be significant, in fact, for 
all different link rate cases, the lines stay flat. It should be pointed out that with ݈௥ ൌ  ?, 
only a few banks survive. Therefore, the following analysis is focused on the case in 
which a high shock amplitude, ɐୈ ൌ  ?Ǥ ?, is applied.  
 
Figure 4.24 Waterfall plots showing the number of survival banks in the heterogeneity 
case at day 300, as function of both heterogeneity and link rate, when ߪ஽ ൌ  ?Ǥ ? (a) and 
(c), and ߪ஽ ൌ  ?Ǥ ? (b) and (d). 
Figure 4.25 shows the effect of the link rate on the number of surviving banks, when 
the link rate is fixed. Figure 4.25(a) shows that when ݈௥= 0, there is little difference in 
number of survival banks as the heterogeneity changes. Since banks are isolated and 
are not affected by the interbank borrowing and lending, changes ǯ not 
affect the results. As the link rate increases, banks are connected and start to affect 
each other. Link rate has a positive effect as shown in figure 4.25(b), (c) and (d), in 
which the link rate is equal to 0.15, 0.5 and 1, respectively. This can also be observed 
in figure 4.25(b), in which more banks survive as the link rate increases. However, 
high heterogeneity tends to destabilise the system as shown in figures 4.25(b), (c) and 
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(d); more banks fail when ݈௥= 0.75 (light blue line) and ݈௥= 1 (dark red line), compared 
to other lines with lower link rates.  
 
Figure 4.25  Number of survival banks in heterogeneous case with ߪ஽ ൌ  ?Ǥ ?ǡ ߪ௢௣௣ ൌ  ?Ǥ ?ǡ 
and heterogeneities, ߪ௦ = 100 (dark blue line), ߪ௦ = 200 (light red line), ߪ௦ = 300 (yellow 
line), ߪ௦  = 400 (purple line), ߪ௦  = 500 (green line), ߪ௦  = 600 (light blue line), ߪ௦  = 700 
(dark red line), and under different link rates ݈௥= 0 (a), ݈௥= 0.15 (b), ݈௥= 0.5 (c), ݈௥=1 (d). 
Simulation results 7: contagion effect on heterogeneous banks 
The same definition is used in this subsection to quantify contagion as in the 
homogeneous case. Figure 4.26 shows the contagion effect as function of the interbank 
link rate and the heterogeneity, when ɐୈ ൌ  ?Ǥ ? (a) and  ɐୈ ൌ  ?Ǥ ? (b). The contagion 
effect is very small when the shock amplitude is low, see figure 4.26(a), compared to 




Figure 4.26  Contagion in heterogeneous banks as function of interbank link rate ( ݈௥= 0 
to 1) and heterogeneity (ߪ௦ =100 to 700), when ߪ஽ ൌ  ?Ǥ ? (a) and  ߪ஽ ൌ  ?Ǥ ? (b). 
 
4.5 Conclusions 
This chapter shows the MATLAB Simulink implementation of the dynamic models 
described in Chapter 3 as well as the results of numerical simulations. It is useful to 
highlight how results presented in this chapter compare with results in the literature, 
more specifically results presented by Iori et al. [103]. Ǥǯ work, it is found that more banks survive when the degree of linkage is 
high. Same conclusion about the link rate can be obtained from the proposed dynamic 
model, which shows that the link rate always contributes positively to the number of 
survival banks. Increasing the reserve ratio has the effect of decreasing the incidence 
of bank failures when the link rate is zero. These findings can be found both in Iori et Ǥǯ work and in this work, which indicate that reserve ratio adds stability to the 
individual banks. However, with an interbank market (link rate larger than zero), the 
effect of the reserve ratio is less clear in Ǥǯ model; increasing the reserve ratio 
initially leads to an increase in the incidence of bank failures, but when reserve ratio 
crosses a critiǡǯfailures. In this work, no such change 
is found; increasing the reserve ratio always causes more banks to fail. This may be 
because in this work larger shocks have been applied; in fact, the amplitude of the 
shocks,ߪ஽, is set to 0.3 and 0.7, which are larger than the value used in Iori Ǥǯǡ
(0.25), thus, the reserve ratio is not sufficient for the individual banks to withstand the 
shock. Therefore, high reserve ratio cannot make more banks survive from the large 
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shock. A further simulation with ߪ஽= 0.25 have been run, and similar results to Iori et Ǥǯȋfigure A.1 in Appendix 4). 
The methods to qualify the contagion ǯ in Iori et al.ǯodel are different 
from the method proposed in this chapter, but two same conclusions can be drawn: 
the first one is that increasing the link rate is likely to increase contagion. In Iori Ǥǯ
work, the size of the avalanches (i.e. the number of failing banks at one point of time) 
gets larger when link rate gets higher; the results of contagion in this chapter also 
show that the contagion increases as link rate increase. The second conclusion is that 
the heterogeneity can contribute to contagion; in Iori et al.ǯ work, more contagion is 
found in the heterogeneous case compared to the homogenous case - the same trend 
is found in the proposed model. 
The results presented in this chapter show that increasing the reserve ratio to 
preserve the banking sǯ. A high 
reserve ratio, in fact, may be advantageous only when the shocks in the deposit is not 
very large and the banks are sparsely connected; when the shocks are large, a high 
reserve ratio may be detrimental to the survival of the banks. Encouraging the 
interbank activities (large link rate), instead, has always a positive effect on the 
number of survival banks in the system. More results of the effect of the reserve ratio 
and the link rate on the interest rate and net-worth of the banks can be found in 
Appendix 4 (figures A.2 and A.3). 
Furthermore, the results presented in this chapter show that both link rate and 
reserve ratio have nonlinear effects on the contagion ǯ. These results 
show the importance of modelling the banking system when simultaneous changes in 
different parameters may have a non-intuitive effect; it is the belief of the authors of 
the proposed work that the findings presented in this chapter can ultimately help 
financial regulators in implementing new policies to preserǯ
stability.       
Finally, it is important to stress that there are situations in which some or all banks in 
the system fail; this suggests that the introduction of control mechanisms to prevent 
banks from failing would be desirable. The next chapter shows the application of 
control mechanisms on the one-bank model to study and improve the stability of each 





Chapter 5  
 
Control Analysis  
 
 
This chapter presents the application and analysis of control mechanisms on the 
model of the nonlinear banking system introduced in Chapter 3. Classical control 
theory is used to study the stability of the dynamic model and subsequently output 
feedback control is designed to improve the stability of the system. It is well known 
that common analytical techniques in the classical control theory are more powerful 
to linear models rather than nonlinear models. Moreover, a nonlinear system is very 
complex and there is no generic way to deal with a nonlinear control system. 
Therefore, linearization is performed on the original model at first. The designed 
feedback control mechanisms are then applied to both the nonlinear model and 
linearized model for testing and comparison.  
This chapter is organized as follows. Section 5.1 shows the general process of control 
system design which can also be used to design controllers for the banking system. 
Section 5.2 explains some basic methodologies which are used in the analysis 
including introduction of state-space models, linearization around the equilibrium 
point and analysis of the stability, observability and controllability of a system. Section 
5.3 presents an equilibrium point analysis for the one-bank model, while Section 5.4 
shows how to perform linearization around these equilibrium points. Section 5.5 gives 
details of the control design according to the analysis in Sections 5.3 and 5.4 as well as 
presenting some simulation results with the designed controller applied. Section 5.6 
presents the conclusions. 
5.1 Control System Design Process 
The design of a control system is a specific example of engineering design. The aim of 
control design is to obtain the system configuration, set the performance specification, 
85 
 
and manipulate the key parameters so that the proposed system performs as desired. 
Though this process is used in the engineering industry, it can be transferred to the 
banking system. Figure 5.1 shows the general process of control system design. It 
consists of seven blocks which are arranged into the three groups explained as follows.  
 
Figure 5.1 Control system design process, adapted from [15]. 
Establishment of goals, variables to be controlled and specifications 
The first step of a control design is to establish the control objectives. For the banking 
system, the general objective is to keep the system stable and ensure that banks do not 
fail. The objectives can vary according to the different problems that the study focuses 




Based on the defined overall control objectives, the variables to be controlled and the 
performance specification are decided upon. The variables to be controlled should be 
the variables that can be manipulated. For example, in the banking system, what the 
bank can control are the lending and investment amongst other things, and these can 
be considered as control variables. The bank cannot control its deposit, so this cannot 
be used as control variables. The performance specifications describe how the closed-
loop system should perform. Usually, it requires the closed-loop system to be stable 
and has a desirable response. The desired response should meet the requirements in 
rise time (the time needed by the control system to reach the desired value after a 
perturbation), peak overshoot (the highest value reached by the response before 
reaching the desired value) and settling time (the time system needs to be stable). 
System definition and modelling 
With the given control objectives and specifications, a control configuration (as shown 
in figure 2.6) can be identified. Then a suitable mathematical model should be built for 
the control analysis and design. Part of this modelling has been performed in chapter 
3 where three models of the banking system have been generated. As the chosen 
design techniques can only be applied to a linear model, linearization of the nonlinear 
banking system models is needed. The linearization involves creating a linear 
approximation of a nonlinear system that is valid in a small region around the 
equilibrium point, a steady-state condition in which all model states are constant. A 
linear model can be obtained by linearization. The analysis and designs are done based 
on this linear model.  
Control system design, simulation, and analysis 
Based on the control configuration and the valid linear model, a controller can be 
designed. The most important process in control design is to adjust the parameter 
values of the controller in order to meet the objectives and performance specifications. 
Then the controller is tested and verified in computer simulations using the full model.  
The design can be finalized and can be proceed to document the results if the desired 
performance is achieved. If the performance is not stable, an improved system 
configuration needs to be established. Then the design process will be repeated until 
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the specifications are met, or sometimes the specifications are considered to be too 
demanding and need to be relaxed.  
5.2 Methodologies in control theory 
This section introduces some basic concepts of control theory which form the 
methodology of the control analysis for the banking system. These include how to use 
the state-space form to represent the model, linearize the model around the 
equilibrium point and study the stability, controllability and observability of the linear 
model.  
5.2.1 State-space representation of the model 
In control engineering, a state-space model is a mathematical model of a system 
whereby the input, output and state variables are related by ordinary differential 
equations. The idea of state-space modelling comes from the state-variable method of 
describing differential equations. In this method, the differential equations describing 
a dynamic system are organized as a set of ordinary differential equations in the 
vector-valued state of the system, and the solution is visualized as a trajectory of this 
state vector in space.   
A general state-space model is shown in equation (5.1),  ࢞ሶ ൌ ଵ݂ሺ࢞ǡ ࢛ǡ ࢊǡ ݐሻ ܡ ൌ ݄ଵሺ࢞ǡ ࢛ǡ ࢊǡ ݐሻ                                                        (5.1) 
where ࢞ is a column vector that represents the state variables. It contains ݊ elements 
for an ݊th-order system. The state variables are the smallest possible subset of system 
variables that can represent the entire state of the system at any given time. The 
minimum number of state variables required to represent a given system, ݊, is usually 
equals to the order of the system's defining differential equation. ࢞ሶ  represents the time 
derivative of each state variable which is also a column vector that has the same size 
as ࢞. ࢛ represents the control inputs variable andࢊ is the disturbance. Both ࢛ and ࢊ 
are row vectors. The numbers of elements in ࢛ and ࢊ are the numbers of the control 
inputs and disturbances. In the one-bank model the cash ܥଵ and investment ܫଵ are the 
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state variables, deposit ܦଵ and investment opportunities ܱ݌݌ଵare the disturbance and 
output is the cashܥଵ.  
Figure 5.2 recalls the block diagram shows the feedback control with state-space 
representation. From the figure it can be seen that the disturbance is an exogenous 
signal that the system cannot control. 
 
Figure 5.2 A block diagram of a negative feedback control system represented in a state -
space form. The plant of the system now is described by ࢞ሶ  which is the derivative of the 
state variable ࢞. ࢟ represents the output of the system. Both࢞ሶ  and ࢟ are functions of the 
state variable ࢞, control input variable ࢛, external disturbances ࢊ and time ݐ. 
A state-space model is used because it can deal with multi-input and multi-output 
systems, i.e. systems that have more than one control input or more than one sensed 
output. Though in the analysis of the one-bank model, the system is a single-input 
single-output system (SISO), this method still can be used and it can build up a good 
foundation for the future analysis of the two-bank model as well as the multi-bank 
model. Another reason to use the state-space model is that it is particularly well suited 
to the use of computer techniques, which enhance our ability to take the advantage of 
the computational efficiency of MATLAB. 
In equation (5.1), when ଵ݂ and ݄ଵ are nonlinear functions of ࢞ and ࢛, it can be said that 
the system is nonlinear, while when ଵ݂ and ݄ଵ are linear with respect to both ࢞ and ࢛, 
the system is linear system. Additionally, if the dynamical system is linear and there is 
no disturbance input, the SISO system can be expressed in matrix form shown as 
follows: ࢞ሺ࢚ሻሶ ൌ ࡭࢞ሺ࢚ሻ ൅ ࡮࢛ሺ࢚ሻ ࢟ሺ࢚ሻ ൌ ࡯࢞ሺ࢚ሻ ൅ ࡰ࢛ሺ࢚ሻ                                                   (5.2) 
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 where ࡭  א ࡾ௡ൈ௡ , ࡮  א ࡾ௡ൈଵ , ࡯  א ࡾଵൈ௡ , and ࡰ  א ࡾ . Sometimes, real systems are 
described by nonlinear models such as (5.1), and the tools in classic control theory 
usually cannot be employed to design controllers for nonlinear systems. Therefore, 
linearization technique is used to find the corresponding linear models which can 
approximate the original nonlinear system thus it is possible to study the behaviour 
of the nonlinear system with the classic control tools by considering the linearized 
models. 
5.2.2 Equilibrium point and linearization 
Frequently behaviour of the nonlinear model within a certain operating range of an 
equilibrium point can be reasonably approximated by that of a linear model. One 
reason for approximating the nonlinear system by a linear model is that, by doing so, 
one can apply rather simple and systematic linear control design techniques such as 
root locus analysis. The behaviour of the solutions of the linear system are expected 
to be the same as the nonlinear ones, so that a controller designed based on the linear 
model will perform well also on the nonlinear model. However, it needs to be stressed 
that a linearized model is valid only when the system operates in a sufficiently small 
range around an equilibrium point. To take into account the presence of nonlinearities, 
more sophisticated tools are needed which are beyond the scope of simple linear 
analysis.  
Consider a system in state-space representation in (5.1). When ࢛ is set to be a constant 
value ࢛כand there is no disturbance, if ࢞ሶ ൌ ଵ݂ሺ࢞כǡ ࢛כሻ ൌ ሾ૙૙ ǥ ૙ሿࢀ, then ሺ࢞כǡ ࢛כሻis said 
to be an equilibrium point of system (5.2). Let ࢟כ ൌ ݄ଵሺ࢞כǡ ࢛כሻ, which is the output 
value at the equilibrium point. The aim of the linearization is to find a linear system 
when ሺ࢞ǡ ࢟ሻ is close to ሺ࢞כǡ ࢟כሻ. In order to do that, it is necessary to approximate the 
functions ଵ݂ሺ࢞ǡ ࢟ሻ and ݄ଵሺ࢞ǡ ࢟ሻ when ሺ࢞ǡ ࢟ሻ is close to ሺ࢞כǡ ࢟כሻ. 
Since the linearization is done around the equilibrium point, a coordinate 
transformation is defined as follows. Denote ȟ࢞ ൌ ࢞ െ ࢞כˈȟ࢛ ൌ ࢛ െ ࢛כˈandȟ࢟ ൌ࢟ െ ࢟כ . The new coordinatesȟ࢞, ȟ࢛, and ȟ࢟ represent the variations of ࢞, ࢛, and ࢟ 




ȟ࢞ሶ ൌ ࡭ȟ࢞ ൅ ࡮ȟ࢛ ȟ࢟ ൌ ࡯ȟ࢞ ൅ ࡰȟ࢛                                                        (5.3) 
Where                  ࡭ ൌ ቂడ௙భడ୶ ቃ࢞כǡ࢛כ ࡮ ൌ ቂడ௙భడ୳ ቃ࢞כǡ࢛כ ࡯ ൌ ቂడ௛భడ୶ ቃ࢞כǡ࢛כ  ࡰ ൌ ቂడ௛భడ୳ ቃ࢞כǡ࢛כ 
From the above linearization process, the relationship between the linear and 
nonlinear systems are shown as in figure 5.3. If the nonlinear system is linearized at 
the equilibrium point ( ࢞כǡ ࢛כǡ ࢟כሻ , then the dynamics of the linear model can 
approximate the dynamics of nonlinear model when the same inputs and initial 
conditions are applied around this equilibrium point.  
 
Figure 5.3 Block diagrams showing the relationship between linear and nonlinear models. 
Any input ݑ  applied to linear model represents an input of ݑ ൅ ݑכ  applied to the 
nonlinear model. Any initial condition ݔ଴  in the linear model is equivalent to initial 
condition of ݔ଴ ൅ ݔכin the nonlinear model. Any output ݕ in the linear model is expected 
to be the same as the output in nonlinear model when pluses by ݕכ.  
For convenience, the notationȟ࢞, ȟ࢛ and ȟ࢟ in equation (5.3) is replaced by ࢞,࢛ and ࢟ respectively in the rest of this chapter. Therefore, if an input  ࢛ ൌ  ? is applied to the 
linear system, the corresponding input for the nonlinear system should be  ࢛כ ൅  ?Ǥ An 
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output of 1 in the linear model is corresponding to the output of ࢟כ ൅  ? in the 
nonlinear model.  An initial condition of  ࢞ ൌ  ? in the linear model represents an initial 
condition of ࢞כ ൅  ? in the nonlinear model.  
5.2.3 Stability, observability and controllability of the linear system 
This section shows some analysis done based on the linear model to study the stability, 
observability and controllability of the linear system to facilitate the subsequent 
control design. There are many concepts of stability, and many different definitions 
are possible. Here the eigenvalues of the matrix ࡭  in the linear model is used to 
investigate the stability of the linear system. Before deciding the control, observability 
and controllability of a system must be considered, since they can tell whether is 
possible to observed or control (stabilize) the system and if the measured output can 
be used to represent the behaviour of the system. 
Stability  
Considering the linear system (5.2), it can be stated that the linear system is  
(a)  stable if all of the eigenvalues of the matrix ࡭ have negative-real values, i.e. the real 
part of each eigenvalue must be less than zero. Practically speaking, for continuous 
time system, stability requires that the complex eigenvalues reside in the open left half 
of the complex plane. 
(b) marginally stable if at least one eigenvalue has a zero real part and other 
eigenvalues have negative real parts. In the continuous time case, if the eigenvalue 
with a zero real part and a zero imaginary part, the system response neither decays 
nor grows over time, while when imaginary part is not equal to zero, oscillations can 
be expected 
(c)  unstable if any eigenvalues of matrix ࡭ have a positive real part. 
Controllability and Observability 
Controllability is related to the possibility of steering the states of a system from any 
initial value to any final value by using an appropriate control signal within some finite 
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time window. If a state is not controllable, then there is no signal that will ever be able 
to control the state.  
A system is controllable if and only if the controllability matrix ࡯ഥ is full rank. ࡯ഥ ൌ ሾ࡮ ࡭࡮ ࡭૛࡮ ǥ ࡭࢔ି૚࡮ሿ 
Observability instead is related to the possibility of observing the state of a system 
through output measurements. If a state is not observable, it can be stable from the 
controller if the unobservable structure is stable. However, if the unobservable 
structure is not stable, the output feedback controller is not able to use it to stabilize 
the system since the controller cannot determine the behaviour of an unobservable 
state.  
A system is observable if and only if the observability matrix ࡻതതതis full rank. ࡻതതത ൌ ሾ࡯ ࡯࡭ ࡯࡭૛ ǥ ࡯࡭࢔ି૚ሿ 
It is important and necessary to check the controllability of a system before designing 
the controller.  Since if one of the eigenvalues of the system is neither controllable nor 
observable, then this part of the dynamics will remain untouched in the closed-loop 
system. If such an eigenvalue is not stable, then the dynamics of this eigenvalue that 
present in the closed-loop system will also be unstable. Therefore, for all the states of 
each variable of the system to be controlled, every "bad" state of these variables must 
be controllable and observable to ensure a good behaviour in the closed-loop system.  
In the remaining of the chapter, the control design and the control methodologies are 
applied only on the one-bank model. The control objective of the one-bank model is to 
keep the cash of the bank at a desired positive value. A suitable equilibrium point is 
identified and linearization is done around this equilibrium point. After the stability 
and observability of the linear model are checked, a controller can be designed based 
on linear control theory. The performance is evaluated by testing the controller using 
both linear and nonlinear models. In the following sections these procedures are 
explained in detail.   
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5.3   Equilibrium point analysis of the one-bank model 
The equilibrium analysis for the one-bank model consists, firstly, of finding the 
equilibrium points. More specifically the values of the state variables, ܫଵ, and ܥଵ, which 
render equations (3.2) and (3.4) zero, for given values of the input variables, ܦଵ and ݋݌݌ଵ. By setting the derivatives to zero, the equilibrium points can be identified˖ ሾሺܥଵכ െ ݎܦଵכሻାǡ ݋݌݌ଵכሿ െ ݓଵܫଵכ െ ݒଵܫଵכ ൌ  ?                              (5.4) െ݃ଵܦଵכ ൅  ݌ଵܫଵכ െ  ݒଵܫଵכ ൌ  ?                                              (5.5) 
where ܥଵכǡ ܫଵכǡ ܦଵכ and ݋݌݌ଵכ ǯǡǡ
and investment opportunity at the equilibrium point. 
In this analysis, it is assumed that ܦଵכand݋݌݌ଵכ, i.e. the disturbance inputs variables, 
are kept constant in a given simulation; the equilibrium points are then found from 
equations (5.4) and (5.5) which can be solved under 3 different cases for the value of 
the cash, ܥଵכǡ with respect to ݎܦଵכ and ݋݌݌ଵכ:  
Case 1:   ? ൑ ݎܦଵכ ൑ ܥଵכ  and  ? ൑ ݋݌݌ଵכ ൑ ܥଵכ െ ݎܦଵכ  ȋǯ    
limited investment opportunity). 
Equations (5.4) and (5.5) become: ݋݌݌ଵכ െ ݓଵܫଵכ െ ݒଵܫଵכ ൌ  ?                                                 (5.6) െ݃ଵܦଵכ ൅  ݌ଵܫଵכ െ  ݒଵܫଵכ ൌ  ?                                                (5.7) 
From equation (5.6) it can be derived: 
  ܫଵכ ൌ ௢௣௣భכ௪భା௩భ                                                             (5.8) 
From equation (5.7) the value for ܫଵכ can be derived: 
 ܫଵכ ൌ ௚భ஽భכ௣భି௩భ                                                            (5.9) 




௢௣௣భכ௪భା௩భ ൌ ௚భ஽భכ௣భି௩భ                                                   (5.10) 
Moreover, there is an infinite number of equilibria characterised by positive and 
constant values forܥଵכ.  
Case 2:   ? ൑ ݎܦଵכ ൑ ܥଵכ  and ݋݌݌ଵכ ൐ ܥଵכ െ ݎܦଵכ  ȋǯ    
investment opportunity is larger than available cash). 
Equations (5.4) and (5.5) become: ܥଵכ െ ݎܦଵכ െ ݓଵܫଵכ െ ݒଵܫଵכ ൌ  ?                                           (5.11) െ݃ଵܦଵכ ൅  ݌ଵܫଵכ െ  ݒଵܫଵכ ൌ  ?                                           (5.12) 
From equation (5.11) it can be derived: 
 ܫଵכ ൌ ஼భି௥஽భכ௪భା௩భ                                                          (5.13) 
From equation (5.12) it can be obtained: 
ܫଵכ ൌ ௚భ஽భכ௣భି௩భ                                                           (5.14) 
Substitute (5.14) into (5.13) and rearrange, the following expression for the cash can 
be derived: 
 ܥଵכ ൌ ܦଵכ ቂ௚భሺ௪భା௩భሻ௣భି௩భ ൅ ݎቃ                                          (5.15) 
Case 3:  ? ൑ ܥଵכ ൑ ݎܦଵ ȋǯȌǤ 
In this case ݋݌݌ଵכ cannot affect the equilibrium since the cash is below the reserve so 
the bank cannot invest. 
Equations (5.4) and (5.5) become:  ? െ ݓଵܫଵכ െ ݒଵܫଵכ ൌ  ?                                                (5.16) െ݃ଵܦଵכ ൅  ݌ଵܫଵכ െ  ݒଵܫଵכ ൌ  ?                                            (5.17) 
From equation (5.16) the following value of the investment can be obtained, ܫଵכ ൌ  ?.  
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From equation (5.17) the following value of the deposit can be derived,ܦଵכ ൌ  ?.  
As  ? ൑ ܥଵכ ൑ ݎܦଵכ andܦଵכ ൌ  ?, so this means thatܥଵכ ൌ  ?.  
Table 5.1 reports a summary of the three equilibrium points. Equilibrium point 1 is 
found in case 1, in which the bank is in a condition where it has enough cash but it can 
only add investment determined by investment opportunity availability. In case 2, 
where equilibrium point 2 is found, the bank has again enough cash and will invest as 
much as it can since the investment opportunity is larger than the available cash. In 
cases 1 and 2, non-zero equilibrium states for ܥଵכ  and ܫଵכ  exist.  In case 3, the bank ǯ             
values for ܥଵכ and ܫଵכ.  
Table 5.1 Summary of the equilibrium points for different cases . 
Equilibrium point 1 Equilibrium point 2 Equilibrium point 3 
With a given ܦଵכ ,  ݋݌݌ଵכ ൌ ௚భ஽భሺ௪భା௩భሻ௣భି௩భ    ܥଵכ ൐ ܦଵכ  כ ݎ  ܫଵכ ൌ ௢௣௣భכ௪భା௩భ  
With a given ܦଵכ , ݋݌݌ଵכ ൐ ܥଵכ െ ݎ כ ܦଵכ  ܥଵכ ൌ ܦଵכ ቀ௚భሺ௪భା௩భሻ௣భି௩భ ൅ ݎቁ  ܫଵכ ൌ ௚భ஽భכ௣భି௩భ  
ܦଵכ  ൌ  ?,  ݋݌݌ଵכ ൌ  ?   ܥଵכ ൌ  ?  ܫଵכ ൌ  ?  
It is interesting to see from table 5.1 how changes in the parameter values,݃ଵ, ݌ଵ,ݓଵ 
and ݒଵ, can affect ܥଵכ and ܫଵכ. For example in equation (5.14), the corresponding value 
of ܫଵכ  depends on the value of ݃ଵ , ݌ଵ  and ݒଵ . So if ݌ଵ  gets larger, then ܫଵכ  becomes 
smallerǤ This means that as the return rate for the investment increases, then less 
investment is required to keep the system in the equilibrium state. While when ݒଵ 
(investment failure rate) and ݃ଵ  (deposit interest rate) are large then ܫଵכ  becomes 
large, which means a high level of investment is needed to keep the bank in 
equilibrium. Similar effects can be found in equation (5.15), as the proportion of the 
matured investment,ݓଵ, and return rate for the investment, ݌ଵ, get higher, less cash is 
needed to keep the system in equilibrium state; ݒଵ and ݃ଵ have the opposite effect on ܥଵכ. So from the above analysis, parameters that increase the net-worth of the bank, 
such as ݌ଵ , decrease the state variables equilibrium values, ܥଵכ  and ܫଵכ , while those 
parameters, such asݒଵ and݃ଵǡ that decrease the net-worth, increase the equilibrium 
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values,ܥଵכ and ܫଵכ. These effects of the parameters can be evidenced by the simulation 
results that are represented in subsection 4.2.2.  
5.4   Model linearization and analysis of the one-bank model 
This section represents how the linearization is performed using MATLAB and 
Simulink. Three linear models are obtained around the three equilibrium points 
(shown in the previous section). Stability analysis is carried out for the three linear 
models separately. 
Linearization using MATLAB and Simulink 
Linearization of the one-bank model is performed around the three equilibrium points 
in table 5.1. The MATLAB  Ǯlinmondǯ  used to do the linearization. This 
command is in a format of Ǯȏǡ B, C,D]=linmod ('SYS',X,U,YȌǯǡ-
space linear model of the system from the ordinary differential equations described in 
the Simulink block diagram called 'SYS', when the state vector, X, input, U, and output 
Y are specified given the value at the equilibrium point. The Simulink diagram of the 
one-ǡǮǯǡ ?Ǥ4, which is a slight modification of the 
diagram reported in figure 4.3 to identify the input, U (red blocks) and output, Y (light Ǯ ?ǯȌ.  
 
Figure 5.4 The one-ǡǮǯǤ  
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Since at this stage there is no controller applied, the linear model only describes the 
dynamics of the open-ǯǡݑ, 
but only the disturbance inputs, i.e. the deposit and investment opportunity. 
Therefore, in the Simulink model in figure 5.4 the blocks shown in red and the block 
linked with the integrator 2 shown in blue identify the input variables, ܦଵ and ݋݌݌ଵ, 
and the output variable,ܥଵ, for the linearization command. The state vector, X, in the 
command is given the value of ܥଵכ  and ܫଵכ  that are calculated by the equilibrium 
equations and the input, U, is given the value of ܦଵכ and ݋݌݌ଵכ that are calculated by the 
equilibrium equations. Then the command will output the ࡭, ࡮, ࡯ and ࡰ that describe 
the linear model as shown in equations (5.2). 
Three linear models  
Three linear models are derived using the equilibrium points and parameter values 
shown in table 5.2. The three linear models are represented in the following equations, 
where ࢞ ൌ ൤ܥଵܫଵ ൨ are the state variables and ࢊ ൌ ൥ ܦଵ݀ܦଵ݋݌݌ଵ൩ is the disturbance. 
Linear model 1  ܠሶ ൌ ࡭૚࢞ ൅ ࡰ૚ࢊࢊ                                                         (5.18) ݕ ൌ ࡯૚࢞                                                                   (5.19) 
where ࡭૚ ൌ ൤ ? ݓଵ ൅ ݌ଵ ? െݓଵ െ ݒଵ൨,ࡰ૚ࢊ ൌ ቂെ݃ଵ  ? െ ? ?  ?  ?ቃ ǡ ࡯૚ ൌ ሾ ?  ?ሿ. 
Linear model 2  ܠሶ ൌ ࡭૛࢞ ൅ ࡰ૛ࢊࢊ                                                          (5.20) ݕ ൌ ࡯૛࢞                                                                   (5.21) 
࡭૛ ൌ ൤െ ? ݓ ? ൅ ݌ ? ? െݓ ?െ ݒ ?൨ǡࡰ૛ࢊ ൌ ቂݎ െ ݃ ?  ?  ?െݎ  ?  ?ቃ ?࡯૛ ൌ ሾ ?  ?ሿ. 
Linear model 3  ܠሶ ൌ ࡭૜࢞ ൅ ࡰ૜ࢊࢊ                                                           (5.22) 
98 
 
ݕ ൌ ࡯૜࢞                                                                   (5.23) 
࡭૜ ൌ ൤ ? ݓ ? ൅ ݌ ? ? െݓ ? െ ݒ ?൨ǡࡰ૜ࢊ ൌ ቂെ݃ ?  ?  ? ?  ?  ?ቃ ?࡯૜ ൌ ሾ ?  ?ሿ. 
The eigenvalues of ࡭૚ǡ࡭૛ and ࡭૜ are calculated using the parameter values shown in 
table 5.2. Also the ranks of the observability matrix (ࡻതതത ൌ ሾ࡯ ࡯࡭ሿ)are calculated to 
check whether the three linear models are observable. From the results shown in table 
5.2 it can be seen that for all the three models the ranks of observability matrix  
( ࡻതതത ൌ ሾ࡯ ࡯࡭ሿ ) are all equal to 2, that is full rank. Therefore, all the states are 
observable across the three models and all the states if available for measurement can 
be used as the feedback in the control design. 
Table 5.2 The three equilibrium points used for linearization and the eigenvalues of the 
A matrix, observability matrix of the three linear models. The parameter values used for 
calculating the eigenvalues are: ݃ଵ ൌ  ?Ǥ ? ?Ȁ ? ? ?, ݌ଵ ൌ  ?Ǥ ? ?Ȁ ? ? ?, ݓଵ ൌ  ?Ǥ ? ?Ȁ ? ? ?, ݒଵ ൌ  ?Ǥ ? ?Ȁ ? ? ? and ݎ ൌ  ?Ǥ ?. 





ܦଵכ with a given value ݋݌݌ଵכ ൌ ௚భ஽భכሺ௪భା௩భሻ௣భି௩భ    ܥଵכ ൌ ܦଵכ כ ݎ  ܫଵכ ൌ ௢௣௣భכ௪భା௩భ  
ߣଵ ൌ ିሺ௪భା௩భሻାඥሺ௪భା௩భሻమଶ ൌ  ?  









ܦଵכ with a given value ܥଵכ ൌ ܦଵ ቀ௚భሺ௪భା௩భሻ௣భି௩భ ൅ ݎቁ  ܫଵכ ൌ ௚భ஽భ௣భି௩భ , ݋݌݌ଵכ ൌ  ܥଵכ െ ݎ כ ܦଵכ ଵܰ ൌ  ܥଵכ ൅ ܫଵכ െ ܦଵכ 
ߣଵ ൌିሺ௪భା௩భାଵሻିඥሺ௪భା௩భାଵሻమିସሺ௩భି௣భሻଶ   ൌ െ ?Ǥ ? ? ? ? 








ܦଵכ ൌ  ?, ݋݌݌ଵכ ൌ  ?   ܥଵכ ൌ  ?  ܫଵכ ൌ  ?  
ߣଵ ൌ ିሺ௪భା௩భሻାඥሺ௪భା௩భሻమଶ ൌ  ?  







The eigenvalues of ࡭૚ǡ ࡭૛  and ࡭૜  allow the analysis of the stability of the linear 
models. In this case, stability means the linear model will stay around the 
corresponding equilibrium point. ǯ
obtained from the stability analysis applied only in the linear model. In the nonlinear 
model, this behaviour only happens when all the states are close to the equilibrium 
point; if the states value move too far away from the equilibrium, then the current 
linear model is not able to represent nonlinear model behaviour anymore, so all the 
stability analysis based on the currently linear model is no longer applicable. For this 
reason, the dynamics of the non-linear model (original one-bank model) needs to be 
represented by all three linear models.  
Stability analysis of linear model 1 
For linear model 1, one of the eigenvalues of ࡭૚is zero and the other one is always 
negative (see table 5.2). So linear model 1 is marginally stable, which means when 
there is no disturbance, wherever the initial condition starts, the system will always 
move back to zero (zero in the linear model is equivalent to the equilibrium point in 
the nonlinear model). Linear model 1 represents the dynamic of the non-linear model 
when all state variables satisfy the conditions shown in Section 5.3 case 1. In this 
dynamic, assuming that the initial conditions for cash and investment areܥଵ଴ andܫଵ଴, 
with a given value of the depositܦଵכ, as long as ݋݌݌ଵכ ൌ ௚భ஽భכሺ௪భା௩భሻ௣భି௩భ  and ܥଵ଴ ൒ ܦଵכ כ ݎ, no 
matter what the value of ܫଵ଴  is at the beginning, the total investment ܫଵ  will always 
come to the value equals to ܫଵכ ൌ ௢௣௣భכ௪భା௩భ.  
Stability analysis of linear model 2 
Linear model 2 represents the dynamic of the nonlinear model when all variables 
satisfy the conditions shown in Section 5.3 case 2. One of the eigenvalues of ࡭૛is 
positive when ݌ଵ ൐ ݒଵ, while the other eigenvalue is negative (see table 5.2). So linear 
model 2 is unstable and if the initial conditions, ܥଵ଴  and ܫଵ଴ , do not start at the 
equilibrium point in the nonlinear model, the system will not be able to come back to 
the equilibrium point.  
Stability analysis of linear model 3 
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The eigenvalues of  ࡭૜࡭૚ǡ ?Ǥ      ?     ?      Ǥ ǡ              ? ȋwhen all variables satisfy the conditions shown in 
Section 5.3 case 3), all the states will come to the equilibrium point.  
5.5   Controller design and testing results of the one-bank 
model  
After carrying out the stability analysis of the linear models presented in the previous 
section, this section introduces how to design the controller to reach the control 
objectives. Three different control objectives are set in the subsection 5.5.1 according 
to different dynamics of the model.  Two output feedback controllers are designed in 
subsection 5.5.2 to meet these objectives. The controllers are tested in different 
dynamic characteristics in subsections 5.5.3, 5.5.4 and 5.5.5. In the last subsection, 
simulation results show how the controller switches when the system enters different 
dynamics. 
5.5.1 Possible dynamics and objectives of the control design 
In the control design for the one-bank model, the objectives are established according 
to the level of the cash the bank holds at a given time. Three zones are defined 
according to the level of cash the bank has, as shown in figure 5.5.  
The cash of the bank changes with time and the bank can enter different dynamics that 
are characterised by different linear models; therefore, according to the equilibrium 
and the linearization analysis, different linear models are used to represent the 
dynamics in each zone. 
Regime 1: in this regime, the cash is above the reserve ratio requirement, which 
satisfies the condition shown in Section 5.3 cases 1 and 2, so this dynamic can be    ?  ?Ǥ    Ǯǯ
under this dynamic in the absence of deposit shocks. Since the bank has extra cash to 
invest in this dynamics, the aim of the control is not merely to keep the cash above 




Regime 2: in this regime, the cash is below reserve ratio requirement but still positive, 
and this satisfies the conditions shown in Section 5.3 case 3. Therefore, this dynamic 
can be described by linear model 3. Under this dynamics, the bank is considered to be ǮǯǤ. Furthermore, 
because of the lack of cash, it stops adding new investment. Therefore, in this dynamics, 
the aim of the control design is to try to adjust the cash to meet the reserve ratio 
requirement. 
Regime 3:  In this regime, the cash at the bank becomes negative and thus the bank 
stops all activities. This can happen when a shock in the deposit is big enough to make 
the cash negative. It is assumed that the bank faces a serious funding gap and if the 
bank does not take action to get more cash, it will fail. The aim of the control is to try 
to bring the cash from negative to positive within a very short time. 
 
Figure 5.5 Plot shows the different dynamics when ܥଵ has the different values. 
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The case considered in dynamics 3 can only happen within the one-bank model if the 
shock in the deposit is big enough to make the cash negative. Once the cash becomes 
negative the bank cannot recover back to positive cash unless a controller is 
implemented (i.e. within the equations of the model) to bring the cash back to positive 
and avoid failure. The design and the implementation of the controller will be 
explained in the following sections. 
5.5.2 Design of output feedback controllers 
Before designing the controller, there is the need to establish the control configuration, 
in which the control input variables and method to measure the output are identified. 
It is proposed that the bank manipulates its investment when its cash is lower or 
higher than the equilibrium value to adjust its cash to the equilibrium value. The 
amount of investment to sell or to add depends on the value of the current cash 
compared with the equilibrium value of the cash. In this control design, the cash of the 
bank is chosen to be the measured output and the control input, ݑ ൌ ߛሺܥଵ െ ܥכሻǡ is the 
difference between actual, ܥଵǡ and equilibrium, ܥכ  ǡ cash multiplied with a properly 
selected feedback gain, ߛ. The control configuration is shown in figure 5.6.  
 
Figure 5.6 The configuration of the feedback control design for the one-bank model. The 
bank manipulates its investment to adjust its cash to the equilibrium value. The error 
signal is the difference between the equilibrium cash value and the actual cash value 
which is obtained through the bank daily settlement.  
The actual cash of the bank,ܥଵ, is measured through the bank daily settlement and 
compared to the equilibrium value of the cash. The bank will then sell or buy assets 
(investment) according to this difference, ሺܥଵ െ ܥכሻǡ to adjust its cash. At the first stage 
the controller brings the cash to the equilibrium value ܥכ and theoretically the, 
controller is able to bring the cash to any expected value,ܥ୰ୣ, by adding an extra part 
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in the controller called the reference input. Details are introduced in the later part of 
this section.  
The output feedback control law ݑ in the linear model can be designed as shown in 
equation (5.24).ݑ represents the amount of the investment sold or bought. The ߛ is 
the feedback gain which will be multiplied by the difference between the actual cash ܥଵ  and equilibrium pointܥכ. This difference is the output ݕ of linear model, and it is 
also the error signal ሺܥଵ െ ܥכሻ  in the nonlinear system.  ݑ ൌ ߛݕ                                                                (5.24) 
In equation (5.24) ߛ ൐  ?. Depending on the strategy used by the bank to adjust the 
cash, two controllers are developed as shown in the following. 
Controller 1  
This controller always tries to bring the cash to the equilibrium value by selling the ǯ            
investment while its cash is lower than the equilibrium. The linear system in the state-
space representation now becomes as shown in equation (5.25) where࡮૚ ൌ ቂ  ?െ ?ቃǤ   
When ݕ is positive, this means the bank sells the investment, while when ݕ is negative 
the bank adds investment.  ܠሶ ൌ ࡭࢞ ൅ ࡮૚ݑ൅ࡰࢊࢊ ݕ ൌ ࡯࢞    ݑ ൌ ߛݕ                                                                (5.25) 
The non-linear system of the one-bank model is described by differential equations 
reported in equation (5.26). When ߛሺܥଵ െ ܥכሻ is positive, it means the bank sells the 
investment, while when ߛሺܥଵ െ ܥכሻ  is negative the bank adds investment. 
ௗூభௗ௧ ൌ ሾሺܥଵ െ ݎܦଵሻାǡ ݋݌݌ଵሿ െ ݓଵܫଵ െ ݒଵܫଵ െ ߛሺܥଵ െ ܥכሻ  




Controller 2  
Under this control strategy, the bank sells its investment when its cash is lower than 
the equilibrium point and adds investment while its cash is higher than the 
equilibrium. The linear system in the state-space representation is the same as shown 
in equation (5.27), but now with ࡮૛ ൌ ቂെ ? ? ቃǤ   When ݕ is positive, this means the bank 
adds the investment while when ݕ is negative the bank sells investment.  ࢞ሶ ൌ ࡭࢞ ൅ ࡮૛ݑ൅ࡰࢊࢊ ݕ ൌ ࡯࢞             ݑ ൌ ߛݕ                                                                (5.27) 
The nonlinear system described by differential equations of the one-bank model is 
now shown in equations (5.28) and (5.29). When ߛሺܥଵ െ ܥכሻ is positive, it means the 
bank adds the investment while when ߛሺܥଵ െ ܥכሻ is negative the bank sells investment. 
ௗூభௗ௧ ൌ ሾሺܥଵ െ ݎܦଵሻାǡ ݋݌݌ଵሿ െ ݓଵܫଵ െ ݒଵܫଵ ൅ ߛሺܥଵ െ ܥכሻ(5.28) 
ௗ஼భௗ௧ ൌ  ௗ஽భௗ௧ െ  ௗூభௗ௧ െ  ݃ଵܦଵ ൅  ݌ଵܫଵ െ ݒଵܫଵ                                (5.29) 
the controllability of the three linear models is checked. The ranks of the 
controllability matrices are shown in table 5.3. All the controllability matrixes have 
full rank, so the linear models are controllable when applied the two distributions. 
Table 5.3 Rank of the controllability matrixes  ࡯ഥ ൌ ሾ࡮ ࡭࡮ሿ   for controller 1 and 
controller 2 applied on linear model 1, 2 and 3. The parameter values used for calculating 
the ranks are:  ݃ଵ ൌ  ?Ǥ ? ?Ȁ ? ? ? , ݌ଵ ൌ  ?Ǥ ? ?Ȁ ? ? ?  ݓଵ ൌ  ?Ǥ ? ?Ȁ ? ? ?  ,  ݒଵ ൌ  ?Ǥ ? ?Ȁ ? ? ? and ݎ ൌ  ?Ǥ ?. 
 Controller 1 Controller 2 
Linear model 1 Rank(ሾ࡮૚ ࡭૚࡮૚ሿ)=2 Rank(ሾ࡮૛ ࡭૚࡮૛ሿ)=2 
Linear model 2 Rank(ሾ࡮૚ ࡭૛࡮૚ሿ)=2 Rank(ሾ࡮૛ ࡭૛࡮૛ሿ)=2 
Linear model 3 Rank(ሾ࡮૚ ࡭૜࡮૚ሿ)=2 Rank(ሾ࡮૛ ࡭૜࡮૛ሿ)=2 
Root locus analysis to find the value of ࢽ  
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After the controller ݑ  is set, the next step is to find a proper value of the feedback gain ߛ  to make the closed-loop system stable. In control theory, the performance of a 
feedback system can be described in terms of the location of the roots of the 
characteristic equation in the s-plane. A technique called root locus analysis was 
developed by Walter R. Evans [122] for designing and analysing the stability of the 
feedback system. The root locus plot is a graphical method for examining how the 
roots of a system change with variation of a certain system parameter, commonly a 
gain within a feedback system.  
Root locus analysis has been performed on the three linear models (linear model 1, 2 
and 3 got in Section 5.4) with two control distributions (࡮૚ ൌ ቂ  ?െ ?ቃ and ࡮૛ ൌ ቂെ ? ? ቃ) on 
them (so 6 cases in total) to study the trajectories of eigenvalues of the matrix ࡭ ൅ ࡮ɀ 
in the complex s-plane as a function of the feedback gain  ߛ ǤǮǯ
is used to sketch the root locus plots for the 6 cases. The results are shown in figure 
5.7.   
In each subplot, the green line and blue line represent the two trajectories of the two 
poles. From the figure 5.7 (a1), (a2) and (a3), it can be seen that there is always a 
situation when two poles are both in the left half plane. This means that with the 
control distribution ࡮૚ ൌ ቂ  ?െ ?ቃ, there always exits a feedback gain ߛ that can make the 
eigenvalues of the matrix ࡭ ൅ ࡮ɀ negative, thus can make the system stable. While in 
the figure 5.7 (b1), (b2) and (b3), the green line never comes to left side of the s-plane, 
which means with the control distribution  ࡮૛ ൌ ቂെ ? ? ቃ, it cannot find a ߛ to make both 
eigenvalues negative. Since there will always be a non-negative eigenvalue which 
makes the system unstable. In the next section, the control term, ࡮૚࢛ ൌ ቂ  ?െ ?ቃ ࢛,  will 




Figure 5.7 Plot of root locus of linear models 1, 2 and 3 (1st, 2nd and 3rd rows 




The command ǮȏǡȐ = rlocus ȋȌǯ is used to find out the exact value of ߛ  . This 
command returns the matrix R which includes the roots of the close-loop system SYS, 
and the matrix K  which includes the corresponding gains for each pair of root.  From 
output values of R and K, the suitable feedback gain in K can be found, and the 
corresponding roots in R have negative values in the real axis. Different ߛ values are 
selected from K for different models, testing results are shown in the following 
subsections. 
Reference input  
The controller developed in the last section is derived to drive the output in the linear 
model to 0, and to the equilibrium in the nonlinear system. Very often in applications, 
however, it is desired the output to track a reference input, i.e. if ݎሺݐሻ is the reference 
input, it would like the output ݕሺݐሻ  ՜ ݎሺݐሻ as ݐ ՜ Ğ. To make the controller that can 
bring the output (cash) to a desired value which is different from the equilibrium, one 
more term is added to the controller as shown in equation (5.30).  ߛ is the feedback 
gain that can make the close-loop system stable, ݎ௘ is the reference input that applied 
in the linear model. In the nonlinear model, the desired value of the output is expected 
to reach, ܥ௥೐  , equals to the equilibrium, ܥכǡplus ݎ௘. ݑଵ ൌ ߛݕ ൅ ଵܰതതതݎ௘                                                        (5.30) ݎ௘ is multiplied with an element ଵܰതതത which can make the derivative of state variable in 
the steady state  ݔ௦௦ሶ ൌ  ? and output variable in steady state ݕ௦௦ ൌ ݎ௘ . The following 
shows the procedure to calculate the value of ଵܰതതത. 
In the steady states, it can be obtained that ݔ௦௦ሶ ൌ  ?                                                           (5.31) ݕ௦௦ ൌ ܥݔ௦௦ ൌ ݎ௘                                                  (5.32) 
From equation (5.31), it can be derived: 
                                                                     ܣݔ௦௦ ൅ ܤݑଵ ൌ  ?                                                 (5.33) 
Substitute equation (5.30) in equation (5.33): 
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ܣݔ௦௦ ൅ ܤߛݕ ൅ ܤ ଵܰതതതݎ௘ ൌ  ? ܣݔ௦௦ ൅ ܤߛܥݔ ൅ ܤ ଵܰതതതݎ௘ ൌ  ? ሺܣ ൅ ܤߛܥሻݔ௦௦ ൅ ܤ ଵܰതതതݎ௘ ൌ  ? ݔ௦௦ ൌ െሺܣ ൅ ܤߛܥሻିଵܤ ଵܰതതതݎ௘ 
From equation (5.32), it can be derived: ܥݔ௦௦ ൌ ݎ௘ െܥሺܣ ൅ ܤߛܥሻିଵሺܤ ଵܰതതതݎ݁ሻ ൌ ݎ௘ െܥሺܣ ൅ ܤߛܥሻିଵܤ ଵܰതതതݎ݁ ൌ ݎ௘ 
Therefore                                         Ȃ ܥሺܣ ൅ ܤߛܥሻିଵܤ ଵܰതതത ൌ  ? 
Thus  
 ଵܰതതത ൌ ሺȂ ܥሺܣ ൅ ܤߛܥሻିଵܤሻିଵ                                        (5.34) 
Implementation of the models in Simulink for testing 
Each controller is tested on both the linear and nonlinear models. The implementation 
of the controller in the linear and nonlinear models is shown in figures 5.8 and 5.9. As 
shown in figure 5.8ǡǮ-ǯǡ
is a commonly used Simulink block to generate the linear model in a state-space 
format. The elements of matrices࡭, ࡮, ࡯ , ࡰ and the initial conditions of the state 
variable are all defined in this block. Since here the closed-loop system is tested, the 
value of the matrix ࡭ is changed to ࡭ ൅ ࡮ߛ࡯.  The red block imports the input variables 
including the disturbance inputs as well as control inputs. 
 




Figure 5.9 shows the Simulink diagram when a controller is implemented in the Ǥ  Ǯǯ 
function of the one-bank model, which represents the control input. It consists of two 
parts, one is the feedback gain times the difference between the actual and the 
expected cash value, the other one is the control input at the equilibrium point (shown Ǯ ? ?ǯȌǤǮǯǮȏǡ B,C,D] = linmod ('SYS', 
X, U)ǯǤ
at the equilibrium point.  
 
Figure 5.9 Block diagram of the nonlinear close-loop system with the applied controller 
in Simulink. 
Here it is necessary to recall the relationship between the linear and nonlinear model. 
As introduced in Section 5.2.2, the linear model is based on the equilibrium point 
where linearization is done. To make sure the linear and nonlinear model are tested 
under the same situation, any inputs, and initial conditions that are applied on the 
linear model should be adjusted to reflect the equilibrium values when applied to the 
nonlinear model.  
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5.5.3 Testing results for regime 1 
Ad shown in figure 5.5, the nonlinear model in regime 1 can be described by linear 
model 1 and linear model 2 (depending on the different investment opportunity). This 
section shows the simulation results when controller 1 is applied on linear models 1 
and 2.  
Controller 1 applied to linear model 1 ɀǡǯȏR,K]  = ȋȌǯ
used. The SYS used in the command is the system represented by equation (5.26), in 
which the input distribution  ࡮૚ ൌ ቂ  ?െ ?ቃ is applied on linear model 1. From the output 
K, , a series of ߛ values can be found that can make the close-loop system having two 
negative poles.  
For testing purpose, a ߛ  value which equals to  ?Ǥ ? ?ൈ  ? ?ହ  is selected and the 
controller 1 now becomes: ݑଵ ൌ  ?Ǥ ? ?ൈ  ? ?ହݕ 
Figure 5.10 shows the simulation results10 when ݑଵ is applied to the nonlinear model 
under two situations starting with different initial conditions. In the first situation the 
initial value of cash ܥଵ଴ ൌ  ? ? and the initial value of investment  ܫଵ଴ ൌ  ? ?. While in the 
second situation, ܥଵ଴ ൌ  ? ? andܫଵ଴ ൌ  ? ?. With a given value of ܦכ equals to 100, the 
equilibrium point lays at: ܦכ ൌ  ? ? ? 
ܱ݌݌ଵכ ൌ ଵܦכሺݓଵ ൅ ݒଵሻ݌ଵ െ ݒଵ ൌ  ?Ǥ ? ? ? ? ܥכ ൌ ܦכݎ ൅  ? ൌ ? ? 
ܫכ ൌ ܱ݌݌ଵכݓଵ ൅ ݒଵ ൌ  ? ? 
                                                             
10 The simulation are carried out in both linear and nonlinear model, since they all get the same 
results, only the results from the nonlinear model will be presented. 
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The controller ݑଵ aims to bring the cash to the equilibrium point whereܥכ ൌ  ? ?. In 
figure 5.10 (a), it can be seen that the deposit is a constant so that there is no shock.  
 
Figure 5.10 Dynamic behaviour   ǯ  ȋȌǡ ȋȌǡ  ȋȌ
and add/sold investment (d) with different initial conditions of cash: ܥଵ଴ ൌ  ? ? (red lines) 
and ܥଵ଴ ൌ  ? ? (blue lines). The grey dash lines in (b) and (c) represent the equilibrium 
value of the cash and investment accordingly. The positive value in (d) means adding 
new investment while negative value means selling investment. The feedback gain in 
controller applied in this case is ߛ ൌ  ?Ǥ ? ?ൈ  ? ?ହ. 
In situation 1 (results are shown in red lines) when initial cashܥଵ଴ ൌ  ? ?, which is 2 
unit above the equilibrium point ܥכ ൌ  ? ?. To bring the cash down, the bank sells 
investment; as shown in figure 5.10 (d), the red line starts with a negative value and 
finally reaches to zero when the cash comes to the equilibrium value. The total 
investment in figure 5.10 (c) decreases at the beginning, and then starts to increase 
after some time. The reason for this behaviour is explained as follows.  
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According to the differential equations describing the investment behaviour (ௗூభௗ௧  in 
equation (5.26)), the change of the investment, 
ௗூభௗ௧ , is affected by four elements: the 
added investment, ሾሺܥଵ െ ݎܦଵሻାǡ ݋݌݌ଵሿ , matured investment െݓଵܫଵ , failed 
investment ǡ െݒଵܫଵ,and sold investment െߛሺܥଵ െ ܥכሻ. The sum of these four elements 
is the change of the investment as shown in figure 5.11 in blue line. It can be seen that 
the change of the investment moves from negative to positive and then to zero, which 
is the reason that the total investment decreases first and then increases. 
The derivative of the cash, as shown in red line in figure 5.11, moves from positive 
value to negative and then to zero. This is why the red line in figure 5.10 (b) first 
increases and then decreases to the equilibrium.  
 
Figure 5.11 The derivatives of the investment (blue line), cash (red line) and net-worth 
(yellow line) in situation 1 when  ܥଵ଴ ൌ  ? ? and ܫଵ଴ ൌ  ? ?. 
According to equation (3.4)11, as the deposit is constant,  
ௗ஽భௗ௧ ൌ  ?Ǥ Though ௗூభௗ௧  changes 
during the test period, it becomes zero finally, thus actually it cannot contribute to the 
                                                             
11 Remind equation (3.4):  
ௗ஼భௗ௧ ൌ  ௗ஽భௗ௧ െ  ௗூభௗ௧ െ  ݃ଵܦଵ ൅  ݌ଵܫଵ െ ݒଵܫଵ 
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change of the cash. The parts that actually contribute to the change of the cash are ݌ଵܫଵ െ ݒଵܫଵ. What the controller 1 aims to do is to affect the cash by manipulating with 
the investment, ܫଵ, so that the value of ݌ଵܫଵ െ ݒଵܫଵ changes. In this situation, as  ݌ଵ ൐ݒଵ , ݌ଵܫଵ െ ݒଵܫଵ ൌ ሺ݌ଵ െ ݒଵሻܫଵ  is monotonically increasing. When the bank sells 
investment, ܫଵ  decreases thus causing ݌ଵܫଵ െ ݒଵܫଵ  decreases. This causes ௗ஼భௗ௧  to 
decrease, as shown in figure 5.11 red line; the derivative of the cash keeps dropping 
and after sometime becomes negative. As 
ௗ஼భௗ௧  becomes negative, the cash ܥଵ starts to 
decrease. As  ܥଵ gets closer to the equilibrium value, the sold investment becomes less. 
The total investment stops dropping and starts to move back to equilibrium point. As ܫଵ increases, ݌ଵܫଵ െ ݒଵܫଵ increases causing  ௗ஼భௗ௧   to increase and move closer to zero, 
thus ܥଵ drops slower and finally stays at the equilibrium. 
Since the aim of the controller is to bring ܥଵ 2 units down to the equilibrium and to 
keep the investment at the same level at the equilibrium, the net-worth at the end 
should be 2 units lower than before. According to the equation that represents the net-
worth in equation (3.5)12. 
The derivative of the net-worth should be 
ௗேభௗ௧ ൌ ௗ஼భௗ௧ ൅  ௗூభௗ௧ െ ௗ஽భௗ௧                                                    (5.35) 
Substitute the equation (3.4) in (5.35), the expression for the net-worth derivative in 
another version can be get as shown in equation (5.36).  
 
ௗேభௗ௧ ൌ ௗ஽భௗ௧ െ  ௗூభௗ௧ െ  ݃ଵܦଵ ൅  ݌ଵܫଵ െ ݒଵܫଵ ൅  ௗூభௗ௧ െ ௗ஽భௗ௧ ൌ െ ݃ଵܦଵ ൅  ݌ଵܫଵ െ ݒଵܫଵ   (5.36) 
This equation shows that the change of the net-worth is only affected by three 
elements: the interest paid to the depositor, the return of the investment and the failed 
investment. Since ݃ଵ,݌ଵ, ݒଵ and  ܦଵare assumed to be constant in the simulation, the 
only part that can affect the net-worth is ݌ଵܫଵ െ ݒଵܫଵ. Therefore, by manipulating the 
investment, the net-worth can also be affected. 
                                                             
12 Remind equation (3.5) ଵܰ ൌ  ܥଵ ൅ ܫଵ െ ܦଵ 
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Given an overview of the whole dynamic, the bank sells investment (or invest less) to 
lose some return that could be earned from the investment. In that way, the cash can 
be brought down. However, this is a theoretical situation for testing. In the reality, the 
bank usually will not face such a situation that it wants to bring down its cash. Instead, 
the bank may want to bring their cash to a higher level to safeguard itself from the 
shock, which corresponds to situation 2. With the initial cashܥଵ଴ ൌ  ? ?, the controller 
tries to bring the cash to the equilibrium pointܥכ ൌ  ? ?. To bring the cash up, the bank 
adds investment (shown in figure 5.10 (d) blue line) in order to earn more return from 
the investment. In this way, the cash increases as shown in figure 5.10(b) blue line. 
Controller 1 applied to linear model 2 
When the input distribution  ࡮૚ ൌ ቂ  ?െ ?ቃ is applied to linear model 2, the output of the 
command Ǯ[R,K]  = rlocus (SYS)ǯ shows that, only one pair of roots in R that have 
negative values in the real axis. The corresponding ߛ in K is 1.  
It can be seen that sometimes the choice of ߛ can be very limited. An analysis has been 
done to see how the value of the parameters can affect the range of the available ߛ 
values. It has been found that when the value of the parameter ݓଵ  changes from 
0.05/360 to 0.3, there are more values in K that have the corresponding negative roots 
in R. This indicates that with a larger value of ݓଵ (which means every day there will be 
 
Figure 5.12 The root locus plots of linear model 1 when applied control feedback  ࡮૚ ൌ ቂ  ?െ ?ቃ with different values of parameter ݓଵ equals to 0.05/360 in (a) and 0.3 in (b). 
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more matured investment), the bank has more flexibility to manage its investment to 
keep its cash at a desired level. The above effect can be verified from figure 5.12, which 
is the plot of root locus when the value of parameterݓଵ is different in linear model 2. 
More green trajectory exits at the left side of the s-plane in figure 5.12 (b) when ݓଵ ൌ ?Ǥ ? than in figure 5.12 (a) when ݓଵ ൌ  ?Ǥ ? ?Ȁ ? ? ?. Therefore, a larger range of ߛ can be 
found when ݓଵ ൌ  ?Ǥ ? to keep the roots of the close-loop system negative. 
Figure 5.13 shows the simulation results when ݓଵ ൌ  ?Ǥ ?. The controller ݑଵwith three 
different feedback gains are tested. In this simulation, the controller follows the form ݑଵ ൌ ߛݕ ൅ ଵܰതതതݎ௘ and aims to bring the cash to a desired valueܥ௥೐ . 
The equilibrium point is calculated by the equations shown in table 5.2: ܦכ ൌ  ? ? ? 
ܥכ ൌ ܦכ ቆ݃ଵሺݓଵ ൅ ݒଵሻ݌ଵ െ ݒଵ ൅ ݎቇ ൌ  ? ? 
ܫכ ൌ ݃ଵܦכ݌ଵ െ ݒଵ ൌ  ? ? ܱ݌݌כ ൌ ܥଵ െ ݎ כ ܦଵ ൅  ? ? ?ൌ  ? ? ? 
The desired valueܥ௥௘ is assumed to be  ? ?, which is 6 units higher than the equilibrium ܥכ ൌ  ? ?. Therefore, ݎ݁ ൌ ܥ௥௘ െ ܥכ ൌ  ?. The value of  ଵܰതതത is calculated using equation 
(5.34). In figure 5.13 (b), as the ߛ increases, the system takes shorter time to reach to 
the desired cash value.  
The controller 1 has the following limitations: it only works when ࡯૚ ൒ ࢘ࡰ૚; when the 
disturbance (shock) is too large to drag the cash down below the reserve ratio ( ૙ ൑࡯૚ ൑ ࢘ࡰ૚) or to negative (࡯૚ ൑ ૙), this controller will not be able to pull the cash back 
to the level that above the reserve ratio, since it only works when system are in regime 
1. Therefore, a cases when ࡯૚ ൑ ૙  and ૙ ൑ ࡯૚ ൑ ࢘ࡰ૚ must be considered in the 




Figure 5.13 Dynamic behaviour   ǯ  ȋȌǡ ȋȌǡ  ȋȌ
and add/sold investment (d) with  initial conditions: ܥଵ଴ ൌ  ? ? and ܫଵ଴ ൌ  ? ? with different 
feedback gains equal toߛଵ ൌ  ?Ǥ ? ? ? ? (blue line), ߛଶ ൌ  ?Ǥ ? ? ? ? (red line) and ߛଷ ൌ  ?Ǥ ? ? ? ? 
(yellow line). The positive value in (d) means adding new investment while negative 
value means selling investment. 
5.5.4 Testing results for regime 2  
Controller 1 applied to linear model 3 
As shown in the linearization section, when ૙ ൑ ࡯૚ ൑ ࢘ࡰ૚ the nonlinear model can be 
linearized to linear model 3.  In linear model 3, the open-loop system is marginally 
stable. Thus with no disturbance, the system always comes back to the equilibrium, 
where ܥכ ൌ  ? and ܫכ ൌ  ?. However, this is not a steady state where the bank wants to 
be. Therefore, in this dynamic, the aim of the control is to bring the cash to a desired 
value which is different from the equilibrium. The desired value is chosen to be  ࢘ࡰ૚, 
since this is the minimum value to meet the reserve ratio requirement. The same 
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method will be used as introduced in the previous section to find out a ߛ  for the 
corresponding feedback controller.  
The input distribution  ࡮૚ ൌ ቂ  ?െ ?ቃ is considered first. Root locus analysis has been 
done when ࡮૚ is applied to linear model 3. As shown in figure 5.7 (a3), there always 
exists a  ߛ  that can make both eigenvalues negative. Thus for testing purpose,  ߛ= ?Ǥ ? ? ? ? is selected. The controller now becomes: ݑଵ ൌ ߛݕ ൅ ଵܰതതതݎ௘ ൌ  ?Ǥ ? ? ? ?ݕ ൅ ሺെ ?Ǥ ? ?ሻ ൈ  ? ? 
The results are shown in figure 5.14. The equilibrium point is:ܥכ ൌ  ? and  ܫכ ൌ  ? ,and 
the desired value which controller aims to bring to isܥ௥௘ ൌ  ? ?.  It can be  
 
Figure 5.14 Dynamic behaviour   ǯ  ȋȌǡ ȋȌǡ  ȋȌ
and add/sold investment (d) with initial conditions of cash: ܥଵ଴ ൌ െ ?. The positive value 
in (b) means adding new investment while negative value means selling investment. The 
feedback gain in controller applied in this case is ߛ ൌ  ?Ǥ ? ? ? ?.  
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seen from the figure 5.14 (d) that the first term  ߛݕ ൌ െߛሺܥଵ െ ܥכሻ in ݑଵ  is always 
above zero, which means the bank is adding the investment all the time. This causes 
the cash to decrease to a negative value at a very early time as shown in figure 5.14(b). 
Since the model allows bank to failure, the simulation keeps running and after some 
time the cash comes back up above zero and finally reaches the control reference 
valueܥ௥೐ ൌ  ? ?.  
Theoretically controller 1 can bring the output to the reference value, but in practice, 
the added investment should be limited by the cash, the bank can only invest when 
cash is positive. However, in this simulation, as there is no such limit, the bank still 
adds investment while there is no available cash. This is the reason that the cash goes 
to negative in the simulation. This means in the real situation, the bank does not have 
enough cash to keep adding the investment which the controller is needed. The results 
of using controller 1 do not have physical meanings in the real banking system. Thus, 
the other input distribution  ࡮૛ ൌ ቂെ ? ? ቃ is considered. 
Controller 2 applied to linear model 3 
Figure 5.7 (b3) shows the root locus of the system, in which the input distribution  ࡮૛ ൌ ቂ  ?െ ?ቃ is applied on linear model 3. From the figure, it shows that there always 
exists a positive eigenvalue, as the green trajectory starts at zero and goes to the right 
hand side of the s-plane. This means it is impossible to find out a suitable ߛ that can 
make both of the eigenvalues negative. However, it should be noticed that the scale of 
the eigenvalues is very small (at  ? ?ିହ ). Moreover, if  taking a further look at the 
outputs from the command Ǯ[R,K] = rlocus (SYS)ǯ, the roots values in R are all small 
numbers. This indicates that this one-bank system is a very slow system; even it is not 
stable, its states will not go to infinity within a short time. Therefore, the control 
mechanism can be considered to use in the following way: the controller 2 is applied 
when cash is below the expected value (ܥଵ ൏ ܥ௥೐), and once the cash reaches the target 
(ܥଵ ൌ ܥ௥೐ ൌ  ? ?), the controller is switched off. Though the system is not at the steady 
state, its cash now meets the reserve requirement and the system is in regime 1. As 
explained in section 5.5.3, in regime 1, the controller 1 can then be applied to bring the 
system to a steady state.  
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For the testing purpose,  ɀ ൌ  ? is used in controller 2 and the controller now becomes: ݑଶ ൌ ߛݕ ൅ ଵܰതതതݎ݁ ൌ ݕ ൅ ሺെ ?ሻ ൈ  ? ? 
The simulation results using controller 2 are shown in figure 5.15 (blue line) 
compared to the simulation results without using the controller (red line). The deposit 
is constant and equals to 100 as shown in figure 5.15 (a). The initial value of the cash 
is 10, which is 10 units below the reserve requirement (reserve ratio is 0.2 so reserve 
requirement is 100×0.2=20).  
 
Figure 5.15 Dynamic behaviour ǯȋȌǡȀinvestment (b), total 
investment(c) and cash (d) with initial conditions: ܥଵ଴ ൌ  ? ? and ܫଵ଴ ൌ  ? ? in two cases: 
without controller (red lines) and with controller (blue lines). The positive value in (b) 
means adding new investment while negative value means selling investment. The 
feedback gain in controller applied in this case is ߛ ൌ  ?. 
The red line shows the dynamic when no controller is applied. It can be seen that the 
bank does not sell any investment (red line in figure 5.15(b) equals to zero). The cash 
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increases slowly as bank receives its matured investment,ݓଵܫଵ, and the return of the 
investment,݌ଵܫଵ. As these two parts have very small values, it is difficult to see the 
increase of the cash in the figure 5.15(b). furthermore, it will take a long time for the 
bank to get enough cash to meet the reserve requirement. Letting the cash level stay 
below the reserve requirement is very dangerous for the bank, as the bank has less 
cash to buffer the shock. Therefore, the bank needs to get its cash back to the reserve 
requirement as soon as possible.   
The blue line shows the dynamic when the controller is applied. At the beginning, the 
bank sells 10 units of the investment as shown in figure 5.15 (d) blue line ( the value 
of ߛሺܥଵ െ ܥכሻ  equals to 10 at the beginning). By selling the investment, the bank 
transfers its investment to cash. Therefore, the total investment, ܫଵ, in figure 5.15 (c) 
decreases while the cash , ܥଵ, in figure 5.15(b) increases. After a short time the cash 
reaches to the reserve requirement 20 so the controller is switched off. Therefore, no 
more investment is sold in (d) and no more decrease in total investment in (c).  
It is interesting to take a further look into the net-worth, which is shown in figure 5.16. 
the figure shows the values of net-worth under two cases, one with the controller and 
the other one without the controller. In both cases, the net-worth is increasing. The 
net-worth increases more slowly when the controller applied. The speed at which the 
net-worth increases, depends on the value of  
ௗேభௗ௧ . The smaller the ௗேభௗ௧  is the more 
slowly net-worth increases. According to the equation (5.36), the change of the net-
worth 
ௗேభௗ௧ ൌ െ ݃ଵܦଵ ൅  ݌ଵܫଵ െ ݒଵܫଵ .  When there is no controller applied, the total 
investment,ܫଵ, is decreasing (Since every day there are some matured investment), 
which causes the ݌ଵܫଵ െ ݒଵܫଵ  becomes smaller, while the interest paid to the 
depositors,݃ଵܦଵ , is the same as before. Therefore, ௗேభௗ௧  becomes smaller. When the 
controller is applied, the bank sells investment, which makes the total investment 
decrease more quickly, thus causes 
ௗேభௗ௧  to decrease more quickly. The value of  ௗேభௗ௧  is 
always smaller in the case with the controller than in the case without the controller. 
This indicates that, when the bank is in the dangerous zone, it has to sell some of the 
investment to get enough reserve to safeguard itself from the shock, however, the bank 




Figure 5.16 Dynamic behaviour   ǯ net-worth when  ܥଵ଴ ൌ  ? ? and ܫଵ଴ ൌ  ? ? for 
two case: without controller (red lines) and with controller (blue lines).  
5.5.5 Testing results for regime 3 
In regime 3, the bank is in a state that it is about to fail. In this state, the cash is negative 
because of the shock in the deposit is larger than the current cash. If the bank does not 
take any action at the current time step, the bank will fail in the next time step. 
Therefore, there is a need to apply a possible controller to bring the cash back to 
positive. From the analysis in the last section, controller 1 cannot be used, as at this 
state the bank does not have cash to add more investment. However, controller 2 can 
be used, as at this state the bank still has investment to sell.  
In this state the bank does not add new investment and neither pays the interest to 
depositors, since it is lack of cash. However, it can still get the matured investment and 
the return of the investment back. Therefore, the matrix A in the linear model is the 
same as in the linear model 3. When controller 2 is applied, the root locus plot is the 
same as shown in figure 5.7 (b3). Thus in regime 3, it is impossible to find a ߛ that can 
make the system stable. As explained in the last section, the scale of the eigenvalues is 
very small (at  ? ?ିହ) and the roots values in R are all small numbers. So that the system 
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is a very slow system and even it is not stable, its states will not go to infinity in a very 
short time. Therefore, controller 2 can be applied to get the cash back to zero and then 
switched off. Again for testing, a ߛ ൌ  ? is used in the controller 2. The simulation 
results are shown in figure 5.17. By selling the investment, the bank brings its cash 
from -2 back to 0 within one-day time. 
 
Figure 5.17 Dynamic behaviour ǯȋȌǡȀinvestment (b), total 
investment(c) and cash (d) with initial conditions: ܥଵ଴ ൌ െ ? and ܫଵ଴ ൌ  ? ? with controller. 
The positive value in (b) means adding new investment while negative value means 
selling investment. The feedback gain in controller applied in this case is ߛ ൌ  ?.  
5.5.6 A switched control paradigm 
From the previous sections, it can be seen that the proper feedback gain can be 
selected according to the different system dynamics to make the cash to reach a 
desired value. Figures 5.18 and 5.19 show the simulation results in a case that as the 
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cash of the bank changes, the nonlinear system switches between different regimes 
and the controller switches accordingly.  
 
Figure 5.18 Dynamic behaviour    ? ? ?    ǯ  ȋȌǡ Ȁ
investment (b), total investment(c) and cash (d) with initial conditions: ܥଵ଴ ൌ െ ? ? and ܫଵ଴ ൌ  ? ? where the controller switches when the system enters different regimes.  
The initial conditions of the simulation are: ଵ଴ ൌ െ ? ? and ܫଵ଴ ൌ  ? ?. The aim of the 
control is to bring the cash to a desired value 45. The system starts in regime 3 and the 
controller applied is the one introduced in section 5.5.5Ǣ ǯ
from -15 to 0 within a short time as shown in figure 5.18 (d). Then the system moves 
into regime 2, therefore the controller is switched to the one introduced in section 
5.5.4 which is ݑଶ ൌ ߛݕ ൅ ଵܰതതതݎ௘ ൌ ݕ ൅ ሺെ ?ሻ ൈ  ? ?. By continuing selling investment, the ǯ      e requirement 20. Then the system moves to 
regime 1, in which the controller introduced in section 5.5.3 can be applied. Figure 
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5.19 shows it takes a long time to finally get the system to a steady state with the 
desired cash value. 
 
Figure 5.19 The dynamic behaviour in  ? ?ହ     ǯ  ȋȌǡ Ȁ
investment (b), total investment(c) and cash (d) with initial conditions: ܥଵ଴ ൌ െ ? ? and ܫଵ଴ ൌ  ? ? where the controller switches when the system enter different regimes. 
5.6 Conclusion 
This chapter performs the application of the control theory on the one-bank model. 
The following conclusions can be drawn. 
The equilibrium point analysis has been performed on the one-bank model and three 
equilibrium points are found. The nonlinear model has been linearized around the 
equilibrium points and three linear models are obtained to describe the dynamics of 
the one-bank model. Through the analysis of the eigenvalues of the state matrices in 
the linear models, it can be seen that one equilibrium point is not stable and the other 
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two are marginally stable. Therefore, there is the need to design a controller to keep 
the one-bank model stable. The design of output feedback controllers has been 
proposed in which the proper feedback gain can be selected according to the different 
system dynamics to keep the cash of the bank at a desired value.  
Moreover, the controllers can be switched according to the dynamics of the system. As 
different feedback gains are needed for different system dynamics, therefore, when 
system switches between different dynamics, a single feedback control mechanism 
will not work in all different dynamics. Thus a switched control mechanism is designed, ǯ. Then it can be switched to the 
proper feedback control mechanism for the current dynamic. Furthermore, the 
equilibrium point analysis can give insight from the control perspective of how the 
parameter values ݃ǡ ݓǡ ݒ and ݌ ǯ behaviour, which can be 
evidenced by the simulation results that are represented in subsection 4.4.2. 
Parameters that increase the net-worth of the bank, such as݌ଵ , decrease the state 
variables equilibrium values,ܥଵכ and ܫଵכ, which is beneficial for the bank since it does 
not need to have high cash and investment to stay at the equilibrium point. Those 
parameters, such as ݒଵ  and ݃ଵǡ  that decrease the net-worth, instead, increase the 
equilibrium values,ܥଵכ and ܫଵכ, which is detrimental for the bank.  
The control design and control analysis proposed in this chapter show how a bank can 
sell its assets (investment) to keep itself stable if needed; the proposed analysis show 
the exact amount of assets needed to be sold, according to control laws. This procedure 
can drive the bank back to a steady state after selling the assets properly. The next 
chapter draws conclusions of the whole work presented in this thesis and presents a 





Chapter 6  
 
Conclusions and Future Work 
 
 
This chapter firstly summarises the main results and achievements presented in this 
thesis and then proposes ideas for future work.  
6.1 Summary 
This thesis presents an interdisciplinary research at the interface between economics 
and control engineering which proposes an innovative model and analysis approach 
to study the dynamics of the banking system. The novelty of this Ph.D. project lies in 
the combination of two research methodologies, one from network modelling and the 
other from control theory. The results contribute to new knowledge regarding the 
understanding of the dynamics of the banking system, which can be ultimately used to 
inform financial regulators and operators.  
The following paragraphs in this section summarise all the contributions of the Ph.D. 
project. 
The first contribution of this thesis is the development of a new network model 
describing the banking system. In this dynamic model, the banking system is 
represented as a network where the nodes are individual banks and the links between 
any two banks consist of interbank loans and borrowings. Ordinary differential 
equations are used to describe the dynamic structure of the banking system. To the 
best of our knowledge, it is the first time that ordinary differential equations are used 
to describe ǯȋǤǤ lending, borrowing, 
investment) and the behaviours of other related quantities (e.g. deposits, investment 
opportunities, interest rates). The proposed model has been implemented in a way 
that allows carrying out numerical simulations and accommodating feedback 
mechanisms typical of control theory. 
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The second contribution is the development of Simulink block diagram of the dynamic 
network model. The Simulink implementation facilitates the application of control 
analysis tools, and it allows adding complexity to the system in a visual and modular 
way. MATLAB scripts have been developed to perform the simulations, save and plot 
the results automatically and in a user-friendly manner.  
The third contribution is the insight that the results of numerical simulations provide 
regarding the dynamics of the banking system. On one hand, the simulation results 
confirm findings that have been obtained by network models reported in the 
literature. These findings regard the role played by the reserve ratio and link rate on 
the failure of banks in the system. Specifically, results presented in this thesis show 
that the reserve ratio helps individual banks to survive when there is no interbank 
lending, but when the banks can lend and borrow money from each other, a high 
reserve ratio has a negative effect on the ability of banks to borrow money and 
therefore to survive; the link rate always contributes positively to the survival of 
banks, but there are conditions under which it increases contagion. On the other hand, 
in this thesis, a new approach to quantify contagion  ǯ  has been 
proposed, and simulation results illustrate quantitatively, for the first time, the 
nonlinear effect of link rate and reserve ratio on contagion. The nonlinear effect of the 
link rate emerges when the reserve ratio is low, namely the increase of the link rate 
increases, at first, contagion and then it decreases contagion after crossing a critical 
level. The nonlinear effect of reserve ratio is shown when the link rate is high, in fact, 
contagion, at first, increases and then decreases as the reserve ratio goes from low to 
high values. It can be suggested that these findings can ultimately help financial ǯǤ  
The fourth contribution of this thesis is the application of control theory, in fact, it is 
the first time, to the best of our knowledge, that control theory has been applied to 
assess and preserve the stability of a dynamic model representing the banking system. 
The equilibrium point analysis has been implemented on the one-bank model and 
three equilibrium points have been found. The original nonlinear model has been 
linearized around the equilibrium points and three linear models have been obtained. 
The equilibrium-point analysis gives insight from a control perspective of how many 
different dynamics can emerge in the original nonlinear model. The stability of each 
dynamics has been studied by analysing the eigenvalues of the state matrix of the 
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linear models. Output feedback control mechanisms have been designed in which 
single banks sell their assets to prevent bankruptcy. The novelty of the approach lies 
in the way banks sell their assets; the sale of assets is prescribed by specific control 
mechanisms, which allow a bank to resume and maintain a stable condition. Moreover, 
a switched control mechanism has been proposed to preserve the bank from 
bankruptcy. The switched control mechanism can examine the dynamics of the system 
and it can be switched to a specific feedback gain which is suitable to control the 
dynamics so to avoid failure.  
This thesis shows how the proposed network model based on the ordinary differential 
equations can be used to simulate the dynamics of a complex system such as the 
banking system. The implementation of control theory presented in this work shows 
how feedback control can be used to design an appropriate control mechanism to 
stabilise the dynamics of a bank. This thesis represents a first, but yet important, step 
towards the combination of network models of the banking system with control 
theory; it should be now plausible and desirable to apply control theory to better 
understand the stability of financial systems.       
The work proposed in this Ph.D. project has the following limitations:  
1. The lack of real data and information regarding banking activities. The 
proposed work gives a theoretical framework to model the banking system. 
The signals used in the simulation such as the random shocks in the deposit 
and the investment opportunities may not be realistic in their amplitude, 
duration or frequency. Furthermore, information about the realistic timing of 
bank activities such as investment, borrowing and lending would be beneficial 
for the model. The knowledge of realistic data regarding the size of banks and 
the interconnection between them would be very useful as well. 
2. The proposed        ǯ ǡ e.g. 
dividend to shareholders are not considered, and more realistic ways of 
modelling how investments are made and mature would be beneficial.    
3. Another limitation is that the appropriate values for the feedback gains are 
highly dependent on parameter values, such as ݃ǡ ݓǡ ݒ  and ݌ , therefore the 
knowledge of realistic values of those parameters may help in choosing the 
feedback gains and arguably design more appropriate control mechanisms. 
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The next section presents some ideas that may tackle some of the limitations 
highlighted above. 
6.2 Future research directions 
1. One direction for future work is to look for and use real data characterising ǯmodelling and simulating. The real data could not be used 
in this work because often values reported in the public domain are mainly 
aggregated data [123], which cannot be used for modelling and simulating a 
system based on a network of individual banks. To overcome this problem, one 
solution is to use a maximum entropy method and a minimum-density solution 
to make an estimation of bank assets and liabilities positions. These two 
method can help to fill in blanks of the network structure by using the available    ǯ   Ǥ   
method assumes that banks diversify their exposures by spreading their 
lending and borrowing across all other active banks, while the minimum-
density methods assumes that interbank linkages are costly to add and 
maintain, therefore, it aims to determine a pattern of linkages for allocating 
interbank positions that is efficient in the sense of minimizing these costs. The 
future study can follow the work of Anand et al. [82], in which the maximum 
entropy method are combined with a minimum density method in order to 
define a useful range that bounds the cost of contagion in the true interbank 
network when counterparty exposures are unknown. Another way to solve the 
issue of using real data is to seek the possibility of a joint project with 
researchers of central banks to have the detailed and disaggregated balance 
sheet data of individual banks from the central bank. With these data, 
simulations can be performed by considering a realistic number of banks and 
realistic level of deposit, investment and interbank borrowing of each bank in 
order to better validate the findings of the proposed approach. Moreover, 
another problem of using the aggregated data to validate the proposed model 
is that the data is often monthly or quarterly based, while the proposed model 
is daily based. To overcome this problem statistical methods can be used for 
interpolating data that are not available in a daily frequency. A low-frequency 
series can be considered as a partially observed high-frequency variable. For 
example, in the empirical application, quarterly variables can be treated as 
130 
 
monthly series observed only in the third month of each quarter, i.e. with 
missing data in the first and second month of each quarter. Interpolation 
techniques [124 Ȃ127] ǲǳ
days conditional on the information in the monthly series.  
2. A more systematic study of the effect of the initial conditions on the behaviour 
of the proposed model should be conducted. For example, initial conditions 
could be chosen so that the interbank borrowing and lending have a value 
different from zero at time zero, as for the real situations. Furthermore, 
different patterns of connections, rather than random, can be used, to see how ǯǤ 
3. The proposed dynamic model can be extended to account for other behaviours 
of banks such as liquidity hoarding and fire sales. To include such behaviours, 
the proposed model can be linked to an agent-based model of the security 
market. An agent based model [128] is a computational model which can be 
used to study financial/economic systems [129] as a whole through simulating 
the actions and interactions of autonomous units, known as agents. Following 
the work by Lux and Marchesi [130], an agent based model of the security 
market can be connected with the proposed model, as shown in figure 6.1.  
 
Figure 6-1 the proposed dynamic model with the agent based model.  
The agent based model of the security market would take the information of ǯsale/acquisition of securities (investment), then the agents-traders in 
the security market would compete with each other to maximise their wealth 
by trading securitiesǤǯbehaviour would affect the price of securities, 
and the investment opportunities,݋݌݌, in the market. The information of the 
security prices and investment opportunities would feedback into the banking 
system and the banksǯ
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ǯ. When the market becomes volatile, the agents may 
change their trading strategies, causing the change of the price of securities 
and ݋݌݌ , which will feedback into the proposed model. This loop between 
banks and market could ultimately cause liquidity hoarding and fire sales.  
4. Another extension of the model could be to add a central bank into the network 
as a node that is linked to all the other banks in the system. New differential ǯǤ	ǡ
the central bank could accumulate deposits from the banks that have extra 
cash and then loan them to the banks that are in need of cash. The central bank 
could change the reserve ratio, ݎ , and the basic lending interest rate, ݄଴ , 
according to the current dynamics of the system. This modelling framework 
could be a useful tool test the effects of the implementations of different 
regulatory policies by the central bank. 
5. More advanced control theory tools could be applied to the proposed dynamic 
model in the future. There are many financial problems 13  that have been 
studied using stochastic optimal control [131Ȃ 136], which aims to design the 
controllers to complete the desired control task with minimum cost. This could 
be applied as a mechanism used by a bank in the model, acting as a central 
bank, to find the optimal policies to stabilise the system. As the banking system 
is highly nonlinear, the control tools applied should also be able to deal with 
nonlinear systems. Two types of methods of solving nonlinear optimal control 
problems can be found in the literature: the first type contains direct methods, 
converts the problem into a nonlinear programming by using the 
discretization or parameterization techniques [137], while the second one 
contains indirect methods and leads to the HamiltonȂJacobiȂBellman (HJB) 
equation, on the basis of dynamic programming [138, 139], or nonlinear two-    ȋȌǡ      e
maximum principle [140]. Results in many recent works [141 Ȃ 143] show the 
control algorithms are quite efficient and is well suited for solving nonlinear 
optimal control problems, which can be considered to be applied in the future 
work. 
                                                             




6. In the real world, the network structure of the banking system can change with 
time in an unpredictable way [144]; this can generate uncertainties in the 
number of links between the banks, which should be taken into consideration 
when modelling the system. Other uncertainties can be introduced by the lack 
of precise values of parameters in the model. Moreover, the dynamics of large 
scale interconnected systems (e.g. the banking system) are usually highly 
nonlinear. It is not only the structure of the system which produces complexity 
but also the nonlinearity of the dynamics. The study of a network with a simple 
linear dynamics does not permit the existence of the multiple states observed 
in real networks and does not accommodate global properties of the system. 
Therefore, the nonlinear systems control theory is needed for the study of the 
uncertainty and the nonlinearity of the interconnected banking system. 
Control tools, such as decentralized feedback control and sliding mode control, 
have received much attention in the literature due to their capacity to deal 
with uncertainties, in nonlinear scenarios14. Work by Yan et al. [153 Ȃ 157] 
proposed constructive frameworks to implement decentralised output 
feedback control strategies based on sliding mode techniques; this work 
encompasses nonlinear system representations, uncertainty and unknown 
perturbations as well as limited available information in the framework. 
Moreover, it is important to note that delays usually exist in the banking 
system due to information transfer [158]; most recent works in the area of 
control for time-delay interconnected systems in [159 Ȃ 164] could be applied 
to deal with the time-delay issues in the banking system. In the work by Yan et 
al. [162], a class of nonlinear interconnected systems with time-varying delays 
is considered, where the time delay appears not only in isolated subsystems, 
but also in the interconnections. A decentralised static output feedback control 
strategy is proposed in Yan et al. [162] to drive the system to exhibit desirable 
dynamics, which could also be applied to the model of the banking system to 
study and control its stability.  This could be an interesting topic for future 
work. 
  
                                                             
14 Works of decentralized output feedback control can be found in [145 Ȃ 147] ; works of sliding 
mode control can be found in [148 Ȃ 152]. 
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Appendix 1: Script for one-bank 
model simulation 
 
All the codes and scripts for the different models and the application of control 
analysis can be found in:   
https://drive.google.com/open?id=0BzCTFEKfyl8tSzhOckZMNTJCOUE 
The following script assigns the initial conditions, parameter values and other 
information to run the simulations for the one-bank model. 
 
%***************************************************************** 
clear all;close all; 
%Parameter settings of one_bank model simulation 
p1=0/100/360; %investment return rate 
w1=0/100/360; %proportion of the total investment that matured 
v1=0/100/360; %proportion of the total investment that failed 
g1=0/100/360; %deposit interest rate 
r=0.2;        %reserve ratio 
  
t=10;tt=0:1:t;%simulation time 
step=0.1;     %step size 
  









C10=0.25;     %total cash       
I10=0.75;     %total investment 
x0=[C10;I10]; 







Appendix 2: Script and function for 
two-bank model simulation 
 
The following script assigns the initial conditions, parameter values and other 
information to run the simulations for the two-bank model. 
 
%************************************************************ 
clear all;close all; 
%Parameter settings of two_bank model simulation 
p1=0/100/360; %investment return rate of bank1 
p2=0/100/360; %investment return rate of bank2 
w1=0/100/360; %proportion of the total investment that matured of 
bank1 
w2=0/100/360; %proportion of the total investment that matured 
v1=0/100/360; %proportion of the total investment that failed of 
bank1 
v2=0/100/360; %proportion of the total investment that failed 
r=0.2;        %reserve ratio 
g1=0/100/360; %deposit interest rate of bank1 
g2=0/100/360; %deposit interest rate 
alpha1=1;     %proportion of the borrowing bank1 repays to bank2 
alpha2=1;     %proportion of the borrowing bank2 repays to bank1 
h12=1/100/360;%interest rate of borrowing bank1 repays to bank2 
h21=1/100/360;%interest rate of borrowing bank2 repays to bank1 
 
t=10; tt=0:1:t;%simulation time 
step=0.1; %step size 
 
%Generate exogenous signal 
D10=1;D20=1; 
Deposit1=[tt' [D10*ones(4,1);(D10-0.2)*ones(2,1);(D10-
0.21)*ones(3,1);D10*ones(t-8,1)]];% Deposit of bank1 
Deposit2=[tt' [D20*ones(6,1);(D20-0.24)*ones(2,1);D20*ones(t-
7,1)]];% Deposit of bank2 
  
opp10=1;opp20=0.01; 
Opp1=[tt' opp10*ones(t+1,1)];%Investment opportunity of bank1 
Opp2=[tt' opp20*ones(t+1,1)];%Investment opportunity of bank1 
  
C10=0.25;C20=0.3;%Initial cash of bank1 and bank2 
I10=0.75;I20=0.5;%Initial investment of bank1 and bank2 
B10=0;B20=0;     %Initial borrowing of bank1 and bank2 
  
x0=[C10;I10;B10;B20;C20;I20];%summary of initial conditions 



















































































Appendix 3: Scripts and function for 
multi-bank model simulation 
 





%function solve the differencial equations 
%input: the total number of the deposit, cash, 
investment,state(survive or failed) 
%borrow(matrix&vector), lend(matrix&vector), investment opp, link 
%w,v,g,p,r,a,b,c,basic interest rate, alpha 
  
%output: the change of the cash,investment,borrow(matrix&vector), 
lend(matrix&vector), 
%link,state(survive or failed) 
  
%split the x to total cash,investment,borrowing,lenidng, net worth 
C=x(1,:);%C is a 1*N 
I=x(2,:);%I is a 1*N 
B=x(3,:); 
Net=x(5,:); 
Bto_detail=BL;% BL is a N*N 
N=length(C);%N is the number of the banks 
  
%Bank experience shock, pay depositor interest, receive investment 
return 
C1= C+Ddot-g.*D+p.*I;%total cash 
%=================================================================
======== 
%interest rate of lending 
frate=zeros(N,N); 
interest=zeros(N,N); 
for j=1:N;%borrowing bank 
    for i=1:N;%lending bank 
        if Csur(1,i)==0 || Csur(1,j)==0 || i==j; 
            frate(i,j)=0; 
            interest(i,j)=dBasic(1,j); 
        else 
            frate(i,j)= a(1,i)*1/((exp((B(1,j)/C1(1,i)-
c(1,i))*b(1,i))+1)); 
            interest(i,j)=frate(i,j)+dBasic(1,i); 
        end 
    end 
end 




for jj=1:N;%borrowing bank 
    for ii=1:N;%lending bank 
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    Bre_detail(ii,jj)=min(max(C2(ii)-
D(ii)*r,0),alpha(ii)*Bto_detail(ii,jj)); 
    %Bto_detail(ii,jj) represent total borrowing bank i borrows 
form bank j 
    Breinterest(ii,jj)=interest(ii,jj).*Bto_detail(ii,jj); 
    C2(ii)=C2(ii)+Bre_detail(ii,jj)+Breinterest(ii,jj);%update 
borrowing bank's cash 
    C2(jj)=C2(jj)-Bre_detail(ii,jj)-Breinterest(ii,jj);%update 
lending bank's cash 






%calculate the protencial borrowing and lending 
pborrows=max(r.*(D-Ddot)-C2,0);%1*N 
plends=max(C2-r.*(D-Ddot),0);%1*N 
%calculate the lending and borrowing betwwen every two banks 
NN=linspace(1,N,N); 
number=NN';%the index of the banks (N*1) 
  
%prepare the matrixs 
pborrow = [number pborrows' Net'];%borrowing matrix with networth 
information 
plend = [number plends' interest']; %add interest information to 
the leniding matrix  
%find the size for borrow and lend banks 
LL=sortrows(plend,-2); 
BB=sortrows(pborrow,-2); 
nl=length(nonzeros(LL(:,2)));%number of lending banks 
nb=length(nonzeros(BB(:,2)));%unmber of borrowing banks 
Pborrow=sortrows(BB(1:nb,:),-3);%borrowing banks with net-worth 
PPlend=sortrows(LL(1:nl,:),1); %lending banks  
Pborrow2=Pborrow;%borrowing banks with net-worth 
PPlend2=PPlend; %lending banks  
  
%start to calculate 
B_detail=zeros(N,N);%create an empty matrix for borrowing value 
 for j=1:nb;%borrowing bank 
      for i=1:nl;%lending bank 
      PPlend2=sortrows(PPlend2,(2+Pborrow2(j,1)));%lending banks 
with interest rates 
      %calculate the borrowing for each bank 
       if link(Pborrow2(j,1),PPlend2(i,1))==0 %|| 
Pborrow(j,2)>sum(PPlend(:,2)); 
       B_detail(PPlend2(i,1),Pborrow2(j,1))=0; 
       else 
       
B_detail(PPlend2(i,1),Pborrow2(j,1))=min(Pborrow2(j,2),PPlend2(i,2
)); 
       end 
       %after borrowing decide whether the bank is failed 
       if sum(B_detail(:,j))<sum(Pborrow2(j,2))%if bank doesnt get 
enough 
           B_detail(:,j)=zeros(N,1);%then borrowing not happen 
           Bre_detail(:,j)=zeros(N,1);%repayment not happen 
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           Breinterest(:,j)=zeros(N,1); 
           C2(ii)=C(ii);%update borrowing bank's cash 
           C2(jj)=C(jj);%update lending bank's cash 
           PPlend2(i,2)=PPlend(i,2);%lending bank's cash update 
           Pborrow2(j,2)=Pborrow(j,2); 
       else 
           PPlend2(i,2)=PPlend2(i,2)-
B_detail(PPlend2(i,1),Pborrow2(j,1)); 
           Pborrow2(j,2)=Pborrow2(j,2)-
B_detail(PPlend2(i,1),Pborrow2(j,1)); 
       end 
      end 
 end 
%create the LINTEREST,BINTEREST 
Badd_sum=sum(B_detail);%added borrowing details 
Ladd_sum=sum((B_detail')); 














    if C3(1,nn)>0  
       index(1,nn)=1; 
       inv_liqui1=inv_liqui1+0; 
    else 
        index(1,nn)=0; 
        inv_liqui1=inv_liqui1+max(left_invest(1,nn),0); 





Ddot=Ddot.*Csur;%set deposit of previous failed banks to zeros 
  
if survive_num~=0 




















%create the index of survial and failed banks 
CfCsur=C3-Idot-v.*I+inv_liqui; 
 
The codes of running the simulation 
TEST.m 
%This is the file that run the simulation, it includes many sub 
srcipts 
clear all;close all; 
set_testing_parameters;%this is the file in which parameter values 
are set 
main_simulation;%this is the file run and save all the simulations 
reults 
clear all;close all; 
set_testing_parameters; 
take_average;%this is the file calculate the average of 
simulations reults 
plot_results;%this is the file plots all the results 
 
set_testing_parameters.m 
%This is the file that set the simulation time, repeat 
time,testing period, number of banks,link rate 
%values and reserve ratios 
T=10;%the repeated time of the simulation 
%the value of reserve ratio used for testing 
reserve_m_1={'01', '02', '03','04','05','06','07'}; 
reserve_m=[0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7]; 
R_length=length(reserve_m); 
%the values of link rate used for testing 
link_m_1={'0','015','035','05','065','085','1'}; 
link_m=[0 0.15 0.35 0.5 0.65 0.85 1]; 
L_length=length(link_m); 
N=50;%Number of the bank 




%This is the file run all the simulations 
for i=1:T;% repeat time 
    T_1=num2str(i); 
    NameT=strcat('time',T_1); 
    mkdir(NameT); 
    Dvan=0.7;%the shock amplitude 
    bankdata;%generate other parameters and intial conditions 
    for j=1:R_length;%different reserve ratio 
        for jj=1:L_length;%different link rate 
152 
 
        
Name=strcat('Multibank_borrow_repay','reserve',reserve_m_1{j},'lin
k',link_m_1{jj}); 
        reserve=reserve_m(:,j); 
        linkrate=link_m(:,jj); 
        createlink;%create the link matrix 
        sim('Multibank_borrow_repay'); 
        ii;%take out the needed results 
        save(Name);%save the results 
        Name_1=strcat(Name,'.mat'); 
        ppr;%summary the results of different links but same 
reserve ratio 
        movefile(Name_1,NameT); 
        end 
        NameRE=strcat('re',reserve_m_1{:,j},'_',T_1); 
        save(NameRE); 


















    for iiii=1:N; 
     deposit_c(jjjj,iiii) = Dvan*Dbar*RandD(jjjj,iiii);%Model B 
     deposit(jjjj,iiii)=deposit(jjjj,iiii)+deposit_c(jjjj,iiii); 





rho=0.3; %0<rho<1, maximun propertion of the depsoit 
Ibar = rho*Dbar; 




   for iiii=1:N; 
investopp(jjjj,iiii) = abs(Ibar +Ivan*Ibar*Rand1(jjjj,iiii)); 
   end 
end 
Investopp=[0 Ibar*ones(1,N);tt' investopp]; 
%~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ 
w=[TT 0.18*ones(t+1,N)];%proportion of the matured investment 
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dBasic = [TT 1/100/360*ones(t+1,N)];%lending/borrowing interesr 
rate 
p = [TT 5/100/360*ones(t+1,N)];%investment return rate 
v=[TT 1*p(:,2:N+1)-0*p(:,2:N+1)];%investment faluire rate 
g = [TT 2/100/360*ones(t+1,N)];%deposit interest rate 











%Flucration of the lending interest rate function parameters 
a = [TT 0.5/100/360*ones(t+1,N)]; 
b = [TT -50*ones(t+1,N)]; 





%Define the link matrix 
link=zeros(N,N); x=rand(N,N);  
for iii =1:N; 
    for jjj=iii:N; 
        if x(iii,jjj)<=linkrate && iii~=jjj; 
            link(iii,jjj) = 1; 
        else link(iii,jjj) = 0; 
        end 
        link(jjj,iii)=link(iii,jjj); 





































%This is the file rearrange and process the results 


















%Index for the bank 
for i=1:N; 
%Transfer the results to matrix 
for x =1:tt; 
    INDEX(x,i)=index(1,i,x); 
    Cash1(x,i) = Cashtotal1(1,i,x); 
    Networth1(x,i) = Networth(1,i,x); 
    Deposittotal1(x,i)=Deposittotal(1,i,x); 
    Investtotal1(x,i) = Investtotal(1,i,x); 
    Investadd1(x,i) = Investadd(1,i,x); 
    Investback1(x,i) = Investback(1,i,x); 
    Investfail1(x,i) = Investfail(1,i,x); 
    Borrowtotal1(x,i) = Borrowtotal(1,i,x); 
    Lendtotal1(x,i) = Lendtotal(1,i,x); 
    Borrowadd1(x,i) = Borrowadd(1,i,x); 
    Lendadd1(x,i) = Lendadd(1,i,x); 
    Borrowrepay1(x,i) = Borrowrepay(1,i,x); 









    for ji=2:t/step+1; 
        if INDEX(ji,i)-INDEX(ji-1,i)==-1; 
            INDEX1(ji,i)=1; 
        else INDEX1(ji,i)=0; 
        end 
    end 
end 
ind = find(INDEX1==1); 
[Time,INDEX2] = ind2sub(size(INDEX1),ind); 
INDEX3= sortrows([Time INDEX2],1);%find the order that banks 
failed 
A=LENDADD-LENDREPAY; %at final date the unpaid loan 
AA=Lendadd1-Lendrepay1;%upaid loan at each time point 
aaa = AA; 




%calculate the percentage that failed banks has upaid loans 
le=zeros(length(Time),1); 
for ji=1:length(Time) 
    if aaa(t,INDEX3(ji,2))>0 
        le(ji,1)=1; 
    else 
        le(ji,1)=0; 





%calulate the extent of the effect from upaid loans 






    for ji=1:N; 
if loanvscash(i,ji)<1 
    loanvscash1(i,ji)=0; 
else loanvscash1(i,ji)=1; 
end 







































































    for ji=1:N; 
        for i=1:N; 
        if INDEX(x,i)==1 && INDEX(x,ji)==1 && i~=ji; 
            LINK1(i,ji,x)=1; 
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        else LINK1(i,ji,x)=0; 
        end 
        end 





for x =1:tt; 




%calculate the number of failed banks at each time step 
failnumber=zeros(t/step,1); 
for i=2:t/step 
    failnumber(i,:)= survivalnumber(i-1,:)-survivalnumber(i,:); 
end 
%calculate the first defalut time 
[row,col] = find(failnumber); 
if numel(row)==0; 
    firstfailtime=t/step; 
    secondfailtime=t/step; 
elseif numel(row)==1; 
    firstfailtime=row(1,1); 
    secondfailtime=t/step; 
else 
    firstfailtime=row(1,1); 





Appendix 4: Additional Simulation 
results 
 
This Appendix shows additional simulation results that support the conclusions in 
Chapter 4. 
1. Effect of reserve ratio and link rate on number of survival banks 
Figure A.1 reports how the number of survival banks changes with a low aptitude, ߪ஽ ൌ  ?Ǥ ? ?ǡ of  shocks in the deposits.  
 
A. 1 Number of survival banks in the homogeneous case with ߪ஽ ൌ  ?Ǥ ? ?ǡ ߪ௢௣௣ ൌ  ?Ǥ ? with 
different reserve ratios, ݎ =0.1 (dark blue line), ݎ =0.13(light red line), ݎ =0.17 (yellow 
line), ݎ =0.2 (purple line), ݎ =0.23 (green line), ݎ =0.3 (light blue line), ݎ =0.4 (dark red 
line), and under different link rates, ݈௥ =0 (a), ݈௥ =0.04 (b), ݈௥  =0.06 (c), 




2. Lending interest rate as a function of link rate and reserve ratio 
Figure A.2 reports how the average lending interest rate of all survival banks is 
affected by different reserve ratios and link rates when ߪ஽= 0.3. Figure A.2(a) reports 
the results corresponding to ݈௥= 0;  since there is no interbank lending, the average 
interest rate stays at the basic rate level. As the link rate increases to 0.15,0.5 and 1, as 
shown in figure A.2(b), (c) and (d) respectively, the average lending interest rate 
increases due to more borrowing and lending happen between banks. As the reserve 
ratio increases, the average interest rate decreases, which indicates that high reserve 
ratio prevent the banks from lending, thus the banks become less active in the 
interbank market. 
 
A. 2 Average lending interest rate of all survival banks in the homogeneous case with ߪ஽ ൌ  ?Ǥ ?ǡ ߪ௢௣௣ ൌ  ?Ǥ ? with different reserve ratios, ݎ =0.1 (dark blue line), ݎ =0.2(light red 
line), ݎ =0.3 (yellow line), ݎ =0.4 (purple line), ݎ =0.5 (green line), ݎ =0.6 (light blue line), ݎ =0.7 (dark red line), and under different link rates , ݈௥= 0 (a), ݈௥= 0.15 (b), ݈௥  = 0.5 (c), 




3. Net-worth as a function of link rate and reserve ratio 
Figure A.3 shows how the average lending interest rate of all survival banks is affected 
by different reserve ratios and link rates when ߪ஽ = 0.3. Figure A.3(a) reports the 
results when ݈௥= 0; this figure shows that when there is no interbank lending, as the 
reserve ratio increases, more net-worth is generated at the end of the simulation 
period. However, when the link rate increases as shown in figures A.3 (b) (c) and (d), 
an increase in the reserve ratio causes a decrease in the total net-worth. This result 
shows similarities in the effect of the reserve ratio and link rate on the average lending 
interest rate as in simulation results 1 in Section 4.4.2.  
 
A. 3 Total net-worth of all banks in the homogeneous case with ߪ஽ ൌ  ?Ǥ ?ǡ ߪ௢௣௣ ൌ  ?Ǥ ? 
with different reserve ratios, ݎ =0.1 (dark blue line), ݎ =0.2(light red line), ݎ =0.3 
(yellow line), ݎ =0.4 (purple line), ݎ =0.5 (green line), ݎ =0.6 (light blue line), ݎ =0.7 
(dark red line), and under different link rates, ݈௥= 0 (a), ݈௥= 0.15 (b), ݈௥  = 0.5 (c), 
 ݈௥= 1 (d). 
 
 
